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Peano’s axioms for arithmetic, published in 1889, are ubiquitously cited
in writings on modern axiomatics, and his Formulario is often quoted as
the precursor of Russell’s Principia Mathematica. Yet, a comprehensive
historical and philosophical evaluation of the contributions of the Peano
School to mathematics, logic, and the foundation of mathematics remains to
be made. In line with increased interest in the philosophy of mathematics
for the investigation of mathematical practices, this thematic issue adds
some contributions to a possible reconstruction of the philosophical views
of the Peano School. These derive from logical, mathematical, linguistic,
and educational works1, and also interactions with contemporary scholars in
Italy and abroad (Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Bernays, Wilson,
Amaldi, Enriques, Veronese, Vivanti and Bettazzi).
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 3–14.
1. The published and unpublished writings of Peano are collected in [Roero 2008].
An English anthology of Peano’s texts is [Peano 1973]. For a rich literature on Peano
and other members of his school see in particular [Luciano 2017]. A complete list
of Padoa’s writings can be found in [Cantù 2007]. The publications of Vailati and a
rich literature on his life and works are listed in the introduction to [Arrighi, Cantù
et al. 2009]. On Pieri see in particular the references quoted in [Marchisotto & Smith
2007]. On Burali-Forti see the references added to [Burali-Forti 1919].
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1 The Peano School
It is debatable whether the group can be classified as a “scientific school” with
an exhaustive list of all its members. The category of a mathematical research
school, explored in its distinctions and national features by David Rowe
[Rowe 2002], has recently been opposed to the category of a mathematical
tradition. According to José Ferreirós a mathematical research school is “a
group led normally by only one mathematician, localized within a single
institutional setting and which counts on a significant supply of advanced
students”, whereas a mathematical tradition “implies that one can find a
common research orientation in different actors that do not share a common
institutional site, but are linked by traceable influences on each other”
[Ferreirós 1999, xxii–xxiii]. To settle the question whether the Peano group
should be considered as a research school or as a mathematical tradition, we
first need to deconstruct several clichés from the literature and clarify the
nature of Peano’s leadership, the circulation of knowledge within the Peano
School, and the role of other collective enterprises beside the Formulario (e.g.,
the Rivista di Matematica, the journal Schola et Vita, the Dizionario, as well
as other contemporary articles and teaching materials). Original contributions
have recently been based on the exploitation of new archival sources. These
include the discovery of new previously unmentioned collaborators, the
distinction of different levels of decision-making in Peano’s editing process
for the Formulario, and new insights into the original contributions of each
member to shared knowledge in the group [Luciano 2017].
2 Philosophical interest
The Peano School is generally considered to be a phenomenon that suddenly
appeared in all its splendour at the Paris congress of 1900 and then was
extinguished like a firework that leaves a vivid but indefinite memory. Given
the long-lasting impression made on Russell and other participants in the
1900 Paris Conferences in Mathematics, Philosophy and Psychology by the
contributions of Peano, Burali-Forti, Padoa, Pieri, and Vailati, literature
on the subject has often sought to find reasons to explain a general loss of
philosophical interest in the Peano school in the first half of the 20th century.
General explanations abound thereon and include: the non-academic nature of
the group; the multiform topics of interest ranging from mathematical analysis
to geometry, from linguistics to universal languages, and from philosophical
pragmatism to logicism [Roero 2010], [Skof 2011], [Kennedy 2002]; the fact
that scarce attention has been given to the transformation of mathematics
and to the development of set theory after 1910 [Quine 1987]; a general belief
that Peano was not really interested in the theory of inferential reasoning, or
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in the metalogical and metamathematical investigation of the properties of
axiomatic theories [van Heijenoort 1967].
Other philosophical explanations have also been suggested: Peano’s
utilitarian approach to logic [Grattan-Guinness 2000] and symbolic notation
[Bellucci, Moktefi et al. 2018]; the lack of a shared and explicit epistemological
framework for relevant logical and methodological issues such as functions
[Luciano 2017], [Cantù 2021], logical identities [Cantù 2007], definitions by
abstraction [Mancosu 2018], and questions of purity [Arana & Mancosu
2012]; a subdivision of labour that led to Giovanni Vailati in Italy [Arrighi,
Cantù et al. 2009] and Louis Couturat in France [Luciano & Roero 2005]
becoming the chief philosophical spokesmen of the group; the belief that
Peano’s presentation of arithmetical axioms had less interesting philosophical
implications with respect to logicism and structuralism than that of Dedekind
[Ferreirós 2005]; the interest of Peano’s collaborators in pedagogical and
political issues [Giacardi 2006], [Luciano 2012].
The topic is reconsidered in a new light in this special issue, as the authors
discuss the relationship between Dedekind’s and Peano’s axioms (Kahle, this
volume), or the absence of the universal quantifier among the primitive
symbols of Peano’s Formulario and its relation to the use of free variables
(von Plato, this volume). Other subjects covered are the peculiarities of
Peano’s symbolic notation (Schlimm, this volume) and differences with respect
to Frege’s (Betran-San Millán, this volume), the lack of recognition of Pieri’s
pedagogical remarks in Italy (Marchisotto & Millán Gasca, this volume), the
early association in the USA with Russell’s point of view (Lolli, this volume),
the interaction between Peano’s auxiliary international language project and
the internationalization movement at the beginning of the century (Aray,
this volume), and finally the limits of Peano’s proof of the impossibility of
infinitesimals (Freguglia, this volume).
3 Logic and epistemology
Some of the usual explanations have lost a degree of effectiveness, because of
new specific results, and also because of the interdisciplinary and practical turn
suggested by the intertwining of logic and epistemology. In this context, the
latter is taken to mean both the analysis of scientific knowledge and the critique
of scientific theories, as in neo-Latin languages. This perspective constituted
the red thread of an international project (PICS INTEREPISTEME 2018-
2020) co-funded by the French National Center for Scientific Research and
the Vienna Circle Institute and co-directed by Paola Cantù and Georg
Schiemer in collaboration with Erika Luciano at the University of Turin. The
objective was to compare three distinct collaborative and interdisciplinary
epistemologies developed by the members of the Peano School, the editorial
board of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, and the Vienna Circle.
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The project showed various points of connection between collaborative and
interdisciplinary approaches and educational and political aims, such as the
vulgarization of scientific knowledge, and the criticism of disciplinary and
national boundaries. However, it focused on the origins and development
of non-mainstream philosophical views that cannot be reduced to logicism
or structuralism, and investigated the underestimated influence of Leibniz’s
philosophy [Luciano 2006], [Cantù 2014], 19th century positivism, empiricism,
and neo-criticism on these standard views in philosophy of mathematics [Cantù
& Schiemer forthcoming].
The specificity of the School’s research programme was only partially
received because of a misunderstanding of the deep relation between education,
linguistics, and axiomatics, and also a simplistic association of Peano’s ideas
with Russell’s philosophy. This tendency emerged in van Heijenoort’s remarks
on the lack of inference rules and metatheoretical investigations, or in the
quick tendency to classify Peano as a logicist but in fact was already evident
in the early reception of Peano in the USA. Gabriele Lolli shows how the
works of the Peano’s School had already been discussed by Edwin B. Wilson
in 1904 in a review of two pieces of writing by Bertrand Russell, which
contributed to the two conceptions being eventually combined as “the Peano-
Russell point of view”.
The ability to discriminate subtle differences between the positions of
Russell, Frege and Peano characterized a fine reader of Peano’s work: Kurt
Gödel. The philosophical notebooks (Max Phil) reveal a deep understanding
of differences on the notions of function and definite description [Crocco,
Van Atten et al. 2017], [Cantù 2016a]. The summary of the Formulario to be
found in one of his Excerptenhefte shows the analysis of the rules of inferences
used in deductive chains. The accurate summary of Peano’s Arithmetices
Principia written in Gabelsberger shorthand on a loose sheet of paper when
Gödel was preparing the article on Russell’s logic (early 1943) has been edited
by Jan von Plato for this special issue. It clearly shows that Gödel read not
only the Formulario [Peano 1895], but also the Arithmetices Principia [Peano
1889], focusing his comments on the formal character of proofs.
4 The implicit philosophy within Peano
School’s practices
The attention paid to mathematical practices has shown that Peano had a
strong impact on the writings of Frege, Russell, Carnap and Gödel, and
also developed a proper philosophical view that emerged from the logical
investigation of definitions, the logical interpretation of the symbols of a formal
language, the distinction between relations and functions, and the difference
between primitive and derived terms or propositions in an axiomatic system.
Peano’s philosophical views is distinct from both logicism and structuralism
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and emerges as a result of a joint investigation of logic, language and math-
ematics, considered both as theoretical and didactic practices. The interest
in definitions and the analysis of language had significant effects on Peano’s
semantics, which differs from what is usually described as conceptualist (or
as a three-level: words/ concepts/ objects) semantics because symbols refer
to concepts only through the mediation of language. In the same way as
dictionary entries that only get meaning when inserted into a given linguistic
context, the symbols’ meaning can only be determined through a preliminary
substitution with linguistic sentences in each of which the symbols refer to
the concepts expressed by the corresponding words in ordinary mathematical
language [Cantù 2021].
This volume constitutes a further decisive step towards the reconstruction
of Peano’s philosophical views from a detailed analysis of logical, mathe-
matical, pedagogical and also linguistic practices. The essays gathered here
focus on the works of Giuseppe Peano, Alessandro Padoa and Mario Pieri,
but the same method could be fruitfully applied to other members of the
school, such as Giovanni Vailati [Arrighi, Cantù et al. 2009], Cesare Burali-
Forti and Alessandro Padoa. The contributions of Peano and other members
of the school are also evaluated by comparison with contemporaries (Richard
Dedekind, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, David Hilbert and Paul Bernays),
resulting in a historically accurate analysis of some subtle but fundamental
differences between their respective projects which aimed to present, analyze
or ground mathematics as a rigorous, deductive science.
Three examples will be briefly mentioned in this introduction: axiomatics,
linguistic symbolization and rigour. Different terms are often used to
characterize the school’s foundational enterprise: symbolization, formalization,
axiomatization, reduction. A deep investigation of the Peano school’s practices
might help disentangle some of the differences between these fundamental no-
tions, and shed new light on different ways to conceive generality, ideography,
metatheoretical inquiries, and the role of notation, intuition, and rigor.
5 Axiomatics
General philosophical and historical reconstructions of the development of logic
in the early 20th century have accustomed us to think of Peano as one of the
fathers of modern axiomatics because of his contribution to the formulation of
the axioms of arithmetic, which still bear his name. Yet, a detailed analysis
of the connections between logical, linguistic, mathematical and pedagogic
writings of the Peano School might help re-evaluate his contributions to logic
and philosophy of mathematics and discover a specific approach to axiomatics.
An axiomatization is a particular kind of presentation of a theory, in which
the logical and the mathematical content is specified by the respective axioms.
Reinhard Kahle’s contribution traces a history of the formulation of the
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properties of real numbers, considered as Sätze by Dedekind and explicitly
formulated as axioms by Peano, acquiring a non-logical nature in Hilbert’s
works and a first-order formulation in Bernay’s contributions. This is a
historically fruitful example of how the investigation of different uses and
presentations of the same mathematical properties of numbers can reveal very
different conceptions of the axiomatization of arithmetic.
Yet, axiomatics cannot be reduced to the investigation of the axiomatic
formulation of single theories. It is a back-and-forth process between the
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic-linguistic levels and their goals: 1) to make
the implicit assumptions of a theory explicit (e.g., by stating all the hypotheses
necessary to prove a given theorem); 2) to investigate the tacit assumptions
of a theory, considering what happens if they are not implicitly assumed (e.g.,
by testing the possibility of creating non-standard models of a theory); 3) to
define the scope and goals of a research programme or discipline [Woodger
1959]. Linguistic analysis is a pillar of Peano’s approach, and cannot be
dissociated from epistemological goals, such as the search for good order
and the minimal number of concepts, and the questioning of the relation
between mathematical practices and a rigourous mathematical language. Far
from being exclusively aimed at the construction of axiomatic systems or
the investigation of deductive inferences, the symbolization of logic rests on
questions very similar to those that have developed in the social sciences: the
need to distinguish the simple from the complex, the first for us from the first
for itself, a canonical form from deviant forms, the definition of a term from
the formation of a concept, the pragmatic consequences of a hypothesis from
its theoretical role [Cantù 2020].
Axiomatics relies heavily on complex practices of symbolization and
formalization, which have a social and interactive nature, and that should
be studied in their different components: phases of redaction (study of the
pertaining bibliography, construction of a hypothetic-deductive order of the
collected results, codification in symbols), division of the tasks among group
members, circulation of knowledge within the group in a hierarchical or peer
context, and the construction of domains of shared knowledge, that do not
need to be mirrored in the final version of publications [Luciano 2017].
6 Symbolization and language
Symbolization is a process that associates symbols to words, but symbols
can play the role of schematic letters, as in Hilbert’s formalization, i.e., as
terms having a merely formal sense that allows for a variety of interpretations,
or have a substantive role, as terms whose meanings have to be conveyed
by elucidation [Klev 2011]. Bertran-San Millán’s contribution explains how
Frege used the symbols of arithmetic as canonical names, i.e., as symbols
with a specific and fixed meaning, so that mathematical letters always have
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a specific domain, determined by the intended application. Peano shared
a similar substantive understanding of mathematical symbols in his early
writings but moved towards a view of undefined symbols as uninterpreted
non-logical constants devoid of meaning, when he investigated metatheoretical
questions concerning the independence of the axioms with Padoa.
The comparative investigation of logic, linguistics and notational practices
offer further insights into the particular version of ideography that is developed
in the Formulario. In this, symbols mean ideas but are first introduced
as names for terms of an interpreted mathematical language having those
ideas as meaning, and then also considered as schematic variables that might
receive different interpretations by substitution of different linguistic terms.
The relation between mathematical symbols, words of mathematical language,
mathematical concepts and mathematical objects has a complex history that
a comparative investigation of Peano’s contributions to logics, mathematics,
linguistics, and symbolic notation might help unravel.
The symbolization of mathematics is often discussed in the light of a
reduction of mathematics to logic or as a translation that preserves the relevant
mathematical meaning. However, it cannot be fully understood without a
detailed investigation of the design principles and the didactical and practical
constraints that accompany the search for technical symbols in a new notation.
The formalization is a way to distinguish the logical form from the non-logical
content but can also be conceived as a method of conceptual analysis that
identifies the relevant logical and mathematical ideas. As Dirk Schlimm shows
in his contribution, this analysis might be used to determine the primitive
terms and propositions and to check the adequacy of the analysis itself, thereby
evaluating whether definitions are correct, and proofs are rigourous.
The distinction between symbolization and formalization is often difficult
to trace, but the investigation of definitions and of metatheoretical issues of
independence between axioms and a careful investigation of the interactions
with linguistics might be of help. There are several aspects of Peano’s approach
to the Interlingua that relate it to mathematical logic: in both cases a language
in use (mathematical language and Latin) is taken as a starting point for
the development of a universally understandable language (logical symbolism,
Interlingua); secondly the two enterprises are based on collaborative networks;
both are grounded in the legacy of Leibniz’ characteristica universalis; finally
they are combined in the last edition of the Formulario, written in “Latino
sine flexione” and symbolic language [Cantù 2016b]. In her contribution,
Başak Aray highlights another similarity: the connection between algebra and
grammar developed in the Formulario, and suggests that the symbolization
developed in Peano’s mathematical practice guided the design of his proposal
for an international auxiliary language: the Latino sine flexione.
This algebraic understanding of grammar more effectively explains how
logic and language are both presented in an equational form, and generality
is expressed using free variables instead of assuming a universal quantifier
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as a primitive logical term. According to Jan von Plato this is the reason
why Peano’s axiomatic systems, like Schröder’s algebraic logic, lacked some
principles of reasoning with the quantifiers even though they contained other
rules of inferences.
7 Mathematical education and rigour
The interrelation between mathematical education and conceptual analysis
offers further hints to understanding the main traits of the Peano school’s
epistemology, the importance of rigour in scientific knowledge and education
and also the interpretation of axiomatics as a metatheoretical investigation
based on a variety of alternative conceptual analyses leading to different
axiomatic presentations and definitions of the mathematical concepts. The
attention to the pedagogic component in the Peano School shows that the
sociological singularity of this research team (the only non academic-based
group in the international panorama) corresponds to a unique educational
project on rigour. This project was deeply intertwined with the mathematical,
philosophical, logical and linguistic views of the group and had non-negligible
effects on the evolution of mathematical teaching in Italy, and beyond.
Rigour is not an accessory or external element that can be imposed on
mathematical teaching. It is instead a result of the development of rational
mathematics and the evolution of all sciences towards the structure of
axiomatic-deductive systems. Rigour is not primarily a foundational problem,
although conversely, the foundational enterprise is intertwined with didactic
concerns [Luciano 2020].
Rigour is a distinctive feature of the Peano School’s style and also an
essential topic in the Italian debate on mathematical pedagogic theory and
teaching practice at the turn of the century. Peano’s crusade in defence
of rigour is both a distinctive mark of his axiomatics and a feature of the
School’s linguistic, mathematical and educational research programmes. It
was neither a negation of the importance of experimental methods in the early
stages of mathematical education [Luciano 2020] nor a simplistic negation
of mathematical intuition which was banished from the proofs of a theory
but remained decisive in the choice of axioms [Rizza 2009]. It was instead a
didactical objective developed through exchanges with school teachers and
their associations, the publication of new textbooks, and participation in
educational Governmental Committees [Giacardi 2006].
In their contribution, Elena Marchisotto & Ana Millán Gasca illustrate
Pieri’s belief that an integration of sensible and rational intuition can deeply
renew the teaching of geometry while also deploying a profound heuristic
value. The analysis of Pieri’s axiomatization of geometry exemplifies the
almost symbiotic relation between axiomatics and pedagogy that is typical
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of the Peano School as well as the partial and complex reception of this idea
in works by Italian contemporary mathematicians, like Enriques and Amaldi.
And yet, the very same idea of rigour gave rise to famous debates, whose
philosophical objectives were sometimes obscured by putting forth educational
motivations or formal demonstrations. The famous debate with Segre on rigour
and intuition was both a manifesto of Peano’s style and an implicit criticism of
Veronese’s hyperspaces and the expression of the rivalry with the geometrical
Italian School [Luciano 2020].
Similarly, Freguglia claims that the famous proof of the impossibility of
infinitesimals was not developed just to complete and rectify an untenable
proof by Cantor—undergoing the similar mistake of presupposing an axiom
that is equivalent to the Archimedean axiom and therefore incompatible
with the existence of infinitesimals. It was also an implicit criticism of
Veronese’s theory of a geometrical non-Archimedean continuum and provided
an opportunity to host a scientific discussion of the topic in the newly founded
Rivista di Matematica.
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Frege, Peano and the Interplay
between Logic and Mathematics
Joan Bertran-San Millán
The Czech Academy of Sciences,
Institute of Philosophy, Prague (Czech Republic)
Résumé : Dans les études historiques contemporaines, les contributions de
Peano sont généralement envisagées dans le cadre de la tradition logiciste
initiée par Frege. Dans cet article, je vais d’abord démontrer que Frege et Peano
ont développé de manière indépendante des approches semblables visant à
s’appuyer sur la logique pour exprimer rigoureusement des lois mathématiques
et les prouver. Ensuite, je soutiendrai cependant que Peano a également utilisé
sa logique mathématique d’une manière qui anticipait la formalisation des
théories mathématiques, laquelle est incompatible avec la conception de la
logique défendue par Frege.
Abstract: In contemporary historical studies, Peano is usually included in the
logical tradition pioneered by Frege. In this paper, I shall first demonstrate
that Frege and Peano independently developed a similar way of using logic
for the rigorous expression and proof of mathematical laws. However, I shall
then suggest that Peano also used his mathematical logic in such a way that
anticipated a formalisation of mathematical theories which was incompatible
with Frege’s conception of logic.
1 Introduction
Even by the early twentieth-century, in Jourdain’s Preface to the English
translation of Couturat’s L’Algèbre de la Logique [Jourdain 1914, viii], Frege
and Peano had been presented as members of the same logical tradition. The
alleged proximity of the views of Frege and Peano, purportedly synthesised by
Russell, has been retained in the contemporary historiography of logic and has
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 15–34.
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become a commonplace.1 Frege’s and Peano’s conceptions of logic stand out
in opposition to the algebra of logic tradition.
In this paper I shall question Peano’s inclusion in the Frege-Russell
tradition on the basis that Peano develops a specific application of logic to
mathematics that is incompatible with Frege’s view. First, I shall argue
that Frege intends to use the logical system developed in his mature works
not only to show that arithmetic can be reduced to logic but also as a tool
for the rigorous expression and proof of mathematical laws. Second, I shall
propose that although Peano devises a reformulation of mathematical theories
by means of logic similar to Frege’s, in addition, Peano and the members
of the so-called Peano school develop a new understanding of the resulting
expressions of this reformulation that anticipates a contemporary notion of
formalisation which Frege cannot accept.2 In sum, I shall investigate Frege’s
and Peano’s views on the application of logic to mathematical theories and
the formalisation of the latter, and conclude that they develop accounts that
are, in significant respects, irreconcilable.
This paper is in two parts. First, I shall discuss Frege’s views on the
application of logic to arithmetic. This involves his logicist project but
also, and crucially, his proposal to apply the formal resources of logic to a
reformulation of mathematical theories. Second, I shall study, on the one
hand, Peano’s aim of creating an ideography by means of the combination of
logical and mathematical symbols and, on the other, the development by the
members of Peano’s school of a new understanding of the expressions of such
an ideography in the context of proofs of independence.
2 Frege’s reduction and symbolisation
2.1 Logicism and the reduction of arithmetic
For a significant stretch of his career, Frege understood the relationship
between arithmetic and logic as the reduction of the former to the latter.
The purpose of Frege’s logicist project is to demonstrate that arithmetic is
a logical theory. In Grundlagen der Arithmetik [Frege 1884], Frege considers
1. Van Heijenoort develops Jourdain’s dichotomy of two logical traditions in
terms of the “logic as language” tradition and the “logic as calculus” tradition [van
Heijenoort 1967b]. This paper became very influential and established a conceptual
framework for the history of modern logic.
2. In the context of this paper, I understand by “formalisation” the replacement
of a set of sentences expressed in a language L (usually, natural language) with a
corresponding set of sentences expressed in a formal language L′ (typically, that of
first-order logic), which preserves the logical form of the sentences of L and expresses it
using logical symbols, but substitutes non-logical constants (which are uninterpreted)
for the non-logical terms of L. On the notion of formal language, see [Church 1956,
2–68].
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the logicist project from a philosophical point of view and tries to informally
justify that the reduction can be carried out. He then attempts a formal proof
of the reduction of arithmetic to logic in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [Frege
1893, 1903, hereinafter, Grundgesetze].
One of the objectives of the logicist project is the explicit definition of the
basic notions of arithmetic by means of the logical symbols. This requires
the development of a logical language with enough expressive power. In order
to achieve this goal, in Grundgesetze Frege profoundly modifies the concept-
script—the logical system he had first presented in Begriffsschrift, eine der
arithmetischen Formelsprache des reinen Denkens [Frege 1879a, hereinafter,
Begriffsschrift]. Among other things, in Grundgesetze he rigidly regiments
quantification and incorporates the notion of value-range in the language by
means of a function symbol, “–εϕ(ε)”.
Frege’s logicist project also aims to prove that all arithmetical laws are
logical laws, i.e., to prove that the laws of arithmetic can be derived in
the calculus of the concept-script from logical laws and explicit definitions.
Such a proof involves a modification of the semantical status of some of
the components of arithmetical propositions; the letters occurring in them
then go on to express generality over the domain of logical objects and,
accordingly, the quantifiers cease to range exclusively over natural numbers.
Therefore, after the reduction of arithmetic to the concept-script, arithmeti-
cal laws can still be interpreted judgements, although they would go on
to express purely logical facts.
Moreover, after the explicit definition of the basic notions of arithmetic, for
Frege there is no need to keep the symbols that represent them in the process
of proving arithmetical laws by logical means. The proofs and judgements
of the first volume of Grundgesetze do not contain arithmetical symbols, but
the primitive symbols of the concept-script, letters and symbols that Frege
introduces by means of definitions, such as “0” and “1”—which refer to the
cardinal numbers 0 and 1, respectively.
All in all, the reduction of a theory to another is significantly different from
the formalisation of a theory. A formalisation requires a formal language or,
at least, a symbolic language that contains non-logical constants. Since non-
logical constants are uninterpreted, the resulting formulas of a formalisation
do not preserve the meaning of the formalised sentences; only the syntactic
status of the symbols of the formalised theory is kept. In contrast, a reduction
does not require a formal language; in fact, it can only be performed by means
of an interpreted language, since the original meaning of both the primitive
symbols and the laws of the reduced theory have to be maintained in essence.
In fact, the basic terms of the theory by means of which the reduction is
performed are substantive, in the sense that they refer to the specific entities
the theory is about.3 This enables the provision of explicit definitions of the
3. I take the notion of substantive basic terms and their role in the reduction of a
mathematical theory from [Klev 2011].
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basic notions of the reduced theory and the preservation of their properties.
For instance, in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to the concept-script, the
cardinal numbers are defined as logical objects, but at the same time they
retain their mathematical properties.
2.2 Early and late applications of logic
As is well known, Frege’s logicist project ended abruptly with the discovery
of the inconsistency of the concept-script presented in Grundgesetze. After
1902, Frege was forced to modify his views on the relation between logic
and arithmetic. The best witness to Frege’s post-logicist understanding of
the relationship between the concept-script and mathematics can be found
in the student notes Carnap wrote while attending some of Frege’s courses
in Jena between 1910 and 1913 [Frege 1996]. In the first of these courses,
Begriffsschrift I (which took place in the winter semester of 1910-1911), Frege
presents the main components of the language of the concept-script—as they
are described in Grundgesetze, but without mentioning the symbols for value-
ranges or for the function Kξ. He thus obtains a higher-order logical language.
Frege then shows, with examples, how its syntax could be naturally adapted
to the expressions of arithmetic. This process consists in connecting atomic
expressions of number theory, such as “a > 0” or “(a− b) + b = a”, using the
logical symbols of the concept-script. The combination of atomic expressions
of number theory and logical symbols also involves the incorporation of the
letters of the concept-script—by means of which generality is expressed—into
the aforementioned atomic expressions. For instance:4
If we want to express that at most one object falls under a concept,
we write:
a d a = d
ϕ(d)
ϕ(a)
e.g., [the concept] positive square root of 1: ξ2 = 1
ξ > 0





[Frege 1996, 17; 77]
4. When an English translation is quoted, two page numbers—separated with a
semicolon—are given: the first corresponds to the most recent edition of the source
listed and the second to the English translation. When no English translation is
available, quotes and page numbers are taken from the most recent edition of the
source and translated by the author.
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In the second course, Begriffsschrift II (which took place in the summer
semester of 1913), Frege first presents the logical fragment of the calculus of
the Grundgesetze concept-script: he introduces the basic laws and some of
its inference rules, but omits basic laws (V) and (VI), which involve value-
ranges.5 Frege then exemplifies how the calculus of the concept-script can
be applied to prove two theorems of analysis. These proofs are detailed
reconstructions of mathematical proofs using the formal tools provided by
the concept-script. First, Frege reformulates the theorem he wants to justify
using a combination of logical and mathematical symbols. Second, he lists
and reformulates in the explained way the propositions of analysis that are
needed in the proof as premises. Third, the logical principles that are required
in the proof are incorporated as premises by means of substitutions, in such
a way that simple formulas belonging to the language of the concept-script,
such as “Mβ(f(β))” or “f(a)” (which, strictly speaking, should be considered
terms) are replaced with expressions of analysis. With all these components,
Frege conducts the proof in a similar way as he had done in Grundgesetze: he
renders explicit all the logical principles and formal steps involved, using the
inference rules available.
Frege’s methodology and goals in these courses coincides with the appli-
cation of the concept-script he devised during the immediate years after the
publication of Begriffsschrift, in the papers “Anwendungen der Begriffsschrift”,
“Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift” and “Über den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift” [Frege 1879b, 1880-1881, 1882]. In these papers he is explicit
about the aim of such a combination of the concept-script with a scientific
theory: Frege strongly associates it with the rigorous expression of the laws
and proofs of such a theory. He rejects the perspective of producing what
he calls an “abstract logic”, i.e., a symbolism isolated from the expression of
specific meaning. As he says in “Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift”, in which
he compares the 1879 concept-script with Boolean logic, “I did not wish to
present an abstract logic in formulas, but to express a content through written
symbols in a more precise and perspicuous way than is possible with words”
[Frege 1882, 97; 90–91]. Also in this paper Frege offers a general overview of
how he intends to apply his concept-script to arithmetic:
Now I have attempted to supplement the formula language of
arithmetic with symbols for the logical relations in order to
5. There is no mention of basic law (IV) in the student notes. However, this basic
law belongs to the propositional fragment of the concept-script and is completely
unrelated to the notion of value-range. In the notes, right before basic law (III) is
introduced by Frege, several pages are empty—which indicates that Carnap missed
some lectures or failed to take notes in them. Either Frege mentioned basic law (IV)
during the course and Carnap did not record it or Frege considered that this basic
law was unnecessary for his purposes in this course and did not mention it.
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produce—at first just for arithmetic—a concept-script6 of the
kind I have presented as desirable. This does not rule out the
application of my symbols to other fields. The logical relations
occur everywhere, and the symbols for particular contents can be
so chosen that they fit the framework of the concept-script. [Frege
1882, 113–114; 89]
Frege’s view in this passage coincides with the use of the concept-script
described in the 1910-1913 courses—that of a formal structure that could be
combined with the atomic expressions of mathematical theories in such a way
that the meaning of the laws of these theories could be expressed in a precise
way and their proofs could be conducted with the standards of rigour of the
concept-script.7
2.3 Frege’s symbolisation
The application of the concept-script which Frege proposes both in his 1879-
1882 papers and in the post-Grundgesetze courses departs from a formalisation.
For the sake of clarity, I shall refer to Frege’s proposed application of the
concept-script to a scientific theory as “symbolisation”, although he never used
this term in this sense.
Frege wants to preserve the symbols of arithmetic and use them as
canonical names, i.e., as symbols with a specific and fixed meaning. Even
quantification is restricted in this application; in the examples in the student
notes, all letters are supposed to range over real numbers, since the numerical







This [c > a and d > b] is supposed to mean that a and b are
real numbers, since it is only for them that > is supposed to be
defined. [Frege 1996, 26; 100]
6. For the sake of terminological homogeneity, I have replaced “concep-
tual notation” with “concept-script” as the English counterpart of the German
“Begriffsschrift” in this quote, taken from Bynum’s translation of [Frege 1882].
7. Frege’s position regarding the application of the concept-script to the rigoriza-
tion of mathematical theories is related to his project of creating a lingua characterica.
This latter notion can be connected to Leibniz’s ideal of a scientific language. The
choice of the term “concept-script” [Begriffsschrift] is also related to this project.
On Frege’s notion of lingua characterica and its relation to the concept-script, see
[Bertran-San Millán 2020a]. See also [Patzig 1969], [Kluge 1977], [Peckhaus 2004]
and [Korte 2010].
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Note that Frege shows no difficulty in restricting the domain of the letters
or the applicability of arithmetical relations. In this context, if the letters “a”
and “c” were to have a domain wider than the set of the real numbers, then
it would not be possible to determine the meaning of an expression such as
“c > a”, since the relation > is, as Frege acknowledges, only defined for real
numbers as arguments.
The symbols of number theory used in this application are not employed
by Frege to express abstract properties and relations. They are not, therefore,
seen as uninterpreted non-logical constants devoid of meaning. Only the letters
have a specific domain, determined by the intended application.
By means of a symbolisation, Frege aims to overcome the lack of precision
posed by the use of natural language in the definition of the derived concepts
of mathematical theories and in their proofs. These theories do not have
the expressive means necessary for the symbolic representation of the logical
relations that form complex sentences. At the same time, most derived notions
are defined in complex sentences. As a consequence, the derived notions,
if defined at all, have to be defined using natural language, by means of
which it is not possible to attain the level of exactness and rigour Frege
requires for mathematics. Likewise, in “Booles rechnende Logik und die
Begriffsschrift”, while comparing his concept-script with Boolean logic, Frege
states the following:
[The concept-script] is in a position to represent the formation
of the concepts actually needed in science, in contrast to the
relatively sterile multiplicative and additive combinations we find
in Boole. [Frege 1880-1881, 52; 46]
By 1910-1913 Frege’s remark on the poor expressive capabilities of Boolean
logic had to be qualified. By then, the proponents of the algebra of
logic had overcome all the expressive shortcomings they had faced in 1880.
However, in the 1910–1913 courses, Frege retains unmodified his claim that the
language of mathematical theories needs to be complemented with the formal
resources of the concept-script if their new concepts are to be defined with
an adequate standard of rigour. In these courses, Frege even appeals to the
same examples as those of “Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift”
[Frege 1880-1881]—namely, the definition of the notion of the continuity of
a function—in order to show the fruitfulness of his symbolisation in the
processes of concept formation.
In fact, by applying the formal resources of the concept-script to a scientific
theory such as analysis, Frege shows a lack of interest in logic as a subject
matter. He takes great pains to carefully show how a proof of a theorem
of analysis can be performed using the formal resources of the concept-
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script,8 but there is absolutely no evidence in the 1879-1883 papers or in
the 1910-1913 courses to show that by symbolising analysis or arithmetic in
the way he does, he intends to answer metatheoretical questions such as the
completeness or consistency of these theories, or the independence of their
axioms. The focus is put on precision and rigour. In “Booles rechnende
Logik und die Begriffsschrift’, after a full symbolisation of the proof of an
arithmetical theorem [Frege 1880-1881, 30–36; 27–32]—analogous to those
performed in Begriffsschrift II [Frege 1996, 25–37; 98–119]—Frege lists the
demands fulfilled by such a symbolisation: a complete and clear specification of
all the principles necessary for the derivation of the theorem; a warrant that the
proof contains no appeal to intuition; and, finally, the certainty that there are
no formal steps missing in the proof, since all of them have been rendered
explicit [Frege 1880-1881, 36; 32].
3 Peano’s symbolisation and formalisation
3.1 Peano’s ideography
One of the most prominent elements in Peano’s development of his logic,
which he calls “mathematical logic”, is the construction of a logical symbolism
that can be used as a tool for the rigorous expression of the laws of scientific
theories as well as for helping making explicit the logical principles involved
in their proofs. Even in Peano’s first uses of his logical symbolism, rigour in
the derivation of theorems and a precise characterisation of scientific terms
are already established as the main goals of this reformulation of scientific
theories. In his seminal Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita [Peano
1889a, hereinafter, Arithmetices principia], Peano expresses himself thus:9
With this notation every proposition assumes the form and
precision equations enjoy in algebra, and from propositions so
written others may be deduced, by a process which resembles the
solution of algebraic equations. That is the chief reason for writing
this paper.
[...] Those arithmetical signs which may be expressed using
others along with signs of logic represent the ideas we can define.
8. More than a third of the pages that correspond to Carnap’s notes on
Begriffsschrift II are devoted to the proof of a single theorem. See [Frege 1996,
29–37; 103–119].
9. In Principii di Geometria logicamente esposti [Peano 1889b, hereinafter,
Principii di Geometria], Peano discusses several axioms of Pasch’s axiomatisation
of geometry—which are formulated in natural language—and contrasts them with
his own axioms—which are symbolised [Peano 1889b, 84–85]. In this discussion he
highlights the ambiguities involved in the expression of mathematical laws by means
of natural language.
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Thus I have defined every sign, if you except the four which are
contained in the explanations of § 1. [Peano 1889a, 21; 102]
As we shall see, Peano’s intended use of mathematical logic can be seen
as what I called a symbolisation. In this sense, he shares Frege’s view on the
combination of logic and scientific theories for the construction of a symbolised
reformulation of these theories.10
Still, Peano’s understanding of a symbolisation cannot be reduced to a
mere rewriting of sentences in the natural language by means of which the laws
of scientific theories are expressed. He produces what he calls “ideography”
and thus connects it—just as Frege had done via Trendelenburg’s use of the
term “Begriffsschrift” [Trendelenburg 1856]—with Leibniz’s scientific ideal of
a characteristica universalis, which is not intended to express uttered sounds
but to represent the structure of concepts.11
In Notations de logique mathématique, Peano reflects on the creation of
an ideography. He describes a similar process to Frege’s symbolisation [Peano
1894b]. As a first step, Peano proposes to extract the logical form of the
sentences of a given theory and to express it using the logical symbols. He
then suggests an analysis of the terms of the theory, by means of which its
primitive terms can be located and their connection with the other terms can
be discovered. This last step makes it clear that Peano does not intend to
perform a mere rewriting of the theory.12 In his words:
Any theory can be reduced to symbols, for every spoken
language, and every writing, is a symbolism, or a series of
signs that represent ideas. In order to apply the signs we have
explained, we can take the propositions of the theory in question,
written in ordinary language, and replace the word is with the
signs ε , =, C, as the case may be, and [put] instead of and, or,
10. Since Frege first developed his approach to the symbolisation of mathematical
theories as early as 1879, it might be asked whether he influenced Peano’s notion
of symbolisation using mathematical logic. It is very unlikely. Peano’s first
symbolisation was presented in Arithmetices principia, published in 1889, while—
as Nidditch [Nidditch 1963, 105] states—he first refers to Frege in [Peano 1891a, 101,
note 5; 155, fn. 5]. Prior to 1891, Peano had published other papers in which he
symbolised mathematical theories: [Peano 1889b, 1890a,b]. More importantly, Frege
articulates in full the application of the concept-script to logic in [Frege 1880-1881];
however, he attempted three times but failed to publish this paper, so probably
Peano never had access to it. The extant correspondence between Frege and Peano
started in 1891—no trace of any previous letter can be found—and there Frege neither
mentions any of his 1879-1882 papers nor explains how he conceives the application
of the concept-script to mathematical theories.
11. As Barnes argues, the term “Begriffsschrift” can be translated as “ideography”
[Barnes 2002]. On the relation between Peano and Leibniz’s scientific ideal, see [Cantù
2014].
12. See also [Peano 1896–1897, 203, 191], where Peano distinguishes between a
symbolisation—by means of an ideography—and a mere rewriting.
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. . . the signs ∩, ∪, . . . ; and that cum granu salis, because we saw
for instance that, depending on the position, the conjunction and
is represented by means of ∩ or ∪.
After this first transformation, the propositions are expressed
in a few words, linked by the logical signs ∩, ∪, =, C, etc.; and
if it has been well done, the words that remain are devoid of any
grammatical form; for all the relations of grammar are expressed
by means of the signs of logic. These words represent the proper
ideas of the theory being studied. Then the ideas represented by
these words are analysed, the composed ideas are decomposed into
the simple parts, and only, after a long series of reductions and
transformations, one obtains a small group of words, which can
be considered as minimum, by means of which, combined with the
signs of logic, all the ideas and propositions of the science under
study can be expressed. [Peano 1894b, 164, my translation]
With this ideography, i.e., with the combination of mathematical logic and
the primitive terms of the language of scientific theories, Peano can eliminate
all traces of natural language in the formulation of these theories. Since their
primitive terms are preserved, the original meaning of the expressions of these
theories is also kept.
Peano refers to his symbolisation of scientific theories as a reduction.
However, he does not intend to define the primitive notions of a theory in
terms of another (in this case, mathematical logic), nor prove that the axioms
of the former are, in fact, theorems of the latter. In this sense, Peano’s notion
of reduction does not correspond to the characterisation of Frege’s reduction
of arithmetic to the concept-script provided in Section 2.1.13
Peano focusses on the ideographic reformulations of mathematical theories.
With the axiomatic method in mind, he produces several symbolic axiomati-
sations of arithmetic and geometry.14 The resulting theories are constituted
by two separate groups of axioms: a set of logical principles (which usually
13. Neither did Frege see Peano’s symbolisation as a reduction, see [Frege 1897,
365–366; 237]. Although there has been a debate in the literature, some consensus
has arisen over the thesis that Peano did not endorse Frege’s logicist project. Most
historical studies plainly deny that Peano was a logicist (see [Kennedy 1963, 264],
[Segre 1995], [Lolli 2011]), while others also emphasise his rejection of philosophical
discussions see [Geymonat 1955]. See also [Grattan-Guinness 2000, 247–249].
14. Having presented the first formulation of his mathematical logic in Arithmetices
principia, during the early 1890s Peano provides multiple examples of the ideographic
formulations of mathematical theories: analysis, see, for instance [Peano 1890b,
1892b]; geometry, see [Peano 1889b, 1894a]; arithmetic, see, for instance, [Peano
1891d]; and even Euclid’s Elements, see [Peano 1890a, 1891b, 1892a]. Peano’s major
ideographic endeavour is his collective project of a Formulaire de mathématiques,
which was published in several volumes and revised in subsequent editions. On this
project, see [Borga, Freguglia et al. 1985, 163–170] and [Roero 2011].
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includes principles of the logic of classes) and a set of mathematical axioms.15
The clear separation of the logical and the mathematical constituents of the
theory is shared with Frege.
Moreover, Peano’s presentation of the language of a symbolised mathemat-
ical theory also preserves this distinction. Peano consistently provides specific
lists for logical (and class-theoretical) and mathematical symbols and treats
the latter as substantive, as canonical names.16 In this regard, later in 1897
he expresses the convenience of preserving the symbols of arithmetic:
The symbols of Algebra allow us to express some propositions:
2 + 3 = 5, 5 < 7, . . .
We keep these symbols; sometimes we even generalise their
meaning; but when we encounter ideas that cannot be expressed
by the symbols of Algebra, we introduce new symbols. For
instance, we want to express the proposition
7 is a prime number;
we already have a symbol to indicate the subject 7; we introduce a
symbol Np to signify “prime number”; and a symbol ε to indicate
“is a”; then the stated proposition is transformed into
7 εNp.
[Peano 1897, 241, my translation]
Peano is aware that the expression of mathematical principles and the
definition of derived notions require, besides the use of logical symbols and
symbols of the calculus of classes, the enlargement of the set of primitive
symbols. For instance, he introduces “N” and “Np” to refer to the class of
natural numbers and the class of prime numbers, respectively. These new
symbols should also be taken as canonical names, although they do not belong
to the language of arithmetic stricto sensu. After all, Peano includes them in
the list of primitive symbols of his symbolisation of arithmetic and assumes
that they express basic properties of numbers that have been left undefined.
By the end of the nineteenth century, geometry lacked a symbolic language
like that of arithmetic. In this sense, Peano’s symbolisation of geometry could
15. This claim should be qualified if the earliest formulations of Peano’s mathe-
matical logic are considered. Peano does not axiomatise the logical component of his
axiomatisation of arithmetic presented in Arithmetices principia. He first offers an
axiomatic presentation of the calculus of propositions in [Peano 1891c]. Moreover,
in Principii di Geometria the logical principles are not explicit. In this work Peano
only includes three axioms that involve equality [Peano 1889b, 61].
16. See, for instance, his presentation in Arithmetices principia [Peano 1889a, 23;
103–104]. On Peano’s view regarding the substantivity of the primitive notions of
geometry and arithmetic, see [Borga, Freguglia et al. 1985, 51–54, 88–94, 109–110].
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not preserve established geometrical symbols that were already in use: the
list of primitive symbols of geometry had to be created anew. In Principii
di Geometria, adopting “1” and “ ε ” as primitive symbols, and using the
symbols of the language of his mathematical logic introduced in Arithmetices
principia, Peano offers a symbolisation of geometry and presents the theory
axiomatically. He thus employs a mixture of logical symbols, arithmetical
symbols and symbols of the calculus of classes and assigns the latter two
a geometrical meaning (sometimes preserving, for certain applications, their
original meaning). For instance, “1” is used to refer to the class of points
and “ ε ” to the relation between a point and a segment [Peano 1889b, 59–61].
However, at the same time, Peano would express that the objects a and b are
points by “a, b ε 1”, where “ ε ” is used as the symbol for membership.
3.2 Formal understanding of symbolised theories
Almost simultaneously to his work on the symbolisation of mathematical
theories, Peano developed a new understanding of symbolised expressions
that was intimately connected with the evaluation of the independence of
the axioms of these theories. As we shall see below, this new understanding
of symbolised mathematical axioms in the context of proofs of independence
anticipates in significant ways a formalisation.
Peano does not explain in detail the nature of this new understanding of
symbolised mathematical laws. However, some members of the Peano school
offer lengthy accounts that are related to their explanation of the resolution
of metamathematical questions such as the independence of the axioms or the
primitive notions of mathematical theories. These accounts can shed light on
Peano’s position.
A fundamental element for the understanding of a symbolised mathemat-
ical theory in Peano’s school is the stratification of the components of this
theory. In Arithmetices principia, Peano distinguishes between the axioms
and the theorems of arithmetic, and also between its defined and undefined
symbols:
Those arithmetical signs which may be expressed by using
others along with signs of logic represent the ideas that we can
define. Thus I have defined every sign, if you except the four
which are contained in the explanations of § 1 [N, 1, +1, =].
If, as I believe, these cannot be reduced further, then the ideas
expressed by them may not be defined by ideas already supposed
to be known.
Propositions which are deduced from others by the operations
of logic are theorems; those for which this is not true I have
called axioms. There are nine axioms here (§ 1), and they express
fundamental properties of the undefined signs.
[Peano 1889a, 21; 102]
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In “Formole di Logica Matematica” [Peano 1891c, 102–104] Peano
rephrases this double distinction in terms of primitive and derived propositions
and symbols. Primitive propositions, or axioms, are left unproved and
primitive symbols are not defined. By means of definitions in terms of
primitive symbols all derived notions can be obtained, and theorems (i.e.,
derived propositions) are the result of derivations that start from primitive
propositions and definitions. This idea refines Peano’s view on the process of
the creation of an ideography.
From this conceptual framework, Padoa characterises in “Essai d’une
théorie algébrique des nombres entiers, précédé d’une introduction logique
à une théorie déductive quelconque” [Padoa 1901] what he calls a “deductive
theory”. The components of a deductive theory are expressed in a language
constituted by a system of primitive symbols (which Padoa calls “undefined
symbols”), while the theory is determined by a system of primitive propositions
(“unproved propositions” in Padoa’s terminology). The deductive approach is
defined by the disentanglement of these systems of symbols and propositions
from their original meaning:
[D]uring the period of elaboration of any deductive theory we
choose the ideas to be represented by the undefined symbols and
the facts to be stated by the unproved propositions; but, when we
begin to formulate the theory, we can imagine that the undefined
symbols are completely devoid of meaning and that the unproved
propositions (instead of stating facts, that is, relations between the
ideas represented by the undefined symbols) are simply conditions
imposed upon undefined symbols.
Then, the system of ideas that we have initially chosen is
simply one interpretation of the system of undefined symbols;
but from the deductive point of view this interpretation can be
ignored by the reader, who is free to replace it in his mind by
another interpretation that satisfies the conditions stated by the
unproved propositions. And since these propositions, from the
deductive point of view, do not state facts, but conditions, we
cannot consider them true postulates. [Padoa 1901, 318; 120-121]
This way of understanding a theory is thus not meant to preserve its
content and express it in a rigorous way, as is the case in the symbolisation
that Peano himself or Frege developed. On the one hand, primitive symbols
are detached from their original meaning and are effectively seen as non-
logical constants, that is, as uninterpreted symbols, whereas on the other hand,
primitive propositions cease to be seen as expressing true facts; they express
the conditions that an interpretation must hold in order to satisfy them.17
17. The fact that Peano and Padoa talk about interpretations and consider
specific domains and interpretations for non-logical symbols does not mean that they
anticipate the contemporary notion of model. On the differences between the notion
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This process entails that the propositions of the formalised theory only
express abstract relations between unspecified objects, properties and rela-
tions. In this sense, the development of a formalised theory (i.e., in Padoa’s
terminology, a deductive theory) involves only a deductive relation between
primitive and derived propositions:
[F]or what is necessary to the logical development of a deductive
theory is not the empirical knowledge of properties of things, but
the formal knowledge of relations between symbols. [Padoa 1901,
319; 121]
The distinction between primitive and derived symbols, and between
axioms and theorems, guarantees that by merely providing an interpretation
of the primitive symbols that satisfies the axioms, the whole theory is
satisfied. All relations between primitive and derived symbols are made
explicit through definitions and, similarly, all theorems are deduced from
axioms and definitions.18
Each of Peano, Padoa and Pieri insist upon putting the notion of
deduction at the centre of their accounts of the formalisation of mathe-
matical theories. However, they never characterise precisely this notion.
In their works, deduction remains an informal notion that is not formally
defined. Peano does offer several specifications of logical principles in his
presentation of the mathematical logic, but all things considered he fails
to provide a full characterisation of the notion of deduction: crucially, a
complete system of inference rules cannot be found in Peano’s presentations
of mathematical logic.19
The hierarchic structure of a mathematical theory proposed by the
members of Peano’s school also involves some methodological principles
that would determine their work on metamathematical questions. Since
a deductive theory is built from a system of primitive propositions and a
system of primitive symbols, the independence of these propositions and the
of interpretation common to Peano and Padoa as opposed to the contemporary notion
of model see [Mancosu, Zach et al. 2009, 323–324].
18. As Blanchette states, the stratification of a mathematical language in terms of
primitive and derived symbols is instrumental to the understanding of reinterpretation
as a method for proving independence, and can be seen as a distinctive feature of
late nineteenth-century approaches to the independence of the axioms of geometry
[Blanchette 2017, 47]. The pioneering work of Peano’s school in this regard should
not be underestimated, especially because of the fact that it predates by a decade
Hilbert’s work on this field.
19. Peano’s metatheoretical questions are, to a great extent, intuitively answered.
Although he does not consider the notion of soundness, his results in metamathemat-
ics presuppose that the calculi he uses are sound. For a discussion on the claim that
Peano does not adopt a fully deductive approach to logic, see [Bertran-San Millán
2020b]. See also [Goldfarb 1980]. For a critical approach to this claim, see [von Plato
2017, 50–57].
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irreducibility of these symbols is understood as a methodological goal. As Pieri
puts in in “Sur la Géométrie envisagée comme un système purement logique”:
As far as possible, primitive ideas should be irreducible to one
another, so that none of them can be explicitly defined by means
of others; and, similarly, the postulates should be independent of
each other, so that none can be deduced from the others. [Pieri
1901, 380, my translation]
It is thus understandable that, right after providing an axiomatisation of
a mathematical theory, Peano studies the independence of their axioms.20
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have focused upon the views of Frege and Peano on the
application of logical symbolism and the methods of logic to mathematical
theories, and concluded that they disagreed as regards substantial aspects.
Their varying views on the formalisation of mathematical theories are
rooted in a deep disagreement regarding their goals. For a significant part
of his career, Frege aimed at showing that arithmetic could be reduced
to logic. Before this project was fully articulated and after it had failed,
he intended to use logic as a formal structure appropriate to supplement
the language of arithmetic. Peano never attempted to reduce arithmetic
to logic, but he also devised—independently of Frege—a symbolisation of
mathematical theories with the assistance of logic. However, Peano also aimed
at answering metatheoretical questions such as the independence of the axioms
of a mathematical theory, and he developed an alternative understanding of
symbolised expressions to fulfil this aim.
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Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language:
Too Suggestive to be Truthful?
Jan von Plato
University of Helsinki (Finland)
Résumé : Le présent article porte sur le rôle inférentiel des quantificateurs
chez Frege, Peano et Russell. Nous abordons ici deux aspects qui caractérisent
la logique mathématique à ses débuts : le progressif perfectionnement des prin-
cipes de raisonnement à l’aide des quantificateurs d’une part, la prétendue im-
possibilité conceptuelle de poser des questions de type métathéorique d’autre
part, telle qu’elle est incarnée par le célèbre dicton de Jean van Heijenoort sur
« la logique comme calcul et la logique comme langage ».
Abstract: The paper focuses on the inferential role of quantifiers in Frege,
Peano and Russell. Two aspects of the early years of mathematical logic are
discussed: the gradual perfection of the principles of reasoning with quan-
tifiers, and the presumed conceptual impossibility of posing metatheoretical
questions, as embodied in Jean van Heijenoort’s well-known dictum about
“logic as calculus and logic as language.”
1 Introduction
Modern logic is usually counted to begin with the times of George Boole,
around 1850, with an initial phase of algebraic logic. It was gradually replaced
by the logic of Frege and Peano, conceived in 1879 and 1889, and received
through the mediation of Russell in the first decade of the 20th century. In
this essay, I shall discuss two aspects of these pioneer years: the principles
of reasoning with the quantifiers, and the awareness about metatheoretical
questions. Jean van Heijenoort, in a widely read essay “Logic as calculus and
logic as language” [van Heijenoort 1967b], claims that such questions were a
conceptual impossibility for the early pioneers of modern logic; a suggestive
thesis that turns out to be in great part a myth not supported by any close
reading of the sources.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 35–47.
36 Jan von Plato
2 Quantifiers in Frege, Peano, and Russell
The alternatives for the formal treatment of foundational questions in mathe-
matics at the end of the 19th century were—excepting Frege whose work was
not understood by others—Schröder’s algebraic logic and Peano’s axiomatic
systems, both lacking essential principles of reasoning with the quantifiers.
The very first appearance of generality and existence were in Aristotle’s
syllogistic: every A is B and some A is B. These quantifiers were, though,
not variable-binding operations and therefore did not play any clear role in
ancient mathematics [see von Plato 2017, chap. 1].
Traditional modes of inference with existence and universality include that
one can take instances of a universal and conclude existence from an instance.
When mathematical proofs got formalised, these were written as axioms, with
t a term that names a constant:
I ∀xA(x) ⊃ A(t) II A(t) ⊃ ∃xA(x)
To infer the other way around, to generality in I, the traditional pattern has
been:
III Assume a counterexample, ∃x¬A(x), and if this turns out
impossible, conclude ∀xA(x).
For this pattern to be useful, one needs to take instances of ∃x¬A(x), a step
that was never made formally precise before 1920.
A principle that relates to II is:
IV Assume the contrary of ∃xA(x) for all cases, namely ∀x¬A(x),
take instances by axiom I, and if something impossible turns out,
conclude ∃xA(x).
Whereas in II existence is inferred from an instance, in IV it is proved
indirectly.
Principles III and IV are based on the intuitive equivalences between
¬∃x¬A(x) and ∀xA(x), and ¬∀x¬A(x) and ∃xA(x). The former, in
particular, has been very prominent, already endorsed by Aristotle (namely
that generality means the lack of a counterexample).
No systematic theory of inferences with the quantifiers appeared before
Frege discovered such in 1879, but it remained unrecognised for some 25 years.
Peano, for example, had axiom II, and had even invented the symbol ∃,
but expressed generality by free variables, typically the inductive step in
arithmetic in which one proves for a property of numbers the implication
A(n) ⊃ A(n+ 1). If n is “arbitrary” and if A(0) holds, the free-variable
formula A(x) can be inferred. Then any substitution instance can be taken,
analogously to axiom I, but Peano recognised no general logical pattern here,
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contrary to Frege, and his formal systems of mathematics remained severely
incomplete. This feature was, in the end, responsible for the failure of the
Peano school. Peano himself dismissed Frege’s discovery by writing in 1895
in a reply to a letter of Frege’s that his approach with just three instead of
Frege’s five basic signs “corresponds to a more profound analysis.”
Frege explains in his Begriffsschrift [Frege 1879] the truth of a universal
proposition by stating that each of its instances is true. Then comes the
“illuminating observation” that one can infer to generality if one has proved
an arbitrary instance, the latter meaning that a proof of A(a) has been given
for a “Latin letter.” The condition is that nothing on which A(a) depends,
given as an antecedent B in an implication, must contain the “Latin letter.”
Frege expressed the universal quantifier by a “German letter” (fraktur) and
a notch in the “judgment stroke.” In modern notation, B ⊃ ∀xA(x) can be
inferred from B ⊃ A(a) when a purely syntactic criterion on the condition B
is fulfilled. Today this is seen as the greatest of logical discoveries:
Russell’s 1903 book The Principles of Mathematics contains an appendix
“The logical and arithmetical doctrines of Frege,” with Frege clearly singled
out as the one to explicitly recognise the difference between “any and every,”
and the need of rules for handling the latter:
He has a special symbol for assertion, and he is able to assert for
all values of x a propositional function not stating an implication,
which Peano’s symbolism will not do. He also distinguishes,
by the use of Latin and German letters, respectively, between
any proposition of a certain propositional function and all such
propositions. [Russell 1903, 519]
These were afterthoughts. No explicit logical notation is used in The Principles
of Mathematics proper, but the treatment is based on Peano’s work. Russell
thinks he can get along with a single primitive notion in logic, what he called
the “formal implication” rendered as “ϕx implies ψx for all values of x” [Russell
1903, 11]. Peano had used the notation ϕx ⊃x ψx for such an implication with
a free variable, typically an eigenvariable in an inductive step from x to its
successor x′. That was the nature of Peano’s arithmetic: there was no universal
quantifier in his formalism. It is easy for us today to understand that this is the
systematic reason for the failure of his attempt to formalize mathematics and
for the demise of his school, but such insights come from hindsight: Russell, for
example, tells in the preface to his book that he had seen Frege’s Grundgesetze
der Arithmetik [Frege 1893] but added that he “failed to grasp its importance
or to understand its contents,” the reason being “the great difficulty of his
symbolism” [Russell 1903, xvi].
A somewhat neglected paper of 1906, “The theory of implication” [Russell
1906], is Russell’s first contribution to the deductive machinery of logic.
Published four years before the Principia, it shows clearly the origins of
Russell’s formal system of proof. In this work, he uses negation and implication
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as primitives, with a handsome axiomatization as a result. As shown in my
Formal Machinery [von Plato 2017, section 5.1], the structure of derivations
in Russell is identical to Peano’s, with two formal rules of inference: to take
instances of axioms, and to apply the rule of detachement.
Van Heijenoort, who edited the book that contains the first English
translation of the main part of Peano’s 1889 work [Peano 1889], instead
of figuring out what Peano’s notation for derivations means, claims in his
introduction that there is “a grave defect. The formulas are simply listed,
not derived; and they could not be derived, because no rules of inference
are given [...] he does not have any rule that would play the role of the
rule of detachment” [van Heijenoort 1967a, 84]. Had he not seen the forms
a ⊃ b and a . a ⊃ b :⊃ b in Peano’s derivations, the typographical display
of steps of axiom instances and implication eliminations with the conclusion
b standing out at right, and the rigorous rule of combining the antecedent of
each two-premiss derivation step from previously concluded formulas? Had
he not seen the identical structure in Russell’s 1906 article? Van Heijenoort’s
unfortunate assessment has undermined the view of Peano’s contribution for
a long time, when instead Peano’s derivations are constructed purely formally,
with a notation as explicit as one can desire, by the application of axiom
instances and implication eliminations.
Russell in his 1906 article goes beyond Peano by introducing the notation
(x)C(x) for universal quantification, presumably the first such notation in
place of Frege’s notch in the assertion sign, alongside the Πx notation in
Schröder’s algebraic logic. The notation for universal quantification allows
to express the rule of generalization as:
If C(y) is true whatever y may be, then C(x) is true for all values
of x. [Russell 1906, 195, slightly modified]
Russell’s formal notation is ` C(y) ⊃ ` (x)C(x), i.e., from the derivability of
C(y) “whatever y may be,” (x)C(x) can be inferred.
The universal quantifier makes its next appearance in Russell’s famous
1908 paper on the theory of types. Its section II is titled “All and any” and
contains:
The distinction between all and any is, therefore, necessary
to deductive reasoning and occurs throughout in mathematics,
though, so far as I know, its importance remained unnoticed until
Frege pointed it out. [Russell 1908, 2289]
Mathematical reasoning proceeds through any:
In any chain of mathematical reasoning, the objects whose
properties are being investigated are the arguments to any value
of a propositional function. [ibid., 227]
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Still, reasoning with just free variables would not do, for bound variables
are needed in definitions (Russell’s terminology for free and bound variables is
“real” and “apparent”). Remarkably, his example is from mathematics proper:
We call f(x) continuous for x = a if, for every positive
number σ . . . there exists a positive number ε . . . such that, for
all values of δ which are numerically less than ε, the difference
f(a+ δ)− f(a) is numerically less than σ. [ibid.]
He goes on to explain that f appears in the definition in the any-mode, as an
arbitrary function, and that σ, ε, and δ instead are just “apparent variables”
without which the definition could not be made.
3 First-order logic
If we take the classical propositional calculus and add to it the rules and
axioms for universality, a complete classical first-order theory of quantification
emerges. An understanding of this matter was slow in coming: The study of
Russell’s logic in Göttingen, from around 1917 on, led in some eight years to the
first impeccable formulation of the axioms and rules of first-order logic. The
first publication of all the axioms and rules, with universality and existence
both taken as primitive notions, was in Hilbert and Ackermann’s Grundzüge
der theoretischen Logik of 1928 [Hilbert & Ackermann 1928]—a book actually
written by Paul Bernays—in which it is acknowledged that the axiomatisation
of quantificational logic was found by Bernays.
Existence was a primitive notion in Hilbert-Ackermann for the somewhat
casual reason that the book emphasised prenex normal form in which both
quantifiers appear only as alternating strings at the head of formulas, followed
by a propositional part as in the example ∀x∃y∀z(A(x, y)&A(y, z) ⊃ A(x, z)).
There is another, subtler reason not revealed by Hilbert-Ackermann, namely,
the impossibility to define ∃ in terms of ∀ in intuitionistic logic. When first-
order intuitionistic logic was definitively axiomatised by Heyting in 1930, he
received a letter of congratulations from Bernays: The latter wrote that after
Brouwer’s visit to Göttingen in 1925, he had figured out the axiomatics of
intuitionistic logic so that classical logic results if the law of double negation
is added. (The letter is found in Troelstra 1990.)
The rule of inference for existence is to instantiate ∃xA(x) by a freshly
chosen arbitrary variable y, in the form of an assumption A(y), where
arbitrariness has the same meaning as with universal generalisation. Whenever
a consequence C of A(y) and possible other assumptions is reached, the as-
sumption A(y) can be deleted if the eigenvariable of existential instantiation y
has no occurrences in the other assumptions nor C. In typical cases, ∃xA(x)
is itself an existential assumption, and it replaces A(y) by the step that is
classified as “existence elimination” in terms of Gentzen’s natural deduction.
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It is instructive to see, in the light of hindsight, how logicians failed in
getting the principles of inference with the quantifiers right. One who got
them right, but did not formalise the quantificational part, was Skolem in his
long paper of 1920 [Skolem 1920]: When an existential assumption is put into
use, that happens by taking an instance with “new letters.” In Skolem’s case,
existence elimination was signalled by the use of Greek letters, only for this
purpose.
In Kolmogorov’s 1925 paper on intuitionistic logic [Kolmogorov 1925],
there is a clear awareness that the principles of inference with generality
cannot be just axioms, but there has to be a rule that “cannot be expressed
symbolically,” just as there has to be at least one rule of inference in axiomatic
propositional logic.
Clamorous misses with the principles of quantificational logic include
Rudolf Carnap’s little treatise Abriss der Logistik of 1929 [Carnap 1929], meant
as a concise presentation of the logic of Russell’s Principia: The most central
component of Russell’s logic is absent from Carnap’s presentation. Yet another
famous logician who never saw the necessity of a rule of generalisation is Alfred
Tarski: Again, one searches in vain for this rule in his path-breaking treatise on
the concept of truth in formalised languages [Tarski 1935]. C.H. Langford’s
1930 review of the Hilbert-Ackermann book is yet another witness of how
difficult it was to even entertain the idea of a formal system of rules for
the quantifiers, a review full of nonsense but still published in the Bulletin
of the American Mathematical Society [Langford 1930].1 Last in this line
comes Ludwig Wittgenstein who tried to do truth-tables even with quantified
formulas.
Kurt Gödel had studied the Principia in the summer of 1928. Next
he found the completeness problem, clearly spelt out in Hilbert-Ackermann
[Hilbert & Ackermann 1928] that he also studied carefully. Gödel, clearly,
would have no completeness theorem for first-order logic had he missed the
crucial rule of generalisation. It is instructive to locate the exact point in which
it is used in his 1930 proof [Gödel 1930]. The step is rather well hidden in the
presentation that proceeds in terms of satisfiability. At one point, Gödel moves
to provability of a free-variable formula, then universally quantified “by 3,” the
number given for the rule of generalisation.
Not long after Gödel, young Gerhard Gentzen gave the definitive formula-
tion of the axioms and rules for quantifiers, in his system of natural deduction.
His approach has a most remarkable property, never seen before, that the
principles of reasoning with each connective and quantifier are pure. By pure is
here meant: formulated independently of the other connectives. In particular,
the principles for universal and existential quantification are fixed once and for
all, and whether a logic is classical or intuitionistic, say, is decided on another
1. This blunder was repaired by Barkley Rosser’s review of the second edition of
1937, with a closely identical title.
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level. Previously it was thought that quantificational inferences would be the
“dubitable” part of classical logic that could lead to contradictions.
A particular feature of natural deduction is the rule of existence elimination
that has two premisses independent of each other: 1. The existential formula
∃xA(x), either assumed or derived, and 2. A derivation of some consequence C
from the assumption A(y) in which y is the arbitrary eigenvariable, i.e., one
that does not occur anywhere but in this subderivation, and not in C. These





Even implication elimination and some other rules with independent premisses,
say A and B in the introduction of a conjunction A&B are thus displayed,
which opens the possibility to analyse the structure of derivations in first-order
logic to the full for Gentzen, with well-known results about the normalization
of derivations and the subformula property of such normal derivations [see von
Plato 2008].
On a more general level, Gentzen’s systematisation of quantificational logic
answers all questions about the meaning of quantifiers and the role of free-
variable formulas, by dividing such questions into two: 1. The meaning when
universality and existence are asserted, given through the conditions for their
introduction. 2. The meaning when they are assumed, given through the
elimination rules that show how such assumptions are put into use. Free-
variable formulas are governed by the restrictions in universal introduction
and existence elimination. The contrast with axiomatic logic is great, for there
free-variable formulas are interpreted as equal in meaning to their universal
closures.
4 “The universality of logic”
One of van Heijenoort’s famous theses about Frege, and by implication about
Russell and to a lesser extent Peano, concerns “the universality of logic.” That
notion is meant to illuminate an important aspect of Frege’s and Russell’s
logic, as in the widely read essay “Logic as calculus and logic as language:”
Another important consequence of the universality of logic is that
nothing can be, or has to be, said outside of the system. And, in
fact, Frege never raises any metasystematic question (consistency,
independence of axioms, completeness). [van Heijenoort 1967b,
13]
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Van Heijenoort wrote such things under the authority of Gödel who in his
paper on the completeness of predicate logic had stated that with a system
such as the Principia Mathematica, the question of completeness “at once
arises.”
Frege’s Begriffsschrift made little compromise in the direction of the reader.
In the long preface to theGrundgesetze some fifteen years later, Frege was more
forthcoming when explaining formulas in proofs:
Each of these formulas is a complete sentence together with all the
conditions that are necessary for it to hold. This completeness,
one that will not tolerate assumptions that could be added tacitly,
seems to me to be indispensable for the rigorous carrying through
of proofs. [Frege 1893, v–vi]
Completeness is used here in two senses, first the grammatical completeness of
a sentence, then the complete display of the conditions under which a formula
holds. This display is further explained as follows:
It cannot be required that all things be proved because that is
impossible; but one can require that all sentences that are used
without proof are expressly stated to be such, so that one can
see clearly on what the whole edifice depends. One must, also,
try to diminish the number of these ground laws, by proving
all that is provable [was beweisbar ist]. Moreover, and here is
where I go beyond Euclid, I require that all forms of inference and
consequence that come to be used are listed in advance. [Frege
1893, v–vi]
The condition of mutual independence of the axioms is expressed by a notion
of provability.
Frege identified the classical propositional calculus as defined through the
primitive notions of conditional and negation, and the semantical criterion of
correctness of formulas and inferences through two truth values formulated in
terms of admission and denial, rather than simply truth and falsity, a step
from an abstract notion of logical truth to semantical principles of reasoning.
Frege does not give any explicit axiom system, but the list of deductive
dependences at the end of the Begriffsschrift identifies one. The question of its
completeness seems to be an aspect Frege did not question but simply believed
in, by his explanation of “the derivation of the more composite judgments from
simpler ones” [Frege 1879, 25]:
In this way, one arrives at a small number of laws that contain, if
one adds those contained in the rules, the content [Inhalt] of all
the others, even if in an undeveloped way.
Consistency of at least the propositional axiom system is immediate, because
Frege shows how to prove that his axioms must be “admitted” by semantical
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criteria and that such admission is maintained by the only rule of inference,
implication elimination.
Peano’s “Sul concetto di numero” [Peano 1891], an article in his newly
established Rivista di Matematica, relates his 1889 axiomatization of natural
numbers to the axioms of Dedekind [Dedekind 1888]. The latter made him
realise that the axioms can be taken in an abstract way, as follows:
These propositions express the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the objects of a system to correspond univocally to the series
of the N ; and they can be enunciated also as follows:
1. The name 1 is given to a particular object of the system.
2. Let an operation be defined for which there corresponds to
every object a of the system another, a+, even that in the
system.
3. And that two objects, the correspondents of which are equal,
be equal.
4. The object called 1 shall not be the correspondent of any.
5. And finally that it be the class common to all classes s that
contain the individual 1 and that, when they contain an
individual, they also contain its correspondent.
It is easy to see that these conditions are independent. [Peano
1891, 93]
Browsing further in the Rivista, one finds in volume VI of 1899 Peano’s notes
on the Formulario project with the following passage:
The composition of my work of the year 1889 was still independent
of the mentioned script of Dedekind; I had, before the printing,
the moral proof of the independence of the primitive propositions
from which I began, those with the substantial coincidence with
the definitions of Dedekind. Later I succeeded in proving the
independence. [Peano 1899, 85]
In the 1889 booklet on the foundations of geometry, we find a similar admission
that the independence of the geometric axioms is a “moral certainty.”
Peano’s last exposition of his arithmetic was in the fifth edition of the
Formulario Mathematico of 1908, written in his own invented language “Latino
sine Flexione.” On page 15, he explains:
We prove that a system of primitive propositions is mutually inde-
pendent, in an absolute way, if we adduce, for each proposition, an
interpretation of the system of primitive ideas that satisfies each
primitive proposition except the one considered. [Peano 1908, 15]
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Such proofs of independence of the Peano axioms are given on page 27 of the
Formulario—so much for the presumed absence of metatheoretical questions
in Peano.
With Russell, van Heijenoort takes an equally cavalier attitude as with
Frege:
Questions about the system are as absent from Principia math-
ematica as they are from Frege’s work. Semantic notions are
unknown. [van Heijenoort 1967a, 14]
The notion of derivability that Russell expresses by the Fregean turnstile ` is in
van Heijenoort’s reading a synonym for “is true.” Russell is, indeed, confused
about propositions, assertions, truth, and derivability, in a way Frege would
never be.
Russell’s 1906 article “The theory of implication” formulates a requirement
of completeness in the following way:
Every deductive system must contain among its premisses as
many of the properties of implication as are necessary to legitimate
the ordinary procedure of deduction.
If it is our purpose to make all our assumptions explicit, and
to effect the deduction of all our other propositions from these
assumptions, it is obvious that the first assumptions we need are
those that are required to make deduction possible. [Russell 1906,
159]
Russell takes it for granted that a complete system of deduction exists, but he
is unable to express the matter in precise terms. A bit later, the formulation
is:
Now in order that one proposition may be inferred from another, it
is necessary that the two should have that relation which makes
the one a consequence of the other. When a proposition q is a
consequence of a proposition p, we say that p implies q. Thus
deduction depends upon the relation of implication, and every
deductive system must contain among its premisses as many of
the properties of implication as are necessary to legitimate the
ordinary procedure of deduction. [Russell 1906, 159]
Consequence is here clearly a notion outside the formal system of deduction.
It is the notion of implication defined by the truth value semantics of classical
propositional logic. The requirement that “all our other propositions” be
derivable is a clear condition of completeness. As to the mutual independence
of the axioms, Russell writes:
In the present article, certain propositions concerning implication
will be stated as premisses, and it will be shown that they are
sufficient for all common forms of inference. It will not be shown
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that they are all necessary, and it is probable that the number of
them might be diminished. [Russell 1906, 159]
Here it is presumed that some purported axioms could be in fact derivable
theorems. Russell summarises the discussion by:
All that is affirmed concerning the premisses is (1) that they are
true, (2) that they are sufficient for the theory of deduction,
(3) that I do not know how to diminish their number. But
with regard to (2), there must always be some element of doubt,
since it is hard to be sure that one never uses some principle
unconsciously. The habit of being rigidly guided by formal
symbolic rules is a safeguard against unconscious assumptions;
but even this safeguard is not always adequate. [Russell 1906,
159–160]
Van Heijenoort’s thesis that truth and provability in Russell are the same can
be hardly maintained, for the reason that the unproved axioms must be true.
Russell’s discussion covers the problem of consistency in propositional
logic: by (1), the axioms are true, and the only rule of inference is one
Russell sometimes formulated as: “inference consists in the dropping of true
antecedents in implications,” namely, if we have that p and p ⊃ q are true,
then even q must be true. Nothing more is needed for a consistency proof of
an axiomatic system of classical propositional logic.
Later in his 1985 article on Herbrand, van Heijenoort writes:
The only question of completeness that may arise is, to use an
expression of Herbrand’s, an experimental question. As many
theorems as possible are derived in the system. Can we exhaust
the intuitive modes of reasoning actually used in science? [van
Heijenoort 1985, 14]
Let’s grant to van Heijenoort this point, but the ones about consistency and
independence don’t hold water, they are unsustainable. A counterexample to
consistency would be a derivable formula that is not true, say A&¬A or 0 6= 1.
A counterexample to independence is given by a purported axiom that turns
out to be derivable, the latter a purely syntactic notion. A direct method for
proofs of independence is the one of Peano in which an abstract calculus gets
different interpretations. A counterexample to completeness is a formula that
is true but not derivable.
Metatheoretical notions such as consistency, independence, and com-
pleteness are meaningful enough when it is understood what would show
such properties not to hold. Indeed, Paul Bernays found out in his
Habilitationsschrift of 1918 that one of Russell’s axioms in the Principia turns
out to be derivable from the rest of the axioms, a result published in Bernays
[Bernays 1926]. Who can deny, then, that a syntactic method for proofs of
underivability in axiomatic logic was an impossibility in the times of Frege and
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Russell? Had someone shown to Frege or Russell an implication that is valid
by the criterion of two truth values, but underivable from the axioms listed in
the Begriffsschrift or Principia Mathematica, these two authors would have
declared their axiomatisation incomplete, something van Heijenoort would
have to regard a conceptual impossibility. Frege, Peano, and Russell would
have naturally taken incompleteness as a failure that can be repaired by the
addition of some principle that had remained hidden. They all clearly believed
that deductive arguments can be perfected.
Van Heijenoort’s pet idea of the “universality of logic” gives a suggestive
and incisive view of the early phase of mathematical logic, but it is mostly a
fantasy when confronted with the sources.
Bibliography
Bernays, Paul [1926], Axiomatische Untersuchung des Aussagen-Kalkuls der
“Principia Mathematica”, Mathematische Zeitschrift, 25(1), 305–320, doi:
10.1007/BF01283841.
Carnap, Rudolf [1929], Abriß der Logistik, Vienna: Springer.
Dedekind, Richard [1888], Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?,
Braunschweig: Vieweg, reprint 1969.
Frege, Gottlob [1879], Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle: Louis Nebert, reprinted in
Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, Olms: I. Angelelli, 1964. English
translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a].
—— [1893], Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, vol. I,
Jena: Hermann Pohle.
Gentzen, Gerhard [1935], Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. I,
Mathematische Zeitschrift, 39(1), 176–210, doi: 10.1007/BF01201353.
Gödel, Kurt [1930], Die Vollständigkeit der Axiome des logischen
Funktionenkalküls, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 37(1), 349–
360, doi: 10.1007/BF01696781, Reprinted in [Gödel 1986, 102–123]. English
translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a].
—— [1986], Collected Works, vol. I, New York: Oxford University Press.
Hilbert, David & Ackermann, Wilhelm [1928], Grundzüge der theoretischen
Logik, Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer.
Kolmogorov, Andrej Nikolaevič [1925], On the principle of excluded middle,
translation of Russian original in [van Heijenoort 1967a, 416–437].
Logic as Calculus 47
Langford [1930], Hilbert and Ackermann on mathematical logic, Bulletin of
the American Mathematical Society, 36(1), 22–25, doi: 10.1090/S0002-9904-
1930-04859-4.
Peano, Giuseppe [1889], Arithmetices Principia Nova Methodo Exposita,
Turin: Fratelli Bocca, partial English translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a].
—— [1891], Sul concetto di numero. Nota I, Rivista di Matematica, 1, 87–102.
—— [1899], Sul § 2 del Formulario, t. II: Aritmetica, Rivista di Matematica,
VI, 75–89.
—— [1908], Formulario de Mathematico, Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 5th edn.
von Plato, Jan [2008], Gentzen’s proof of normalization for natural deduc-
tion, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 14(2), 240–257, doi: 10.2178/bsl/
1208442829.
—— [2017], The Great Formal Machinery Works: Theories of Deduction
and Computation at the Origins of the Digital Age, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Russell, Bertrand [1903], The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
—— [1906], The theory of implication, American Journal of Mathematics,
28(2), 159–202, doi: 10.2307/2369962.
—— [1908], Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types, American
Journal of Mathematics, 30(3), 222–262, doi: 10.2307/2369948.
Skolem, Thoralf [1920], Logisch-kombinatorische Untersuchungen über die
Erfüllbarkeit oder Beweisbarkeit mathematischer Sätze, nebst einem
Theoreme über dichte Mengen, as reprinted in [Skolem 1970, 103–136].
Section 1 translated into English in [van Heijenoort 1967a].
—— [1970], Selected Works in Logic, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, edited by
J. E. Fenstad.
Tarski, Alfred [1935], Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen,
Studia Philosophica, 1, 261–405.
van Heijenoort, Jean (ed.) [1967a], From Frege to Gödel, a Source Book in
Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
van Heijenoort, Jean [1967b], Logic as calculus and logic as language,
Synthese, 17, 324–330, doi: 10.1007/bf00485036.
—— [1985], Jacques Herbrand’s work in logic and its historical context, in
Van Heijenoort’s Selected Essays, 99–121, Naples: Bibliopolis.

Peano’s Reception in the USA. Wilson’s
Review of Russell’s Principles
Gabriele Lolli
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Italy)
Résumé : Dans une recension des Principles de Russell datant de 1904, Edwin
B. Wilson accorde une attention particulière aux travaux de Peano et de
ses collaborateurs. Son but était de mieux les faire connaître aux USA, où
leurs œuvres « étaient malheureusement peu diffusées et n’étaient en outre
pas spécialement appréciées ». La reconnaissance dont Peano bénéficiait aux
yeux de Russell est amplifiée par Wilson, ce dernier estimant que la logique
de Peano est bien plus qu’un nouvel « outil logique », tout en considérant le
logicien italien comme un précurseur du logicisme. Wilson s’oppose ainsi au
jugement dépréciatif dont Peano faisait l’objet de la part de Poincaré. Dans le
domaine de la géométrie en particulier, Wilson revendique diverses avancées
accomplies par l’école de Peano par rapport à Hilbert en ce qui concerne la
philosophie de la méthode axiomatique.
Abstract: In a review of Russell’s Principles from 1904, Edwin B. Wilson
pays great attention to Peano’s work and that of his collaborators. His
purpose was to make this work known in the USA where it “unfortunately
is very little known and still less appreciated”. Wilson expands Russell’s well-
known acknowledgement of Peano’s influence on his own development, seeing
in Peano’s logic more than a new “mathematical tool”, describing Peano as a
kind of proto-logicist, and defending him from Poincaré’s criticisms. Especially
in geometry, he vindicates several priority issues for Peano’s school with respect
to Hilbert in the philosophy of the axiomatic method.
1 Introduction
In 1904 Edwin Bidwell Wilson (1879-1964) wrote a review in the Bulletin
of AMS of two books by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), The Principles of
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 49–67.
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Mathematics [Russell 1903] and a French translation of the older An Essay on
the Foundations of Geometry [Russell 1897, 1901a]. Wilson’s review of these
books [Wilson 1904] is interesting per se, as a description of the natural or
naïve motivation of a logicistic view of mathematics, and we will briefly also
dwell on this part. However one has the impression that the review had been
primarily conceived as an opportunity to talk about Peano and his school, and
to describe his work as a prelude to Russell’s. In fact, while we do not know,
we doubt that at that period any of Peano’s paper had been translated into
English and thus made known to the American scientific public.
In [Wilson 1904, 74, fn.∗], Wilson refers readers to another review by
Couturat of the same 1903 book by Russell which is mainly dedicated to Cantor
and set theory: “So large is the work of Russell, that Couturat’s review and
our own supplement rather than overlap one another”. However Ivor Grattan-
Guiness (1941-2014) glosses both reviews together noting that [Couturat 1904]
“concentrated on Cantor [...] having written elsewhere on the Peanists”, while
Wilson “dwelt on the Peanists, whose work [according to Wilson] ‘is very
little known and still less appreciated’ in the USA (p. 76), referring to their
four lectures at Paris [1900 International Congress of Philosophy]” [Grattan-
Guinness 2000, 330]. So there seems to be an agreement with Grattan-Guiness
in seeing [Wilson 1904] as focused on the Peanists.
Wilson had begun his career in mathematics with a Ph.D. at Yale in 1901
and the same year wrote a book on Vector analysis based on Josiah Willard
Gibbs’ (1839-1903) lectures. He then studied in Paris in 1902-1903, and for a
while was interested in the foundations of geometry (he criticized “so-called”
Hilbert’s foundations in 1903). Next he began teaching at Yale and later at
MIT in the department of physics. He was inspired by Gibbs to work in
mathematical physics, first in mechanics and the theory of relativity, then
in aeronautics and aerodynamics and later in statistics with applications in
many fields. He wrote the first American advanced calculus text. His most
demanding logical contribution, apart from a few reviews, is a discussion of
categoricity, which we shall come back to later.
His time in Paris clearly brought him into contact with the lively
discussions on foundations that were beginning in Europe. While he was in
Paris, he possibly met Louis Couturat (1868-1914) who was devoting himself
to promoting Russell’s work. Wilson begins his review by explaining what is
“the problem of the ultimate foundation of mathematics”: throughout history,
[...] what has been accepted [in pure mathematics] as sure and
accurate in one generation has frequently required fundamental
revision in the next. Euclid and his pupils could doubtless have
complained of the lack of rigour and logical precision in his
predecessors just as forcibly as some modern pupils of Weierstrass
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berate their scientific ancestors and companions.
[Wilson 1904, 741]
He mentions Euler, Cauchy, Laplace, and Dirichlet, and some of their
inaccuracies or errors, which nonetheless did not hinder their work.
We notice that the advance toward our present rigour has been
made step by step by great men who, however, were no greater—
one might almost say no more careful—than their fellows working
in apparent unconsciousness of the impending trouble and perhaps
even incredulous at first as to its reality. When will this revision
stop? And whereunto will it finally lead? This is the problem of
the ultimate foundation of mathematics. (75)
This is a problem that cannot be easily disposed of by ignoring it:
the delicacy of the question is such that even the greatest
mathematicians and philosophers of to-day have made what seem
to be substantial slips of judgement and have shown on occasion
an astounding ignorance of the essence of the problem they were
discussing. (75)
At times this could have been caused by the failings of individual intuition in
dealing with matters that are still unsettled, “but all too frequently it has been
the result of a wholly unpardonable disregard of the work already accomplished
by others” (75).
After this criticism of his fellow-mathematicians, Wilson enters the subject
by quoting the first section of the first chapter of The Principles, containing
Russell’s famous definition of pure mathematics as the class of all propositions,
with variables, of the form “p implies q”, with a few qualifications (the logical
constants allowed in p and q being: implication, to be an element of, such
that, the notion of relation, and truth, plus “such further notions as may be
involved in the general notion of propositions of the above form” (75)).2
2 Peano & Co.’s encomium
Russell’s was “probably the first attempt to give a complete definition of
mathematics solely in terms of the laws of thought and the other necessary
paraphernalia of the thinking mind”; it was made possible by “two things:
first, the more careful discrimination of what pure mathematics is; second, the
extraordinary development of logic since Boole removed it from the trammels
of medieval scholasticism” (76). But
1. Hereinafter, page numbers in the text, (n), without further reference, indicate
the source [Wilson 1904].
2. Russell’s presentation of symbolic logic as in the second chapter of the book
was still in its infancy.
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He to whom the presently highly developed state of the foun-
dations of mathematics is chiefly due is Peano—one whose work
unfortunately is very little known and still less appreciated in this
country. (76)
Although Leibniz achieved a lot and his work in recent years has been
made known by L. Couturat,3 George Boole (1815-1964) freed us from
Aristotelianism, and C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) and Ernst Schröder (1841-1902)
carried the technique of logic much farther,4
[this notwithstanding] they had never accomplished that intimate
formal relation between logic and all mathematics which was the
necessary precursor to a yet more intimate philosophic relation
and which has been brought about by Peano aided by a large
school of pupils and fellow-workers. The advance has been made
largely by introducing into symbolic logic such a simplification
of notation as to relieve it of its unwieldiness and to allow its
development into a powerful instrument without which one can
hardly hope to get the best results in the treacherous though
treasure-laden fields of the foundations of mathematics. (76–77)
Wilson is however aware that not everyone concurs with his view and
that Peano even had his detractors. Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) in particular
(in his review of Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie) “spurns this [Peano’s]
pasigraphy, characterizing it as disastrous in teaching, hurtful to mental
development, and deadening for investigators, nipping their originality in the
bud” (77).5 Even accepting the first statements, to which Wilson will return
in the conclusions,
we had best be cautious in accepting such sweeping statements as
the last, even from so great an authority—especially in view of the
fact that, equipped with this pasigraphy, the Italian investigators,
Peano and his pupil Pieri,† with some rights of priority, had given
a more fundamental logical‡ treatment of the subject on which
Poincaré was writing than is to be found in the work he was
praising so highly [the Grundlagen]. (77–78)
Footnote † (77) is simply is a reference to [Pieri 1898] and [Pieri 1899].
Footnote ‡ (77) instead is a long note in which Wilson disputes some of
3. Wilson here quotes [Couturat 1901].
4. According to Wilson the importance of the logic of relations was emphasized
by Peirce in 1880-1884, but only now begins to show its utility. He does not mention
here, but later in the review, (80, fn.∗), that the first exercise Russell did to master
Peano’s machinery was to treat the theory of relations symbolically, in [Russell 1901b].
Wilson excuses Peano and his followers for neglecting the importance of this subject
because they were “so busy [...] with other important questions”.
5. Wilson is quoting (77), from [Poincaré 1903, 5].
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Poincaré’s judgements. His own assessments in this footnote amount to a
vindication of several priority issues for Peano’s school.
Since Poincaré praised the “long step in advance” made by David Hilbert
(1862-1943) in the philosophy of mathematics by regarding “his geometric
elements as mere things”, Wilson reminds us that Peano had already taken the
same stance [Peano 1889] and that Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) had expressed
the same idea in [Vailati 1891] and [Vailati 1892]. He also notes that by
1897 Peano and his students had gone further by envisaging the postulate
that points are classes, with a twofold advance: first of all the necessity of
a postulate, secondly the use of the term “class”, which permitted a further
reduction of mathematical reasoning to logic.
As for attributing the idea of the independence of the axioms to Hilbert, in
1894 Peano had already stated the problem and given proofs of independence
for certain axioms with simple systems of elements. “By 1899 the idea and
method were both five years old at least” (77, fn.‡).
Of course, in Hilbert’s work “there still remains [...] matter enough for the
amplest praise”:
The archimedean axiom, the theorems of Pascal and Desargues,
the analysis of segments and areas, and a host of things are treated
either for the first time or in a new way, and with consummate
skill. We should say that it was in the techniques rather than
in the philosophy of geometry that Hilbert created an epoch.
(77, fn.‡)
What Wilson is implying with this strong assertion is that the philosophy
of the axiomatic method was already well established and widespread. This
was in fact the subject of Vailati’s two papers and he could have mentioned
others geometricians, such as Moritz Pasch (1843-1930) for example.
Turning to arithmetic and algebra, Wilson is on slippery ground either
because of his lesser competence, or for his propensity to take the claims of
Alessandro Padoa (1868-1937) and Cesare Burali-Forti (1861-1931) at face
value. Indeed he probably only read these in the summaries of their Paris
1900 papers without studying them, otherwise he would have been doubtful
about or mystified by Padoa’s alleged feat.
In his communication at the Congresses,6 Padoa had explained very
precisely how to analyse the formal structure of a deductive theory. He had in
a sense defined and set out the canon of the axiomatic method which Wilson
largely draws from in section 4 of the review dedicated to the fundamental
concepts of the axiomatic method. One of the principles was that
6. Padoa repeated his communication at both congresses, preceding it at the
philosophy congress with a “logical introduction to any deductive theory”. An English
translation of this introduction is included in [van Heijenoort 1967, 118–123].
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Pour démontrer la compatibilité d’un système de postulats,
il faut trouver une interprétation des symboles non définis, qui
vérifie simultanément tous les postulats. [Padoa 1903, 87]
On that occasion, Padoa had also addressed the problem of consistency posed
by Hilbert in 1899 for the number system (in a conference that became
[Hilbert 1900b]) and inserted as problem n. 2 in his list of problems, [Hilbert
1900a]. Padoa was probably disappointed by the silence that had greeted his
contention when he claimed explicitly in 1903 that Hilbert’s problem n. 2 was
completely solved, and that actually “Le problème n. 2 [de M. Hilbert] n’était
qu’une causerie” [Padoa 1903, 86].
What he had done was to define an interpretation saying that “entier
signifie nombre entier relatif” and “sucx signifie 1 + x”. This is not
very different from Poincaré’s assertion (p. 8 of his review) that we know
that axioms are non-contradictory “since geometry exists”, to which Wilson
implicitly takes issue (78, fn.‡).
Wilson however accepts that “a solution [of problem n. 2] has long since
been proposed in the article here referred to” (78, fn.∗), the reference being
[Padoa 1903]. He admits nevertheless in a cryptic way that “There are those,
however, who hold that Padoa has gone so far as to overshoot the mark” (78,
fn.∗). In the same footnote, Wilson regrets having overlooked the fact that
a solution to the consistency problem along the lines proposed by Hilbert
“seems logically impossible”. What Hilbert asked for in 1900 was direct
proof of the consistency of the axioms of arithmetic through “an appropriate
modification of known methods of proof”, applying only “the known inference
methods of the theory of irrational numbers” [Hilbert 1900a, § 41]. However
Wilson acknowledges that “Hilbert has again taken up the matter much more
searchingly than in 1900” (78, fn.∗). He was also informed that Hilbert had
proposed a new approach at the Heidelberg congress in August 1904 and
regretted that he had not seen the text.
It is consistent, however, with the attitude of Peano’s collaborators towards
building models that the interpretation be made with the “ideas” we already
have. In 1906, Peano defined a model for his arithmetic axioms using some
work which had had a different aim (we shall mention this later), but remarking
at the same time that “proof that the system of axioms for arithmetic, or for
geometry, do not involve contradictions is not, to my mind, necessary. For we
do not create axioms arbitrarily, we rather assume the simplest propositions
we find to be as axioms, whether explicitly written or implicit, in every treatise
of arithmetic or geometry” [Peano 1906, 365].
What Wilson could not be aware of is that there were also reservations
about Padoa’s attitude inside Peano’s school but these were only to be
expressed in the immediately ensuing years. Mario Pieri (1860-1913) indirectly
disagreed with Padoa by affirming at the end of his 1904 paper that “it is vain
to seek a direct and absolute proof of the compatibility of the arithmetical
axioms in the field of Arithmetic itself” [Pieri 1904, 331, my translation]. Pieri
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on the contrary looked at Hilbert’s effort to give a logical proof of compatibility
with interest although he remained conscious of the difficulties of avoiding the
notion of number.
In 1906 Pieri came to believe in the possibility of a logical proof of
compatibility with a logic that includes the concept of class:
je me propose précisément d’etablir la compatibilité des axiomes
arithmétiques de R. Dedekind et G. Peano dans un domaine ∆ de
Logique pure [...] en raisonnant dans les limites de la Logique des
classes. [Pieri 1906, 203]
Pieri started from Burali-Forti’s proof that finite classes are a model of
Peano’s axioms but he had to modify this by substituting II below to a Burali-
Forti axiom that A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947) had pointed out as erroneous,
and [Poincaré 1908, 209] had unfairly laughed at.7 Pieri’s proof succeeds by
relying on the logical axioms of the Formulario and the two “principes suivants:
I. Il y a au moins une classe infinie (Le Tout est une classe infinie);
II. Étant donnnée une classe infinie, dont les élements sont à leur tour des
classes, la classe formée par tous les élements de celles-ci est elle-même
infinie.” [Pieri 1906, 207]
Pieri maintains that he can include these two principles without scruple
among the logical axioms “car je n’y vois qu’une détermination convenable des
concepts de classe et représentation” [Pieri 1906, 207].
But, independently of a discussion of this conviction,
je crois avoir établi que le concept de nombre entier, avec ses
propriétés fondamentales (y compris le principe d’induction) peut
être construit sur la Logique des classes de M. Peano, au moyen
des propositions I et II. [Pieri 1906, 207]
Wilson would have appreciated Pieri’s attempt which was the only piece
of true logicism which came from Peano’s school. For now, he continues to
speak highly of the Italians’ contributions as known to him:
Anyone who is acquainted with the articles presented to the
Philosophical Congress at Paris in 1900 by Peano, Burali-Forti,
Padoa and Pieri,8 cannot be convinced that these authors had
become deadened, and the artificiality of their system is by no
means so certain as it might be. (78)
Again at the end of the review in the bibliographic suggestions for further
reading, Wilson suggests that these papers should be read.
7. For more details on this comedy of errors, see e.g., [Lolli 2012, x and xx-xxi].
[Burali-Forti 1896] is relevant also for the history of the axiom of choice, see [Moore
1982, 129].
8. [See references, for all the four of them identifiable by the year 1900.]
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Since then, our author, Russell, has simplified and improved the
older work of C. S. Peirce on the theory of relations, adapting it
to the system of Peano, and has produced a coherent treatment
of the great problems underlying mathematics. (78)
To him those papers “show the point at which the Italian school had arrived in
1900. It is since that time that most of Russell’s technical work has appeared”
(93).
Wilson fails to perceive that the handing of the baton from Peano to Russell
did not really constitute the launching of a project to take matters further
but that there was a hiatus, a different conception. Peano was no logicist.
He wanted to express existing mathematics in a rigourous, compressed and
complete way. He obviously had to deal with arithmetic, geometry, algebra,
real and complex numbers, calculus, but did not want to define mathematical
entities (“numbers cannot be defined” he said in [Peano 1891]) and once the
Formulario was on the right track he had only to make it grow, up to [Peano
1908]. As for foundations, “[h]ic difficultas maxime ex sermonis ambiguitate
oritur”, difficulties come from the language ambiguities. The solution is the
same as that suggested by Leibniz, namely to assign signs to the simplest ideas
from which all others are composed by logical operators.
That date in 1900 also marks the point at which the Italian school
practically ceased to be effectively involved. Wilson could probably not have
had the historical perspective to see the school had run its course but
contemporary mathematicians felt that no further contribution could come
from it. Apart from the work of Pieri mentioned above which concerns
questions of set theory which were in any case alien to Peano’s vision, the
only breath of life in the following years is limited to [Peano 1906] and his
defence of non predicative definitions against Poincaré.
In his 1906 paper on the Cantor-Bernstein theorem Peano answered
Poincaré’s question as to whether the theorem could be proved without
recourse to the natural numbers. After a general discussion of the impossibility
of eliminating all mathematical ideas from such proof, otherwise only the
logical signs would remain—showing clearly on this occasion that he is no
logicist—Peano remarks that in this case one may avoid numbers.
The incriminated definition occurring in the known proofs was of the form
Z(u) =
⋃
{gn(u) : n ∈ N},
g being a bijection, which Peano substituted by
Z(u) =
⋂
{v : u ⊆ v . g“v ⊆ v}.
Then “suppose that only logic, and not arithmetic, is known, so that the
symbols 0, N0 and + are meaningless”; if u is not empty, and one of its elements
is indicated with 0, if we let N0 = Z({0}) and x+ = g(x),
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[and] I read 0, N0,+ as in arithmetic [...] we deduce theorems
identical with the axioms of arithmetic. [Peano 1906, 364–365,
my translation],
just to add immediately however that there is no necessity for a model.
In any case, in 1908 Wilson still did not have the sensation that Peano’s
work was finished and that Russell had taken on a new way of working and
could thus repeat that “reading modern Italian is a necessary condition”, to
become symbolic logicians [Wilson 1908a, 188]. And perhaps this was not
enough and Latin was also required as Wilson warns elsewhere “if I understand
his inflexionless latin” [Wilson 1908b, 437].
3 Russell’s logicism
Now Wilson turns to Russell, although he will have the opportunity to come
back to Peano with pertinent remarks.
In section 3 of the review, Reason, Wilson briefly discusses how mathe-
matics had needed to push its foundations back until they rested solely on
logic. Mathematics as well as any reasoning obviously presupposes a mind
capable of ratiocinative processes. It is usually assumed that if we are careful
enough there is no need for formulating and learning the laws of thought before
beginning to reason or even that a formulation of those laws is impossible.9
However the review began by talking of errors. Where do errors creep in? It
is interesting to read the ideas of someone who was still near the beginning
of the movement of arithmetization and introduction of epsilon proofs almost
to the point of having experienced its bewildering novelties in his lifetime and
who saw it as something still meaningful for foundations.
Where then do the errors creep in? An examination of some
typical cases shows that it is generally through lack of a sufficiently
careful definition of the terms. [...] In mathematics it is
the absence of precise definition which brings in the erroneous
statements concerning differentiation, continuity and infinity, with
a host of others. The perception of this difficulty was the origin
of the principle of arithmetization and of epsilon proofs. (79)
Finally, after one has mastered the principles of modern analysis, there is
no need for the actual presence of epsilon in the proofs.
Nevertheless it is a satisfaction to have this formal method to
fall back on whenever challenged by one’s own hesitancy or by
that of others. In like manner, who has not at times during some
9. He refers to “[J.-M.C.] Duhamel, Des méthodes dans les sciences [de
Raisonnement], [Gauthier-Villars], Paris, 1875, vol. 1, p. 17”.
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long complicated or indirect logical demonstration felt the least
bit uncertain; who would not be glad to have at his hand some
formal method such as Peano’s, based upon certain rudimentary
propositions and concepts?
In truth, it is a matter of more consequence than is sometimes
thought, to have clearly in mind those processes which are
definitely to be admitted as logical. [...]
The question then becomes of fundamental importance: What
is at the bottom of our logic? (79)
“We constantly use propositions, passing from certain propositions as
hypotheses to certain others as conclusion” (80); looking for other principles
“we come upon classes or sets of objects represented in ordinary speech by
common nouns”; finally we perceive that the “relations are of the utmost
importance” (“one of the lasting services of Russell” (80, fn.∗).
The complete logical calculus, as now used, is a combination of
these three types. (80)
We may grant, then, that logic is necessary to mathematics. It is
affirmed to be sufficient. This in reality is the remarkable content
of the definition [of pure mathematics] given by the author. (80)
But the affirmation of its sufficiency fully justifies and even renders imperative
a critical examination of its principles that the simple necessity might never
force us to. The number of logical premises which are sufficient to establish the
calculus in all generality necessary for mathematics is small. However there
are a certain number of elementary ideas such as implication, the notions of
proposition, class, and relation that must be known.
It is the discussion of these questions which are of a philosophical
rather than mathematical nature that fills the first Part of Rusell’s
Principles. (80)
Notwithstanding the novelty, and the many philosophical and mathematical
difficulties, Wilson has no doubt that “to a large extent the author is successful
in his attempt” (80).
4 Some methodological notions
The next section, Some notions, is dedicated to elucidating certain technical
notions to avoid the inconvenience of having to include definitions throughout
the rest of the speech.
“Axiom” is a word that is best abandoned in pure mathematics. Its more
familiar meaning, as “self-evident truth”, has no place in pure mathematics,
which is “a formal subject over which formal and not material implication
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reigns.†”10 The proper word to use for statements we posit in mathematics
would seem to be “postulate”.
What self-evident truths can there be concerning objects which
are not dependent on any definite interpretation but are merely
marks to be operated upon in accordance with the rules of formal
logic? Postulates, however, may be laid down at will so long as
they are not contradictory. It is the postulates which give the
objects their intellectual though not physical existence. (81)
“Definition” for philosophers stands for “a process of analysis and exem-
plification which brings before the mind a real consciousness of the object
defined” (81–82). Mathematical definition is the attribution of a name to
some object whose existence has been established or postulated. “It is the
process of replacing a set of statements by a single name and is resorted to
solely for convenience” (82). Footnote∗ (82), quotes [Peano 1900] to the effect
that it might be better to exclude a large number of definitions.
All definitions are nominal. But there are three styles of definition that
can be illustrated in connection with the theory of integers.11 One possibility
for defining the class of integers is to find a class, whose elements are classes
or propositions, among which there is an element analogous to zero (e.g., the
null class), and it is possible to define operations with the properties we use
for integers. We could say that this class is the class of integers. It would
be a particular but satisfactory definition of integers. We would also be sure
that there would be no contradictions in our system of integers unless there
were a contradiction in our logic. Another possibility would be to write a
suitable set of postulates with the appropriate symbols. “In order to prove
the noncontradictoriness of our system of postulates and indefinables, that
is, the existence of our elements” (83),12 we should build some system which
provided an interpretation of the indefinables and of the postulates, and in the
end we should resort to our logic and thus there would not be much difference
from the previous case. The definition would be more general in that the
integers would not be a particular set but any set satisfying the postulates.
Thirdly we could define, as Russell does, numbers by means of the property
of having the same number in case a one-to-one relation exists between the
elements. Also this kind of definition becomes a nominal one thanks to
Russell’s work on relations.
Finally, since the use of postulates is so common, although in principle
avoidable in pure mathematics, Wilson expresses “a few words” on consistency,
independence, irreducibility and completeness. After mentioning Padoa’s
10. In † it is admitted that in logic “we should incline to use the word axiom [...]
for we are dealing with the actual (mental) world and not with a system of marks.
The basis of rationality must go deeper than a mere set of marks and postulates”.
11. Although implicit, the reference here is to [Burali-Forti 1901].
12. Notice how Wilson independently states Hilbert’s famous thesis on the connec-
tion between consistency and existence.
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method for proving the redundancy of a symbol in terms of others, he observes
that “Huntington‡ seems to have been the first to bring to effective use the
idea of completeness” (84); with this “we have arrived at the limit of present
ideas concerning the interrelations of the notions at the base of mathematics
as defined by postulates” (84). These ideas were well known and discussed
in the US, paving the way in fact for the clarification of the concepts of
completeness and categoricity. “Completeness” was the translation of Hilbert’s
Vollständigkeit and it was used in the sense of completeness in its semantical
form, meaning that every sentence of the language of an axiomatic theory was
either a logical consequence of the axioms or was incompatible with them,
or as deductive completeness. It was also used for what came to be called
categoricity, together with other words.
Edward Vermylie Huntington (1874-1952) in [Huntington 1902] had pro-
vided a set of postulates for the continuous magnitudes that he believed to
be “complete”, meaning that postulates were mutually independent, non-
contradictory and “sufficient”. By this he meant that “there exists essentially
only one” model. “Only one” is intended through the modifier “essentially”
to mean the same thing as our “up to isomorphisms”, although the word was
not available.
In 1904 Oscar Veblen (1880-1960) followed advice from John Dewey
(1859-1952) to suggest the term “categoricity” to substitute the ambiguous
“completeness” [Vollständigkeit]. Veblen maintained he had the right to apply
the undefined terms point and order to any class of objects satisfying the
axioms but that he also aimed to show that “there exists essentially one such
class” [Veblen 1904, 346]. Completeness, which he stated in semantical terms,
would follow.
In 1905 Huntington borrowed Veblen’s term “categorical” for “sufficient”,
conceiving it in the sense that any proposition in primitive language is
either deducible from the postulates or contradictory to them (deductive
completeness). “We have to admit however that our command of the processes
of logical deduction is not yet, and probably never will be sufficiently complete
to justify this assertion” [Huntington 1905, 210†].
Wilson must have known Veblen’s proposal since he uses the term
“categoricity”. He had the opportunity to come back to categoricity in 1908
by intervening in the debate on Zermelo’s axiom of choice which he saw rather
as a logical axiom. He is thus led to discuss logic in general. First he observes
that
It is not always desirable and indeed not always possible to obtain
a set of postulates which shall be categorical: for it may well
happen that the systems to be determined are such that not even
a one to one correspondence between their elements is available,
to say nothing of the preservation of the interpretation of the
symbols [S]. [Wilson 1908b, 434]
Then he recalls that
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Huntington gives a subsidiary definition or explanation of the idea
of categoricity wherein he asserts that if a set [P ] of postulates on
the undefined symbols [S] is categorical, then every proposition
concerning [S] must be deducible from the postulates [P ] or be in
contradiction with them. [Wilson 1908b, 434]
In a system determined categorically, every proposition phrased in terms of
[S] is either compatible or incompatible with [P ].
What, however, does the word deducible mean? The meaning
is entirely relative to the system of logic which is available for
drawing conclusions from the set of primitive propositions [P ].
Some may consider that the human mind has instinctively at its
disposal all valid methods of deduction. This is a tremendous
postulate, and one entirely devoid of other than sentimental value.
In fact, if it leads to the abandoning of the research for valid
methods of deduction, it is dangerous and worse than useless. It
is an essential of the modern attitude in logic that the deducer
should state distinctly his form of inference. Hence deducible
cannot be regarded as equivalent to compatible.
It is clear that in an ideal perfection of logic compatibility and
deducibility would be equivalent for categorically defined systems.
That state of perfection appears at present to be very remote.
[Wilson 1908b, 436]
5 The Principles
The next two sections, 5 Numbers (85) and 6 Geometry and Mechanics (87),
are entirely devoted to the mathematical development of the Principles. The
definitions of numbers, of cardinals and of ordinals are obviously discussed,
“with the guidance of the principle of abstraction” (85) (meaning: equivalence
classes). Finite and infinite are neatly distinguished. According to Wilson, an
advantage of Russell’s method, with contributions by Alfred North Whitehead
(1861-1947), “is that by the use of logical addition the numerical addition of a
finite or infinite number of finite or infinite cardinals may be and indeed (if we
invoke the principle of abstraction) should be defined in such a manner that
the order in which the numbers are added plays no part” (85). To Wilson,
This is a great victory for common sense and must appeal to
everyone as a vindication of the school-child in his inherent notion
that he has the same number of marbles whether he has five in
one pocket and three in another or three in two pockets and two in
a third, no matter which of his pockets these be. The principle of
commutation and association of the terms in addition is entirely
done away with, except in so far as mechanical difficulties prevent
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us from writing simultaneously a number of terms and the signs
of addition connecting them. (85)
Of course, “there still remain difficulties to solve”, but “there is no reason
why he [the author] should not find adherents who will take up the work and
attempt the solution in a spirit of hearty cooperation” (87).
As for real numbers,
[t]here is a school of creationists who, when they find that certain
infinite processes lead to no rational limit nor yet to a number
which becomes infinite, postulate the existence of a limit and thus
obtain the irrational numbers. The author does not consider an
ipse dixit like this to be a sufficiently good theorem of existence.
He therefore considers infinite sets of rationals and by means of
them he forms a set of things which he calls real numbers. A
real number is neither a rational nor an irrational; it is a certain
infinite set of rationals. (87)
Wilson appreciates the “very satisfactory account of the philosophy of the
infinite and of the continuous”.
The comments on geometry are interesting in that Wilson sees Russell’s
presentation as a good example of how to avoid the postulates method. He
skips however the details of the definition of geometry as “the study of series
[successions] of two or more dimensions” (87) so that readers of the review
cannot grasp it unless they resort to Russell’s book. The simplest example is
a succession of reals. The anomalous definition is partly due to the fact that
“Mathematical geometry has long since been divested of all spatial relations
between its elements” (87). On the other hand, as those who define geometry
by postulates are forced to show the existence of their elements by having
recourse to systems of numbers the question is quite pertinent:
Why not begin with a purely nominal definition like the above
and avoid the trouble of proofs of existence, of independence, and
of irreducibility? (88)
Wilson confronts the new approach with the previous one of [Russell 1897]
whereby geometry depended on mechanics, and shows the path leading to its
foundations pursued by the author as deeply as to the logical basis before
returning to rebuilding it through the solution of many logical issues.
6 Conclusions
One conclusive remark on logic, in section 7 Conclusions (90), is the warning
that there are many systems of logic at present. Since a few of the topics which
need a logical treatment are very complex like infinity and the continua, “it
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might not be regarded as surprising if some points were found to stand out
permanently, so that logicians will permanently disagree” (90). In fact Wilson
is aware that there is a logical difficulty in the very logical system developed
by Russell. Frege’s repair work is discussed in the appendix to the book under
review. In (90, fn.∗), Wilson recalls Hilbert’s attempt in the Heidelberg address
(quoted before) to recast the principles of logic and arithmetic so as “to render
them sufficient for mathematical reasoning”:
We certainly hope he has succeeded in doing so to the satisfaction
of both mathematicians and philosophers. (90, fn.∗)
Meanwile
[...] [i]t is dangerous to accept the naïve point of view of those who
claim that a certain piece of reasoning depends on the operation
of logic alone but who fail to state what those operations are. (90)
From the pedagogical standpoint, Wilson entirely accepts Poincaré’s
warning that “pure logic alone [...] is harmful to the earlier development of the
mind” (91). Hence, instead of troubling students with elaborate deductions
of the properties of arithmetic operations, it would be better to let them
appreciate the ideas of finite and infinite cardinals and ordinals, of compactness
and continuity, the different kinds of infinity. A clear-cut “physical conception”
that numbers possess order and may be associated with the points of a line is
both necessary and sufficient for ordinary rigourous analysis.
An inadequate vague idea regarded as a useful working hypothesis
seems, on the whole, productive of more good and less harm than
an inadequate definite idea regarded as final. (91)
As for mathematics, “we have learned that many of the objects which have
been thought of as individual must be regarded as classes” (91). According
to Wilson, “we cannot define Euclidean space, but we can define the class
of all Euclidean spaces”. In (91, fn.†), he notes that this apparently lowers
the importance of the concept of completeness (discussed before in relation to
Huntington):
For it appears as if the one-to-one correspondence between the
different Euclidean spaces were really of minor significance. This
is but another instance of the fact that the elements themselves
are unimportant—that it is the abstraction from them which is
most fundamental. (91, fn.†)
The idea of completeness is however a step forward toward a fuller description
of the systems dealt with. Wilson would certainly be happy with the many
later concepts of model theory.
A note of optimism in conclusion. Since during the construction of
the mathematical objects “we have introduced no new indefinables, no new
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postulates, no processes other than those of logic, there is no possibility of our
arriving at contradictions except through the failure of our logical system to
be logical; and behind this we cannot go” (91). The existence of the classes
which we have dealt with remained to be shown and this was done by Russell,
starting from below—the null class, the finite cardinals, the class of finite
cardinals, and so on.
The promised second volume will contain “actual chains of deduction
leading from the premises of logic through arithmetic to geometry” (92).
Wilson could hardly surmise that this logic would have to wait till 1908.
Finally: “For those who wish sooner to get at the Peano-Russell point of
view”, a short bibliography is added which is “very incomplete” but useful to
trace the development of the idea. Beyond the papers quoted in the footnotes,
it comprises Peano’s two 1889 seminal works, “the starting point of the whole
movement”, the four Italian Paris contributions again, a paper by Whitehead
on cardinal numbers and one by Burali-Forti on a general theory of numbers.
Logica matematica by Burali-Forti in the series of Manuali Hoepli may serve
as a textbook.
The Formulaire de mathématiques edited by Peano, is rather hard
to begin on. The Rivista de matematica [...] also edited by Peano,
furnishes much easy and instructive reading matter. (92)
As for our conclusions, it seems to us that when talking of the “Peano-
Russell point of view”, Wilson’s assessment is even too generous, but after all
fair, when he ascribes to Peano “an intimate formal relation between logic and
all mathematics [...] precursor to a yet more intimate philosophical relation”
(76), left to be revealed by Russell. It is not the case that “he [Peano] was
always more precise than anyone else, and that he invariably got the better of
any arguments upon which he embarked [at Paris 1900 Congress]” as Russell
said. In Russell’s exhalted words, Peano’s logic was “a new mathematical
technique”, as stated in [Russell 1967, 144–145]. Peano’s logic used classes,
and, although he himself probably lost interest in its development, certain of
his followers at least [Pieri 1906] paid attention to the necessity of axioms for
classes and [Burali-Forti 1916a,b] later gave a definition of ordered n-tuples.
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Résumé : Dans cet article nous entendons comprendre comment l’arithmé-
tique de Peano a atteint la place qu’elle occupe aujourd’hui en mathématiques.
Nous comparons tout d’abord les approches de Peano et de Dedekind, avant
de mettre en avant le rôle de Hilbert et Bernays dans les développements
ultérieurs de l’arithmétique de Peano.
Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the question how Peano’s Arithmetic
reached the place it occupies today in Mathematics. We compare Peano’s
approach with Dedekind’s account of the subject. Then we highlight the role
of Hilbert and Bernays in subsequent developments.
Propositiones, quae logicae operationibus a caeteris deducuntur,
sunt theoremata; quae vero non, axiomata vocavi.
[Peano 1889, iv]
1 Einleitung
Die Peano-Arithmetik ist die heute allgemein anerkannte axiomatische
Grundlage der Arithmetik. Dabei handelt es sich allerdings nicht um die
Originalformulierung von Peano [Peano 1889], sondern um eine Variante,
die vor allem den metamathematischen Resultaten von Kurt Gödel
Rechnung trägt. Modern gesprochen arbeitet Peano bei der Formulierung des
Induktionsaxioms in einer Logik zweiter Stufe. Da eine solche Logik aber,
wie wir aus Gödels Resultaten wissen, nicht (rekursiv) axiomatisierbar ist,
ist es für den mathematischen Beweisbegriff geboten, sich auf die Logik
erster Stufe zu beschränken. Damit müssen aber zumindest die elementaren
zahlentheoretischen Funktionen der Addition und Multiplikation axiomatisch
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hinzugenommen werden (während sie in Peanos Originalansatz noch definito-
risch eingeführt werden konnten).
In diesem Artikel wollen wir der Frage nachgehen, wie die Peano-
Arithmetik ihre aktuelle Form erhielt und wie sie ihren Platz in der heutigen
Mathematik gewinnen konnte. Auf der Basis der historischen Entwicklung
zeichnen wir dabei die theoretisch notwendig gewordenen Modifikationen nach
und betonen die Abgrenzung zu Dedekind, der kurz vor Peano in der Schrift
Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? [Dedekind 1888] eine Begründung der
Arithmetik vorgelegt hat, die Peano erst kurz vor der Veröffentlichung seiner
Axiome vorlag.1
Diese Verbindung zu Dedekind wird von einigen Autoren dazu benutzt,
statt von den Peano-Axiomen von den Dedekind-Peano-Axiomen zu sprechen.2
Tatsächlich muß man Dedekind zugestehen, daß er die mathematischen
Sachverhalte, die den Axiomen zugrundeliegen, wohl sehr viel tiefer erkannt
hatte als Peano. Wir wollen aber dafür argumentieren, daß es Peanos Verdienst
ist, die Auszeichnung der charakterisierenden Eigenschaften der natürlichen
Zahlen in Axiomen herausgestellt zu haben, während Dedekind dezidiert diese
„Axiome“ auf tiefliegende logische Prinzipien zurückführen wollte, so daß jene
bei ihm zu Sätzen wurden.
Insofern wäre es wohl historisch angebracht, von den Dedekind-Peano-
Eigenschaften der natürlichen Zahlen zu sprechen. Wenn man aber die spezi-
fische Auszeichnung von Axiomen vor Augen hat, muß man die Bezeichnung
Peano-Axiome nicht kritisieren. Dabei ist es nicht von Belang, ob man Axiom
im traditionellen Sinne als intuitiv wahre Aussage versteht oder doch nur
im modernen Sinne als unbewiesene, an den Anfang einer Untersuchung
gestellte, nicht hinterfragte Voraussetzung; beide Lesarten sind mit Peanos
Darstellung verträglich.
Eine eingehende Untersuchung der Geschichte der mathematischen
Induktion findet man bei [Felgner 2012]. Wir setzen hier erst bei Dedekind
und Peano an und betrachten vor allem die Unterschiede zwischen ihren
Ansätzen. Anschließend beleuchten wir das weitere Schicksal der Peano-
Axiome, insbesondere bei Hilbert und Bernays. Letztere können wohl dafür
verantwortlich gemacht werden, daß die Peano-Arithmetik ihren heutigen
ausgezeichneten Status gewinnen konnte.
1. Für die retrospektive Frage, wie Peano zu seinen Axiomen kam, können wir
auf die detaillierte Ausarbeitung von Segre verweisen [Segre 1994], die sich bei
der Beurteilung des Verhältnisses von Peano zu Dedekind wesentlich mit unserer
Sichtweise deckt.
2. Siehe z. B. bei [Sieg & Morris 2018, B.2], aber auch schon, als „Peano-
Dedekind“, bei [Weyl 1928, 86]. Tapp schreibt: „In der historisch informierten
Literatur hat sich daher auch schon eingebürgert, diese Axiome nach Dedekind und
Peano zu benennen“ [Tapp 2013, 88].
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2 Dedekind (zum ersten)
Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) veröffentlichte 1888 seine berühmte SchriftWas
sind und was sollen die Zahlen?. Dort wird in § 6 die „Reihe der natürlichen
Zahlen“ als „einfach unendliches System“ eingeführt. Wir wollen hier nicht
näher auf die spezifische Terminologie von Dedekind eingehen, an die sich
unmittelbar die Frage nach seiner Eingruppierung in die verschiedenen moder-
nen mathematikphilosophischen Positionen anschließen würde.3 Der Begriff
„System“ steht aber im Prinzip für das, was wir heute „Menge“ nennen.4
Es gibt noch weitere, auch notationelle Eigenheiten, die sich nicht weiter
durchgesetzt haben. So entspricht „3“ der heutigen Teilmengenrelation „⊆“
und durch die durch den Index 0 bezeichnete Funktion erhält man aus der
Menge A die „Kette des Systems A“ [Dedekind 1888, § 44].5 Schließlich ist
ϕ die Nachfolgerfunktion, die aber nicht nur auf einzelnen Zahlen, sondern
allgemein auf Mengen operiert. Die Einführung der natürlichen Zahlen wird
dann wie folgt gegeben:
71. Erklärung. Ein System N heißt einfach unendlich, wenn es
eine solche ähnliche Abbildung ϕ von N in sich selbst gibt, daß N
als Kette (44) eines Elementes erscheint, welches nicht in ϕ(N)
enthalten ist. Wir nennen dies Element, das wir im folgenden
durch das Symbol 1 bezeichnen wollen, das Grundelement von N
und sagen zugleich, das einfach unendliche System N sei durch
diese Abbildung ϕ geordnet. Behalten wir die früheren bequemen
Bezeichnungen für die Bilder und Ketten bei (§ 4), so besteht
mithin das Wesen eines einfach unendlichen Systems N in der
Existenz einer Abbildung ϕ von N und eines Elements 1, die den
folgenden Bedingungen α, β, γ, δ genügen:
α. N ′ 3 N .
β. N = 10.
γ. Das Element 1 ist nicht in N ′ enthalten.
δ. Die Abbildung ϕ ist ähnlich.
3. Siehe dazu das Ende von § 7 unten, insbesondere Fußnote 22.
4. Dedekind erwähnt zwar Bolzano und Cantor kurz in der Vorrede in Bezug
auf seine Endlichkeitsdefinition, bedient sich aber nicht deren Namen Menge oder
Mannigfaltigkeit.
5. Der Begriff der Kette wird gut in Zermelos Würdigung der Dedekindschen
Arbeit erläutert, die er für Landaus Nachruf auf Dedekind verfaßt hat:
Bei jeder Abbildung eines Systems S auf einen (echten oder unechten)
Teil S′ von S gibt es „Ketten“, d. h. Teilsysteme K, welche gleichfalls
in sich selbst abgebildet werden, und jeder beliebige Teil A von S läßt
sich zu einer kleinsten Kette A0 ergänzen, welche als Durchschnitt aller
A umfassenden Ketten einfach als „die Kette von A“ bezeichnet wird.
[Zermelo 2010, 298]
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Die Rolle von ϕ als Nachfolgerfunktion und die damit einhergehende
Einführung der ′-Notation6 wird wenig später wie folgt erläutert:
[U]nter a, b . . .m, n . . . [werden] stets Elemente von N , also
Zahlen, unter A,B,C . . . Teile [modern gesprochen: Teilmengen]
von N , unter a′, b′ . . .m′, n′ . . . A′, B′, C′ . . . die entsprechenden
Bilder verstanden [...], welche durch die ordnende Abbildung ϕ
erzeugt werden und stets wieder Element oder Teile von N sind;
das Bild n′ einer Zahl n wird auch die auf n folgende Zahl genannt.
Damit kann Dedekind nun den folgenden Satz beweisen:
80. Satz der vollständigen Induktion (Schluß von n auf n′). Um
zu beweisen, daß ein Satz für alle Zahlen n einer Kette m0 gilt,
genügt zu zeigen,
ρ. daß er für n = m gilt, und
σ. daß aus der Gültigkeit des Satzes für eine Zahl n der
Kette m0 stets seine Gültigkeit auch für die folgende Zahl n′
folgt.
3 Peano (zum ersten)
Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932) veröffentlichte [Peano 1889] seine Schrift
Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita. Abbildung 1 zeigt, wie die
Axiome für die Arithmetik in § 1 vorgestellt werden.
Zwei Jahre später legte Peano eine modifizierte Version vor (die in
Abbildung 2 wiedergegeben ist und in der u.a. die sich auf die Gleichheit
beziehenden Axiome nicht mehr zur Arithmetik gerechnet werden) [Peano
1891, 84].7
Gegenüber Dedekind fällt bei Peanos Darstellungen sofort auf, daß dieser
sich einer formalen Notation bedient, die der heute geläufigen schon sehr nahe
kommt. Diese Einführung formaler Notation war eine der Hauptmotivationen
von Peano, und seine Verdienste um die moderne logico-mathematische
Notation sind allgemein bekannt und müssen hier nicht gesondert
gewürdigt werden.8
Den für uns wichtigen sachlichen Unterschied — die Einführung der
arithmetischen Eigenschaften statt ihrer Herleitung aus übergeordnenten
Prinzipien — spricht Peano selbst aus:
6. Diese Notation hat sich bis heute gehalten; siehe dazu auch Fußnote 19.
7. Für eingehende Beschreibung der Entwicklung von Peanos Zahlbegriff, auch
über die natürlichen Zahlen hinaus, siehe [Kennedy 1974b].
8. Siehe z. B. [Grattan-Guinness 2011], der weiter auf [Grattan-Guinness 2000,
Kap. 2, 4 und 5] verweist, wobei das Kapitel 5 Peano: the Formulary of Mathematics
besonders hervorzuheben ist.
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Abbildung 1
Fra quanto precede, e quanto dice il Dedekind, vi ha una
contraddizione apparente, che conviene subito rilevare. Qui non si
difinisce il numero, ma se ne enunciano le proprietà fondamentali.
Invece il Dedekind definisce il numero, e precisamente chiama
numero ciò che soddisfa alle condizioni predette. Evidentemente
le due cose coincidono.9 [Peano 1891, 88]
9. „Wie Dedekind bemerkt, enthält das Vorhergehende einen scheinbaren [termi-
nologischen] Widerspruch, den man sofort feststellen sollte. Hier wird nicht die Zahl
definiert, sondern es werden ihre grundlegenden Eigenschaften formuliert. Dedekind
hingegen definiert die Zahl; genauer [gesagt] nennt er Zahl, was die vorgenannten




4 Peano und Dedekind
In der Literatur ist es eine wiederkehrende Diskussion, ob:10
– Peano durch „[d]as Studium des Dedekindschen Essays auf eine Liste
von ein paar Axiomen“ geführt wurde,11 oder:
– Peano „unabhängig und in völliger Unkenntnis der Dedekindschen
Veröffentlichung zu seiner Analysis der natürlichen Zahlen gekommen
war“.12
Die Priorität von Dedekind ist unbestritten, und Peano schreibt selbst, daß
ihm Dedekinds Arbeit vorlag.13
Ob Peano seine Axiome aus dem Studium der Dedekindschen Arbeit
gewann oder schon vorher unabhängig gefunden hatte, ist wohl auch deshalb
kontrovers, weil er sich selbst dazu widersprüchlich geäußert hat. Eine
Bemerkung von Peano kann leicht als Argument für die erste Sichtweise gelesen
werden (auch wenn sie eine unabhängige Entdeckung nicht ausschließt):
10. Siehe auch [Segre 1994, 292, für weitere Zitate insbesondere Fußnote 21]; die
Liste ließe sich inzwischen weiter verlängern.
11. So [Felgner 2012, 41]. In ähnlicher Weise auch [van Heijenoort 1967, 83], u.a.
12. So sein Biograph [Kennedy 1974a, 15], aber auch [von Plato 2019] u.a.
13. „Utilius quoque mihi fuit recens scriptum: R. Dedekind, Was sind und was
sollen die Zahlen; Braunschweig, 1888, in quo quaestiones, quae ad numerorum
fundamenta pertinent, acute examinantur“ [Peano 1889, v].
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Le proposizioni primitive che precedono sono dovute al
Dedekind, [Dedekind 1888, n. 71]; [...].14 [Peano 1891, 86]
Später hat Peano explizit die zweite Auffassung zu Protokoll gegeben:
La composizione del mio lavoro a. 1889 fu ancora indipendente
dallo scritto menzionato del Dedekind ; prima della stampa, ebbi
la prova morale dell’indipendenza delle proposizioni primitive da
cui io partivo, nella loro coincidenza sostanziale colle definitioni
del Dedekind.15 [Peano, 1896–1899 1898, 243]
Für eine unabhängige Entdeckung der charakterisierenden Eigenschaften
der natürlichen Zahlen seitens Peano spricht aus unserer Sicht, daß sich
seine Axiome nicht unmittelbar mit denen von Dedekind identifizieren lassen.
Die notwendige „Übersetzung“ bedarf eines gewissen Aufwandes.16 Hätte
Peano diesen Aufwand vor der Niederschrift seiner Arbeit betrieben, denn
hätte er sich wahrscheinlich auch des komfortablen Rekursionstheorems von
Dedekind bedient.
Letztlich ist es müßig, ohne zusätztlich Quellen über den genauen histo-
rischen Hergang zu spekulieren.17 Und für die uns interessierende Frage des
Unterschieds, ob die charakterisierenden Eigenschaften der natürlichen Zahlen
als Axiome oder Sätze aufgefaßt wurden, spielt es keine Rolle, ob Peano bei
der Formulierung direkt auf Dedekind zurückgriff oder nicht; der Unterschied
der Auffassungen besteht unabhängig davon.
5 Dedekind (zum zweiten)
Bei Dedekind werden die charakteristischen Eigenschaften der natürlichen
Zahlen nicht axiomatisch gegeben, sondern ergeben sich definitorisch inner-
halb seiner informellen Mengenlehre. Tatsächlich verfolgt er ein logizisti-
sches Programm für die Arithmetik, wobei die — nicht formal eingeführ-
te — Mengenlehre als Teil der Logik betrachtet wird. Der Dedekindsche
Logizismus wird von ihm in den Eröffnungsworten des Vorworts eindeutig
zum Ausdruck gebracht:
14. „Die vorhergehenden grundlegenden Sätze sind Dedekind zuzuschreiben [...]“.
[Übersetzung von Peter Schuster].
15. „Die Erstellung meiner Arbeit von 1889 war noch unabhängig von der von
Dedekind erwähnten Schrift; vor Drucklegung hatte ich den moralischen Beweis,
daß die grundlegenden Sätze, von denen ich ausging, unabhängig waren, in ihrer
wesentlichen Übereinstimmung mit Dedekinds Definitionen.“
16. Tapp gibt eine solche in zwei Zwischenschritten, die aus unserer Sicht — und
entgegen der Intention des Autors — die Unähnlichkeit der beiden Formulierungen
deutlich hervortreten lassen [Tapp 2013, 87].
17. Segre bezeichnet die Frage nach der Priorität als „hoary and unimportant“
[Segre 1994, 292].
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Was beweisbar ist, soll in den Wissenschaften nicht ohne Beweis
geglaubt werden. So einleuchtend diese Forderung erscheint, so
ist sie doch, wie ich glaube, selbst bei der Begründung der
einfachsten Wissenschaft, nämlich desjenigen Teils der Logik,
welcher die Lehre von den Zahlen behandelt, auch nach den
neuesten Darstellungen noch keineswegs als erfüllt anzusehen.
[I]ch [nenne] die Arithmetik (Algebra, Analysis) nur einen Teil
der Logik [...]. [Dedekind 1932, 335]
Die Idee eines rein axiomatischen Aufbaus der natürlichen Zahlen, wie er von
Peano gegeben wird, ist mit diesem Anliegen unverträglich.
Wie gesagt, kommt der Logizismus Dedekinds in einem mengentheo-
retischen Gewand daher. Wir müssen hier nicht der Frage nachgehen, ob
Dedekinds Mengenlehre tatsächlich einen rein logischen Charakter hat; Hilbert
wird dies später verneinen (siehe unten § 9). Als viel schlimmer hat sich heraus-
gestellt, daß diese Mengenlehre im Prinzip den bekannten mengentheoretischen
Paradoxien, wie z. B. Russells Paradoxon, ausgesetzt ist. Dedekind ist sich
dieser Problematik in den 1890er Jahren bewußt geworden und hat lange mit
der Herausgabe der dritten Auflage gezögert; als er dieser 1911 schließlich
zustimmte, schrieb er im Vorwort:
Als ich vor etwa acht Jahren aufgefordert wurde, die damals
schon vergriffene zweite Auflage dieser Schrift durch eine dritte
zu ersetzen, trug ich Bedenken, darauf einzugehen, weil inzwi-
schen sich Zweifel an der Sicherheit wichtiger Grundlagen meiner
Auffassung geltend gemacht hatten. Die Bedeutung und teilweise
Berechtigung dieser Zweifel verkenne ich auch heute nicht. Aber
mein Vertrauen in die innere Harmonie unserer Logik ist dadurch
nicht erschüttert; ich glaube, daß eine strenge Untersuchung
der Schöpferkraft des Geistes, aus bestimmten Elementen ein
neues Bestimmtes, ihr System zu erschaffen, das notwendig
von jedem dieser Elemente verschieden ist, gewiß dazu führen
wird, die Grundlagen meiner Schrift einwandfrei zu gestalten.
[Dedekind 1932, 343]
Aus moderner Perspektive läßt sich dazu sagen, daß Dedekind insoweit Recht
hat, als sich die „Grundlagen“ — vor allem aber auch die mathemati-
schen Resultate — seiner Schrift innerhalb einer axiomatischen Mengenlehre,
wie z. B. der von Zermelo, einwandfrei entwickeln lassen. Die logizistische
Grundüberzeugung Dedekinds, nach der die Logik alleine (wie sie auch immer
genau abgegrenzt sein sollte) als Grundlage seiner Resultate dienen kann, ist
aber nicht mehr zu retten.
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6 Peano (zum zweiten)
Peanos Ansatz, die Arithmetik auf — modern gesprochen — nicht-logische
Axiome aufzubauen, ist grundlagentheoretisch unproblematisch und hat sich,
der Idee nach, heute durchgesetzt.
Allerdings darf man nicht übersehen, daß auch Peanos Axiomatisierung,
so wie sie von ihm 1889 und 1891 gegeben wurde, eine problematische
Mengenlehre zugrunde liegt. Axiom 9 (1889) bzw. Axiom 5 (1891) benutzt,
so wie es formuliert ist, mit K offensichtlich eine Allmenge. Da Peano keine
formalen Mengenbildungsoperationen angibt, kann man ihm wohl nicht direkt
einen Widerspruch durch die Formalisierung des Cantorschen Paradoxons
über die Menge aller Mengen nachweisen; aber eine genaue Abgrenzung
der Formelklasse, für die vollständige Induktion zur Verfügung steht, bleibt
zumindest offen. Wie auch immer die genaue Abgrenzung der Eigenschaften
auszusehen hat, sie erlaubt zumindest zweitstufige Eigenschaften,
so daß sich die arithmetischen Operationen der Addition und Multiplikation
definieren lassen.18
Im Gegensatz zu Dedekind war sich Peano aber des nicht-logischen
Charakters seiner Axiome bewußt, was durch die Einführung der Symbole N ,
1, und a+ 1 (bzw. a+)19 in den Explicationes (1889) bzw. den vorangestellten
Sätzen (1891) deutlich wird. Diese sind nicht, wie bei Dedekind, durch
Definitionen in einer übergeordneten Theorie gegeben. Die Notwendigkeit einer
solchen Hinzunahme nicht-logischer Zeichen spricht Peano explizit aus:
18. Dabei kann sich Peano auf Graßmann stützen:
In arithmeticae demonstrationibus usus sum libro: H. Grassmann,
Lehrbuch der Arithmetik, Berlin 1891. [Peano 1889, v]
19. Das Problem der Bezeichnung der Nachfolgerfunktion und deren Kollision mit
der (zweistelligen) Addition wurde von Bernays zum Ausdruck gebracht:
Der Fortschreitungsprozeß pflegt in der Mathematik durch „+1“
angegeben zu werden. Diese Bezeichnungsweise hat jedoch den Mangel,
daß der begriffliche Unterschied zwischen der Auffassung von „a + 1“
als der auf a folgenden Zahl und andererseits der Summe von a und 1
nicht zur Darstellung gelangt. [Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 219, Fußnote 1]
Bernays bedient sich daher der auch schon bei Dedekind verwendeten Schreibweise a′
für den Nachfolger von a.
Leonard Nelson zum Beispiel hat den begrifflichen Unterschied bei der unter-
schiedlichen Verwendung des + Zeichens nicht gesehen:
Hieran scheitert z. B. auch der Versuch, das oben genannte
Grassmannsche Axiom als Definition der Addition aufzufassen. [... wir
müßten,] um den Sinn des + Zeichens auf der linken Seite der Gleichung
durch die rechte Seite zu erklären, bereits die Bedeutung kennen [. . . ],
die es auf der rechten Seite hat [...]. [Nelson 1905-1906, 43]
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Puto vero his tantum logicae signis propositiones cuiuslibet scien-
tiae exprimi posse, dummodo adiungantur signa quae entia huius
scientias representant. [Peano 1889, v, unsere Hervorhebung]
7 Dedekind (zum dritten)
Wenn wir bis hierher die Verdienste Peanos für die Herausarbeitung der
Axiome der Arithmetik als nicht-logische Komponenten gegenüber Dedekind
hervorgehoben haben, müssen wir aber noch hinzufügen, daß die mathemati-
sche Analyse der Grundlagen der Arithmetik bei Dedekind sehr viel tiefer geht
als bei Peano.
Zuerst hat Dedekind ein allgemeines Rekursionsschema zur Einführung
von Funktionen bewiesen, das bei Peano fehlt [Dedekind 1888, Satz 126].20
Darüberhinaus beweist Dedekind die Kategorizität seiner Charakte-
risierung:
132. Satz. Alle einfach unendlichen Systeme sind der
Zahlenreihe N und folglich (nach 33) auch einander ähnlich.
[Dedekind 1932, 376]
Dieses Resultat kann vielleicht als das mathematisch tiefste der Dedekindschen
Abhandlung betrachtet werden. Es hat so keine Entsprechung bei Peano
(der dazu überhaupt erst eine Theorie der Semantik seines Axiomensystems
hätte entwickeln müssen) und sein Fehlen hat zu einem aus unserer Sicht
tiefgreifenden Mißverständnis des axiomatischen Ansatzes bei Russell geführt
(siehe unten § 8).
Schließlich hatte Dedekind aber auch die Notwendigkeit der zweitstufigen
Formulierung der vollständigen Induktion erfaßt, wie aus den Ausführungen
in seinem Brief an Keferstein deutlich wird.21 Dabei hatte er insbesondere
schon die Konstruktion von heute sogenannten Nichtstandardmodellen der
(erststufigen) Peano-Arithmetik vor Augen [siehe Kahle 2017]. Bei Peano
finden sich keine Anhaltspunkte, daß er bei der Formulierung seiner Axiome
vergleichbare Analysen vorgenommen haben könnte.
Felgner rekonstruiert Dedekinds Vorgehensweise in algebraischer
Begrifflichkeit:
20. Van Heijenhoort schreibt dazu in seiner Einführung zur englischen Übersetzung
von [Peano 1889]:
[Peano] proves for addition a theorem [...] and a similar theorem [...] for
multiplication; but these theorems are far from having the same effect
as Dedekind’s Theorem 126. [van Heijenoort 1967, 84]
21. Dieser Brief findet sich in englischer Übersetzung in der Textsammlung von
van Heijenhoort [van Heijenoort 1967]; eine kritische Edition wurde von Tapp [Tapp
2017] besorgt.
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[Die Grundidee des Beweises von Dedekind] kommt aus der
Algebra. Wenn Φ eine Eigenschaft ist, die der Zahl 0 zukommt
und mit einer Zahl n auch ihrem Nachfolger n + 1, dann ist die
Menge E = {n;n ∈ N & Φ(n)} unter der Nachfolger-Operation
abgeschlossen und ist also (algebraisch gesehen) eine Substruktur
der Halbgruppe 〈N, ν〉, wenn ν die 1-stellige Nachfolger-Funktion
ist: ν(x) = x + 1. Um E = N zu beweisen, muß man also
„nur“ zeigen, daß E = N überhaupt keine echten Substrukturen,
die die 0 enthalten, besitzt. (Aus algebraischer Sicht ist dies
genau die Aussage des Prinzips der vollständigen Induktion.)
[Felgner 2012, 38f]
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist man geneigt, Dedekinds Analyse weni-
ger dem Logizismus zuzurechen, als vielmehr dem Strukturalismus. Der
Strukturalismus, wie er in der Mathematik vor allem durch Bourbaki pro-
pagiert wurde, hat seine Grundlagen ohne Zweifel in Dedekinds algebrai-
schen Arbeiten, die später von Emmy Noether weiter entwickelt wurden.
Insbesondere Sieg weist darauf hin, daß auch schon Dedekinds Behandlung der
Arithmetik in diesem Kontext gesehen werden muß [Sieg & Morris 2018].22
8 Russell, Couturat, nochmal Russell
und auch Gödel
Peanos axiomatischer Ansatz wurde natürlich von ihm selbst und seiner Schule
weitergeführt.23
Wie sich die Peano-Arithmetik zur heutigen Standardtheorie entwickeln
konnte, scheint aber eine vergleichsweise unklare Geschichte zu sein.
Oft wurden Peanos Axiome als eine Art Lemmata behandelt, die zwar
die charakteristischen Eigenschaften der natürlichen Zahlen durchaus erschöp-
fend zusammenstellen, aber eben nicht den Charakter von eigenständigen
Axiomen haben, sondern letztlich für passend definierte logische Ausdrücke
bewiesen werden sollen. Dieses Verständnis entspricht im wesentlichen dem von
Dedekind, allerdings wird — Russell folgend — häufig auf Freges Definition der
22. Es ließe sich hier noch eine eingehende Debatte um das Verständnis von
Dedekinds Ansatz anschließen, auf die wir verzichten müssen. Einen guten Überblick
zum aktuellen Stand der Diskussion gibt [Reck 2017]. Für die Beziehung von Dedekind
zu Peano können wir noch spezifisch auf [Ferreirós in Vorbereitung] verweisen, der
auch die beiden zentralen Artikel in einen historischen Vergleich zueinander gesetzt
hat [Ferreirós 2005].
23. Dabei kam Peano auch z. B. zur Überzeugung, daß es besser sei, die Zahlenreihe
mit 0 statt mit 1 beginnen zu lassen. Als Beispiel für weitergehende Arbeiten können
wir auch auf [Padoa 1902] verweisen.
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Zahlen zurückgegriffen.24 Bei diesen logizistischen Ansätzen sehen die Autoren
insbesondere die Mengenlehre, sofern sie von ihr Gebrauch machen, als einen
Teil der Logik an.
Eine erste derartige Behandlung der Peano-Axiome findet sich in Russells
The Principles of Mathematics [Russell 1903]. Dort wird Peanos Axiomatik
in Kapitel XIV äußerst kritisch behandelt. Russell gibt zwar die Peano-
Axiome an, hat aber das erklärte Ziel, die nicht-logischen Zeichen durch
logisch definierte zu ersetzen. Unter Benutzung der Zahldefinition von
Frege will er gezeigt haben, daß für diese Zahlen die „Axiome“ erfüllt sind
und kommt zur Konklusion:
There is, therefore, from the mathematical standpoint, no need
whatever of new indefinables or indemonstrables in the whole of
Arithmetic and Analysis. [Russell 1903, § 123]
Der Titel unserer Arbeit könnte aber von Russell übernommen sein, wenn er
schreibt:
Dedekind proves mathematical induction, while Peano regards it
as an axiom. [Russell 1903, § 241]
Im anschließenden Satz bescheinigt er deshalb Dedekind “an apparent supe-
riority”. Heute sehen wir das genau umgekehrt.
Couturat hatte es sich in seinem Buch Les Principes des mathémati-
ques [Couturat 1905] zur Aufgabe gemacht, eine Darstellung von Russells
Principles zu geben, die dann um „eine Analyse der meisten Arbeiten der
mathematischen Zeitgenossen bezüglich derselben Frage“ [Couturat 1908, viii]
erweitert wurde. In Kapitel II, § B werden Peanos Axiome zur Einführung der
natürlichen Zahlen als eine „sog. Definition mittels Postulaten“ vorgestellt.
Doch der Status dieser Art der Definition wird im Zusammenhang mit der
von [Padoa 1902] vorgenommenen Reduktion der nicht-logischen Konstanten
ausdrücklich in Zweifel gezogen:
Diese Vervollkommnung der Grundlagen der Arithmetik hat
gleichwohl keine so grundlegende Bedeutung, wie man glau-
ben könnte. Sie hätte sie sicherlich, wenn man kein anderes
Mittel zur Begründung der Arithmetik besäße als ihre Stützung
durch irgend welche Grundbegriffe und Postulate; sie hat jene
Bedeutung nicht mehr, sobald man das eine oder andere System
von Postulaten aus einer ausdrücklichen Definition der ganzen
Zahl herleiten kann, wie dies H. Russell gezeigt hat. Denn dann
sind weder die Grundbegriffe wahrhaftig undefinierbar, noch die
Grundsätze unbeweisbar, und infolgedessen hat es keine so große
Bedeutung mehr, daß ihre Anzahl auf ein Minimum reduziert
werde. [Couturat 1908, 60]
24. Eine eingehende Behandlung der Einflüsse Freges kann hier nicht gegeben
werden, wir können aber auf [Gillies 1982] verweisen.
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Anschließend wird die Russell zugerechnete und auf Frege zurückgehende
Definition der Zahlen in mengentheoretischer Sprache gegeben mit der
Konklusion:
Diese Definition setzt, wie man sieht, den Sinn fest, den man den
drei undefinierbaren Symbolen beizulegen hat und zwar in rein
logischen Ausdrücken. Nunmehr hört die Definition der ganzen
Zahlen auf, an drei von den logischen Konstanten unabhängige
Grundbegriffe gebunden zu sein; sie reduziert sich auf eine
Nominaldefinition, die keine anderen undefinierbaren Begriffe au-
ßer den logischen Konstanten enthält. Dadurch ist die Anknüpfung
der Arithmetik an die Logik vollendet ohne Hinzunahme irgend
eines neuen Grundbegriffes. [Couturat 1908, 62]
In der Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy von 1919 hat Russell Peano
eine positivere Darstellung zukommen lassen als noch 1903. Bei der Einführung
der natürlichen Zahlen schreibt er:
Having reduced all traditional pure mathematics to the theory of
the natural numbers, the next step in logical analysis was to reduce
this theory itself to the smallest set of premises and undefined
terms from which it could be derived. This work was accomplished
by Peano. [Russell 1919, 5]
Nach einer eingehenden Behandlung der Peanoschen Axiome bleibt er aber
bei seiner kritischen Haltung, daß die nicht-logischen Symbole noch auf der
Grundlage des Fregeschen Zahlbegriffs durch definierte „logische“ Ausdrücke
ersetzt werden können, so daß die Axiome zu beweisbaren Sätzen werden:
It is time now to turn to the considerations which make it necessa-
ry to advance beyond the standpoint of Peano, who represents the
last perfection of the “arithmetisation” of mathematics, to that of
Frege, who first succeeded in “logicising” mathematics, i.e., in
reducing to logic the arithmetical notions which his predecessors
had shown to be sufficient for mathematics. [Russell 1919, 6f.]
Diese Sichtweise konnte sich sogar noch bis zu Kurt Gödel halten. Als
er 1931 seine epochale Arbeit zur prinzipiellen Unvollständigkeit rekursiver
Axiomatisierungen der Arithmetik veröffentlichte, bezog er sich formal auf
Whitehead und Russells Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell 1910-
1913] aber mit Rückgriff auf Peano:
P ist im wesentlichen das System, welches man erhält, wenn man
die Peanoschen Axiome mit der Logik der PM 16 überbaut. [Gödel
1931, 176]
Die Fußnote 16 zur Logik der Principia Mathematica stellt dann aber klar,
daß auch Gödel eine logizistische Einführung der Zahlen für ausreichend hält:
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Die Hinzufügung der Peanoschen Axiome [...] dien[t] lediglich zur
Vereinfachung des Beweises und [ist] prinzipiell entbehrlich.
Bei Russell (und mit ihm auch Couturat) ist noch interessant, daß er
Peano dafür kritisiert, daß dessen Axiome unterschiedliche Interpretationen
zulassen.25 Wenn Russell eine solche Kritik auch auf Dedekind ausdehnt
[Russell 1903, chap. XXX], zeigt das in erster Linie, daß er die tiefere
Bedeutung von Dedekinds Kategorizitätsresultat nicht adäquat erfaßt hat.
Hier kann man durchaus ein grundsätzliches philosophisches Problem im
Verständnis der natürlichen Zahlen sehen, das bis heute nachwirkt. Carl Siegel
hatte im Vorwort zu seiner deutschen Übersetzung von [Couturat 1905] zur
Unterscheidung von Arithmetik (als einer auf die Logik zu gründende Theorie)
zur Geometrie (als einer nicht-logischer Elemente bedürftigen Theorie)
bemerkt:
Die Axiome der Arithmetik lassen sich von den rein logischen
Grundsätzen herleiten, die der Geometrie dagegen nicht. Die
Tatsache, daß es nur eine Arithmetik, aber mehrere (logisch gleich
mögliche) Geometrien gibt, beweist das eben Gesagte schlagend.
[Couturat 1908, vi]
Unser modernes Verständnis einer Axiomatik läßt zumindest im Prinzip
immer unterschiedliche Interpretationen zu. Dieses Verständnis wurde ganz
wesentlich von Hilbert geprägt, der es von der Geometrie auf beliebige
Axiomensysteme ausgedehnt hat. Und dabei läßt sich unmittelbar auf Peanos
Axiomatisierung zurückgreifen, auch wenn das bei Hilbert nicht explizit
herausgestellt ist.
9 Hilbert
David Hilbert (1862–1943) hat zusammen mit seiner Schule in den 1920er
Jahren die mathematische Logik im wesentlichen so herausgearbeitet, wie wir
sie heute kennen.26 Ausgehend von seiner bahnbrechenden Neuaxiomatisierung
25. 1919 hat er das in den folgenden Worten ausgedrückt:
In Peano’s system there is nothing to enable us to distinguish
between these different interpretations of his primitive ideas. [...]
This point, that „0“ and „number“ and „successor“ cannot be
defined by means of Peano’s five axioms, but must be independently
understood, is important. We want our numbers not merely to verify
mathematical formulæ, but to apply in the right way to common objects.
[Russell 1919, 9]
Besonders der letzte Satz steht der späteren Hilbertschen Auffassung entgegen, die
sich in gewissem Sinne in der Mathematik durchgesetzt hat.
26. Im Prinzip kamen später lediglich die Beschränkung auf Logik erster Stufe, vor
allem von Skolem gefordert, hinzu [siehe Moore 1988] sowie der scharf abgegrenzte
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der euklidischen Geometrie hat er nach der Reduktion dieser auf die
Arithmetik — und wir müssen hinzusetzen: Arithmetik zweiter Stufe, was für
Hilbert seinerzeit eine natürliche Auffassung war — erkannt, daß eben diese
Arithmetik einer Axiomatisierung bedarf. Eine solche Axiomatisierung gibt zu
neuen grundlagentheoretischen Fragestellungen Anlaß. Die wichtigste dieser
Fragestellungen war das zweite Hilbertsche Problem in der berühmten Liste
von Problemen, die Hilbert auf dem Internationalen Mathematikerkongreß
in Paris vorgestellt hat; weitere Fragestellungen wurden in dem program-
matischen Vortrag Axiomatisches Denken [Hilbert 1918] aufgeworfen, den
Hilbert 1917 vor der Schweizerischen Mathematischen Gesellschaft hielt. Die
Durchdringung des hinter diesen Fragestellungen liegenden logischen und
mathematischen Feldes, das nicht zuletzt durch die Hilbertsche Beweistheorie
abgegrenzt werden kann, hat schließlich zu unserem modernen Verständnis
von mathematischer Logik geführt.27
Das zweite Hilbertsche Problem trägt den Titel Die Widerspruchslosigkeit
der arithmetischen Axiome, wobei es aber ausdrücklich um die Konsistenz
einer Axiomatik der reellen Zahlen geht (da, wie gesagt, Hilbert die Arithmetik
zweitstufig aufgefaßt hat). Eine solche Axiomatik hatte Hilbert im Jahr zuvor
in seinem Aufsatz Über den Zahlbegriff [Hilbert 1900] gegeben. Dabei ging es
ihm neben der konkreten Axiomatik auch darum, die axiomatische Methode
als solche (und in ihrem modernen Verständnis) der von ihm sogenannten
genetischen Methode28 gegenüberzustellen. Er schreibt:
Meine Meinung ist diese: Trotz des hohen pädagogischen und
heuristischen Wertes der genetischen Methode verdient doch
zur endgültigen Darstellung und völligen logischen Sicherung
des Inhaltes unserer Erkenntnis die axiomatische Methode den
Vorzug. [Hilbert 1900, 181]
Dem Beispiel seiner Axiomatisierung der Geometrie folgend beginnt er an-
schließend die Auflistung seiner Axiome mit den Worten:
Begriff einer Semantik, eingeführt von Tarski. Bei Hilbert selbst darf man die heute
übliche Beschränkung auf Logik erster Stufe aber noch nicht voraussetzen, siehe
[Kahle 2019].
27. Man muß sich darüber im Klaren sein, daß Hilbert eine wechselvolle
Entwicklung durchgemacht hat, bevor er zu der schließlich in [Hilbert & Bernays
1934, 1939] niedergelegten Form der Beweistheorie kam. Hier ist nicht der Platz,
diese Entwicklungen detaillierter nachzuzeichen, wir können aber auf entsprechenden
Arbeiten von Sieg verweisen [Sieg 1999, 2013].
28. „Ausgehend von dem Begriff der Zahl 1, denkt man sich gewöhnlich durch
den Prozeß des Zählens zunächst die weiteren ganzen rationalen positiven Zahlen
2, 3, 4, . . . entstanden und ihre Rechengesetze entwickelt; sodann gelangt man durch
die Forderung der allgemeinen Ausführung der Substraktion zur negativen Zahl;
[usw. bis zu den reellen Zahlen als Schnitt oder Fundamentalreihe]. Wir können
diese Methode der Einführung des Zahlbegriffs die genetische Methode nennen, weil
der allgemeinste Begriff der reellen Zahl durch sukzessive Erweiterung des einfachen
Zahlbegriffs erzeugt wird“ [Hilbert 1900, 180].
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Wir denken ein System von Dingen; wir nennen diese Dinge
Zahlen und bezeichnen sie mit a, b, c, . . . . Wir denken diese
Zahlen in gewissen gegenseitigen Beziehungen, deren genaue und
vollständige Beschreibung durch die folgenden Axiome geschieht.
[Hilbert 1900, 181]
Jetzt folgen nicht die Peanoschen Axiome für die Arithmetik der natürlichen
Zahlen, sondern eine Axiomatik für die reellen Zahlen. Mit den reellen
Zahlen hatte Hilbert einen sehr viel problematischeren Gegenstandsbereich
vor sich, als wenn man nur die natürlichen Zahlen betrachtet. Insbesondere
ergibt sich dabei schon die Frage nach dem Status aktual unendlicher
Mengen; zudem führt Hilbert auch sein umstrittenes Axiom der Vollständigkeit
ein. Allerdings bedurfte es der Resultate von Kurt Gödel, um formal zu
zeigen, daß die reellen Zahlen — in einer erststufigen Axiomatisierung —
prinzipiell nicht auf die natürlichen Zahlen zurückführbar sind, bzw. daß
eine zweitstufige „Axiomatisierung“ bereits für den rein logischen Teil nicht
mehr rekursiv sein kann.
Wenn man vom Vollständigkeitsaxiom absieht, ist die Charakteristik
der Hilbertschen Axiomatik aber kaum von der Peanos zu unterscheiden.
Insbesondere erlauben Hilberts Ausführungen keinesfalls, ihn hier in eine Reihe
mit Dedekind, Frege, Russell und Couturat zu stellen, soweit man deren
logizistischen Anspruch, die Zahlen durch logische Definitionen einzuführen,
herausstellt.
In seinem Beitrag zum Internationalen Mathematikerkongreß 1904 in
Heidelberg (Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik, [Hilbert
1905]) hat Hilbert eine erste rudimentäre Idee seiner später entwickelten
Beweistheorie gegeben. Dabei werden Frege und Dedekind kurz behandelt29
und auch Cantor, dessen Mengenlehre aber auch nicht ausreichende Sicherheit
gewährleiste.30 Der Logizismus, wie er sich 1904 darstellte, wird schließlich
explizit verworfen, wenn Hilbert schreibt:
Man bezeichnet wohl die Arithmetik als einen Teil der Logik
und setzt meist bei der Begründung der Arithmetik die herge-
brachten logischen Grundbegriffe voraus. Allein bei aufmerksa-
mer Betrachtung werden wir gewahr, daß bei der hergebrach-
ten Darstellung der Logik gewisse arithmetische Grundbegriffe,
z. B. der Begriff der Menge, zum Teil auch der Begriff der
29. Freges Ansatz wird dabei wegen der Russellschen Antinomie verworfen; ebenso
Dedekind „wegen des unvermeidlichen Widerspruchs des [bei ihm] zur Verwendung
kommenden Begriffs der Gesamtheit aller Dinge“ [Hilbert 1905, 249].
30. „G. Cantor hat den genannten Widerspruch [bei Dedekind] empfunden
und diesem Empfinden dadurch Ausdruck verliehen, daß er ‚konsistente‘ und
‚nichtkonsistente‘ Mengen unterscheidet. Indem er aber, meiner Meinung nach, für
diese Unterscheidung kein scharfes Kriterium aufstellt, muß ich seine Auffassung
über diesen Punkt als eine solche bezeichnen, die dem subjektiven Ermessen noch
Spielraum läßt und daher keine objektive Sicherheit gewährt“ [Hilbert 1905, 249].
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Zahl, insbesondere der Anzahl, bereits zur Verwendung kommen.
[Hilbert 1905, 250]
Hilbert hat den 1904 skizzierten Ansatz zur Beweistheorie erst einmal
beiseitegelegt (wohl auf Grund der Kritik Poincaré’s an der vermeintli-
chen Zirkularität einer beweistheoretischen Begründung der Induktion).31
Stattdessen trat er nach der Veröffentlichung der Principia Mathematica
von Whitehead und Russell [Whitehead & Russell 1910-1913] selbst in eine
„logizistische Phase“ ein.32 Dabei wurden die Principia Mathematica einer
eingehenden Prüfung unterzogen, insbesondere in der Dissertation seines
Doktoranden Heinrich Behmann. Letztlich sah er aber auch Whitehead und
Russells Ansatz als gescheitert an und drückte das 1920 in einer seiner
Vorlesungen deutlich aus [Hilbert 1920, 33]:33
Das Ziel, die Mengenlehre und damit die gebräuchlichen
Methoden der Analysis auf die Logik zurückzuführen, ist heute
nicht erreicht und ist vielleicht überhaupt nicht erreichbar.
Dennoch — und das durchaus überraschend — findet sich im Lehrbuch von
Hilbert und Ackermann Grundlagen der theoretischen Logik eine Einführung
des Zahlbegriffs auf der Grundlage der Fregeschen Definition und eine
eindeutige Übernahme des Russellschen Standpunkts von 1903/1919, wobei
lediglich das Unendlichkeitsaxiom bemängelt wird:
Von besonderem Interesse ist auch, wie unter Zugrundelegung
der logischen Einführung des Anzahlbegriffs und allerdings we-
sentlicher Benutzung des genannten Axioms der Unendlichkeit
die zahlentheoretischen Axiome zu logischen, beweisbaren Sätzen
werden. [Hilbert & Ackermann 1928, 88]
In einer Fußnote wird dabei auf die deutsche Übersetzung von Russells
Einführung in die mathematische Logik [Russell 1923] verwiesen. Die zahlen-
theoretischen Axiome werden von Hilbert und Ackermann aber überhaupt
31. Hier sollten wir bemerken, daß es neben der logizistischen und der (später
so charakterisierten) formalistischen Auffassung der Induktion im Rahmen einer
Axiomatik noch die auf (Kronecker und) Poincaré zurückgehende und durch Brouwer
und Weyl aufgegriffene heute intuitionistisch zu nennende Auffassung der Induktion
als Prinzip des „inhaltlichen mathematischen Denkens“ [Weyl 1928, 86] gibt. Diese
Auffassung steht der Hilbertschen nicht notwendig entgegen; sie wird von ihm in der
Beweistheorie sogar ausdrücklich als Grundlage des metamathematischen Schließens
herangezogen. Eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Problemkreis, der
keinen unmittelbaren Bezug zu Dedekind und Peano mehr hat, geht aber über den
Rahmen dieser Arbeit hinaus.
32. Siehe [Kahle 2013] und auch z. B. [Tapp 2013, § 4.1.4 Hilberts Logizismus].
33. Das Zitat findet sich veröffentlicht in [Hilbert 2013, 363]. In einem Vortrag,
den Hilbert 1927 in Hamburg hielt, gibt er seinen inzwischen verabsolutierten Anti-
Logizismus wie folgt wieder:
Die Mathematik wie jede andere Wissenschaft kann nie durch Logik
allein begründet werden. [Hilbert 1928, 65]
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nicht angegeben und dementsprechend fehlt auch jeglicher Hinweis auf
Peano.34
Tatsächlich finden sich in Hilberts Veröffentlichungen35 keine expliziten
Referenzen auf Peanos Axiomatisierung der natürlichen Zahlen.36 Es gibt aber
einen — für uns zentralen — Verweis auf Peano in einer unveröffentlichten
Mitschrift zu der 1917 von Hilbert gehaltenen Vorlesung über Mengenlehre:
Peano [konnte] die bei Dedekind verborgenen Axiome ans
Licht ziehen und an die Spitze seiner Begründung der Theorie
der ganzen Zahlen stellen. [...]
Die ganzen Zahlen nehmen also tatsächlich in der Mathematik
eine Sonderstellung ein; und wenn wir die Axiome derselben noch
weiter begründen wollen durch Zurückführung auf die Gesetze der
Logik selbst, so stehen wir vor einem der schwierigsten Probleme
der Mathematik überhaupt.
Wenn wir uns also jetzt auf den Peanoschen Standpunkt
stellen, d. h. wenn wir Axiome der Arithmetik aufstellen, aber d. h.
auf eine weitere Zurückführung derselben verzichten und die ge-
wöhnlichen Gesetze der Logik ungeprüft übernehmen, so müssen
wir uns bewusst sein, dass wir dadurch die Schwierigkeiten einer
ersten philosophisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Begründung nicht
überwunden, sondern nur kurz abgeschnitten haben. [Hilbert
1917, 145f.], zitiert nach [Hilbert 2013, 33f., Fußnoten 5 und 6]
Hilbert kritisiert hier im Jahr 1917 Peanos Standpunkt dahingehend,
daß die „philosophisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Begründung“ lediglich „ab-
geschnitten“ worden sei. Nachdem sich Hilbert aber spätestens seit 1920
zu einer Aufgabe des logizistischen Programms genötigt sah, ist es genau
dieses „Abschneiden“ der — überzogenen oder zumindest nicht erfüllbaren —
philosophischen Begründungsansprüche, das der Axiomatik in der Mathematik
zu ihrem durchgreifenden Erfolg verholfen hat.
34. Erst in der vierten Auflage von [Hilbert & Ackermann 1958] hat Ackermann
die Peano-Axiome explizit diskutiert, dann aber schon mit dem erststufigen
Induktionsschema (womit sie als Beispiel einer nicht mehr endlich axiomatisierten
Theorie dienen). Auch wird auf die Notwendigkeit hingewiesen, „noch rekursi-
ve Definitionen für zahlentheoretische Funktionen“ hinzunehmen zu müssen. Die
Fregesche Anzahldefinition und der Hinweis, daß sich damit „die zahlentheoretischen
Axiome [...] logisch beweisen lassen“, wurden aber beibehalten [Hilbert & Ackermann
1958, 152].
35. Das unten noch zu nennende zweibändige Werk Grundlagen der Mathematik
[Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 1939] muß man natürlich Bernays alleine zurechnen.
36. Man kann dafür beispielsweise den Fundstellen des Namens Peano im
Namensverzeichnis von [Hilbert 2013] nachgehen.
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10 Bernays
Wenn wir Hilbert als Wegbereiter der heute dominierenden, anti-logizistischen
Auffassung der Peanoschen Axiome, die diese unbewiesen an den Anfang der
Arithmetik stellt, betrachten dürfen, so liegt das nicht an einer einzelnen
Bemerkung in einem unveröffentlichen Vorlesungsmanuskript. Er verdankt
diese Stellung wohl vor allem den Ausführungen von Paul Bernays (1888–
1977), durch den das moderne Verständnis in dem zusammen mit Hilbert
herausgegebenen zweibändigen Werk Grundlagen der Mathematik [Hilbert &
Bernays 1934, 1939] detailliert entwickelt und bekannt gemacht wurde.
In § 6 des ersten Bandes, das den Titel Widerspruchsfreiheit unendli-
cher Individuenbereiche. Anfänge der Zahlentheorie trägt, verweist Bernays
schon im Titel von Abschnitt a) 3. auf Peano: Übergang zu Axiomen
ohne gebundene Variablen unter Verschärfung der Existenzaxiome: das
Symbol 0; Ziffern im neuen Sinne; Peanosche Axiome; Zusammenstellung
der erhaltenen Axiome. Die (technisch sehr detaillierte) Darstellung von
Bernays steht, wie aus dem Titel des Paragraphen hervorgeht, unter der
Zielsetzung, Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweise zu führen. Und diese sollen, auch
nach der Veröffentlichung von Gödels Unvollständigkeitssätzen, im Rahmen
der Hilbertschen Beweistheorie geführt werden und dementsprechend nicht
durch logizistische Interpretationen der Zahlentheorie erbracht werden. Wenn
man sich die anti-logizistischen Bemerkungen von Hilbert von 1904 in
Erinnerung ruft und wenn man die Erkenntnisse, insbesondere die Gödelschen
Resultate, der sich in den folgenden 30 Jahren rasant entwickelnden ma-
thematischen Logik vor Augen hält, würden sowohl eine mengentheoretische
Interpretation als auch die Benutzung zweitstufiger Logik nicht mehr den
grundlagentheoretischen Ansprüchen für einen Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweis
genügen. Insofern kann Bernays gar nicht anders, als eine Axiomatik mit
Hilfe von nicht-logischen Zeichen, wie Peano sie gegeben hatte, an den Anfang
zu stellen. Er tut dies zuerst nur für die Peano-Axiome ohne Induktion
[Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 219]. Anschließend wird die vollständige Induktion
separat eingeführt und detailliert erörtert. Dabei wird klar herausgestellt,
daß sie „von Aussagen der Theorie handelt“ [Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 265],
was in Bernays’ Kontext an dieser Stelle eine Beschränkung auf Formeln
der Logik erster Stufe beinhaltet. Bernays legt dann in § 7 Die rekursiven
Definitionen dar, daß die Peanoschen Axiome für 0 und Nachfolger „kei-
neswegs ausreich[en], um die üblichen Begriffsbildungen der Zahlentheorie
zur Darstellung zu bringen“ [Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 286]. Es folgt eine
Zwischenstation, wo die Rekursionsgleichungen für die Addition zu den
Peano-Axiomen mit erststufiger Induktion hinzugenommen werden und das
Ergebnis von Presburger zur Vollständigkeit dieser Theorie ausgeführt wird.
Mit dem Axiomensystem (Z) haben wir schließlich die moderne Darstellung
der erststufigen Peano-Arithmetik vor uns, wie sie — unter Auslassung der
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a = b→ (A(a)→ A(b)),
a′ 6= 0,
a+ 0 = a,
a+ b′ = (a+ b)′,
a · 0 = 0,
a · b′ = a · b+ a,
A(0) & (x) (A(x)→ A(x′))→ A(a).
(Z)
Zu dieser einerseits im Induktionsschema gegenüber der Originalformulierung
Peanos beschränkten, andererseits um die Addition und Multiplikation erwei-
terten Axiomatisierung bemerkt Bernays:
Außerdem hat [die in diesem Kapitel diskutierte Methode
für Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweise] auch den Nachweis ermög-
licht, daß das Axiomensystem Peanos bei Zugrundelegung des
Prädikatenkalkuls und der Gleichheitsaxiome noch nicht zum
Aufbau der Zahlentheorie ausreicht, daß vielmehr die Hinzufügung
der Rekursionsgleichungen für die Addition und Multiplikation
zu diesem Axiomensystem eine wesentliche Erweiterung bedeu-
tet, durch welche erst der Reichtum der zahlentheoretischen
Beziehungen zustande kommt. [Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 373]
Wir können nicht sicher sein, ob Bernays der erste war, der die erststufige
Peano-Arithmetik unter Einschluß der definierenden Axiome von Addition und
Multiplikation herausgearbeitet hat.37 Die Geschichte der Rekursion ist lang
und verwickelt und wird von von Plato geschildert [von Plato 2017]. Man kann
dabei z. B. Skolem herausstellen, der bedeutende Beiträge zur Entwicklung
der elementaren Rekursionstheorie geliefert hatte und zudem als entschiedener
37. Von Plato hat im Bernays-Nachlaß, der an der ETH Zürich aufbewahrt wird,
ein stenographisches Manuskript zu Bernays’ Vortrag Die Rekursion als Grundlage
der Zahlentheorie, den er am 21. Februar 1928 in Göttingen gehalten hat, ausfindig
machen können. Die Transkription dieses Manuskripts, die mir von Maria Hämeen-
Anttila und Jan von Plato freundlicherweise angeboten wurde, zeigt, daß sich Bernays
schon zu dieser Zeit eingehend mit der hier zur Diskussion stehenden Fragestellung
beschäftigte, auch wenn er damals — aus der Perspektive der Rekursion heraus —
noch nicht die in Z zusammengestellten Axiome behandelte.
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Verfechter der (ausschließlichen) Verwendung von Logik erster Stufe in der
Formalisierung der Mathematik gilt. Aber seine Arbeiten zur Rekursivität
von Addition und Multiplikation schließen nicht die Induktion als formales
Axiom bzw. Axiomenschema ein. Die (erststufige) Peano-Arithmetik ist in der
Form, wie wir sie heute kennen, allem Anschein nach von Bernays in seinem
System Z zum ersten Mal niedergelegt worden.
11 Konklusion
Zusammenfassend würden wir die Situation bezüglich der historischen Beiträge
zur Axiomatisierung der Arithmetik wie folgt beschreiben:
1. Dedekind hatte von einem mathematischen Standpunkt aus die charak-
terisierenden Eigenschaften der natürlichen Zahlen am besten erfaßt;
seine Behandlung leidet aber darunter, daß er sie im Rahmen eines
logizistischen Programms durchführt, die diese Eigenschaften nicht
axiomatisch an den Anfang der Theorie stellt, sondern sie als Sätze
aus einer übergeordneten (und später als problematisch erkannten)
Mengenlehre, die er als einen Teil der Logik auffaßt, herzuleiten versucht.
2. Peano erreicht zwar nicht die mathematische Tiefe von Dedekind bei
der Behandlung der Arithmetik. Die Isolierung der charakterisierenden
Eigenschaften der natürlichen Zahlen als Axiome stellt aber einen
konzeptionellen Gewinn dar, der allerdings erst durch die weitere
Entwicklung der mathematischen Logik erkennbar wurde.
3. Hilbert hatte richtig erkannt, daß eine logizistische Begründung der
arithmetischen Axiome letztlich unergiebig ist, womit neben dem Ansatz
von Dedekind auch die Ansätze von Frege und Russell zum Scheitern
verurteilt sind. Das liegt nicht zuletzt daran, daß sich die Mengenlehre
nicht, wie von Dedekind und anderen vorausgesetzt, als Teil der Logik
erweisen ließ. Vor diesem Hintergrund läßt sich — in Einklang mit
Hilberts allgemein propagierter axiomatischen Methode — der Status
der Peano-Axiome als nicht-logische Axiome erkennen.
4. Bernays, im Wissen um die den logischen Formalismen durch die
Gödelschen Resultate gesetzten Grenzen, arbeitete schließlich die erst-
stufige Peano-Arithmetik heraus, wie wir sie heute kennen und schätzen.
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Peano on Symbolization,
Design Principles for Notations,
and the Dot Notation
Dirk Schlimm
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Résumé : Peano a été l’une des forces motrices dans le développement du
formalisme mathématique actuel. Dans cet article, nous étudions son approche
particulière de la conception notationnelle et présentons quelques caractéris-
tiques originales de ses notations. Pour motiver l’approche de Peano, nous
présentons d’abord sa vision de la logique comme méthode d’analyse et son
désir d’un symbolisme rigoureux et concis pour représenter les idées mathé-
matiques. Sur la base à la fois de sa pratique et de ses réflexions explicites
sur les notations, nous discutons des principes qui ont guidé Peano dans
l’introduction de nouveaux symboles, le choix des caractères et la mise en
forme des formules. Enfin, nous examinons de plus près, d’un point de vue
systématique et historique, l’une des innovations les plus marquantes de Peano,
à savoir l’usage de points pour regrouper des sous-formules.
Abstract: Peano was one of the driving forces behind the development of
the current mathematical formalism. In this paper, we study his particular
approach to notational design and present some original features of his
notations. To explain the motivations underlying Peano’s approach, we first
present his view of logic as a method of analysis and his desire for a rigorous
and concise symbolism to represent mathematical ideas. On the basis of both
his practice and his explicit reflections on notations, we discuss the principles
that guided Peano’s introduction of new symbols, the choice of characters, and
the layout of formulas. Finally, we take a closer look, from a systematic and
historical perspective, at one of Peano’s most striking innovations, his use of
dots for the grouping of subformulas.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 95–126.
96 Dirk Schlimm
1 Introduction
One of the concerns of philosophers of mathematics is to clarify the principles
and methods that drive the development of mathematics. In this paper, we
shall take a closer look at Giuseppe Peano’s (1858-1932) general views about
logic as a method of analysis of mathematical ideas and his more practical
concerns regarding the presentation of the results of such analyses.1 As we
shall see, these notions are subtly intertwined and motivated by his general
aims of striving for rigor and conciseness.
Like other mathematicians and logicians in the 19th century, Peano
attributed the lack of satisfying solutions to many questions in the foundations
of mathematics to the ambiguities of ordinary language [Peano 1889a, III].
In the use of symbolic languages to represent and analyze mathematical
ideas and their logical relations, Peano envisaged a way of avoiding such
ambiguities. However, Peano also realized that certain restrictions had to
be imposed on these symbolisms. For example: to avoid ambiguities, each
symbol should have a unique and precise meaning; to avoid errors, the symbols
themselves, although arbitrary in principle, should be such that the cognitive
effort necessary for their use is reduced to a minimum. Accordingly, Peano
considered the development of an appropriate symbolic language, which he
called “symbolic writing” (scrittura simbolica) or “ideography” [Peano 1896-
1897, 202], to be a crucial task for the advancement of mathematics. As a
consequence, in addition to formulating his famous axiomatization of arith-
metic, Peano also originated many innovations in mathematical symbolism,
including the dot notation in logic.
The early development of Peano’s logical notation can be easily retraced
by considering his publications from 1887 to 1889.2 Before 1888, Peano’s
publications (e.g., [Genocchi 1884] and [Peano 1887]) do not contain any
specific notations for logic. In the latter, Grassmann is mentioned in the
Preface, but no logicians are. Logical notation appears for the first time
in Peano’s Calcolo Geometrico secondo l’Ausdehnungslehre di H. Grassmann
[Peano 1888], whose preface is dated February 1, 1888, and which begins with a
short chapter on “The operations of deductive logic”, based on Schröder’s Der
Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls [Schröder 1877]. However, Peano replaces all
of Schröder’s symbols “in order to forestall any possible confusion between
the symbols of logic and those of mathematics” [Peano 1888, X] (quoted
from [Peano 2000, xiv]). A year later, Peano published his famous work
on arithmetic, Arithmetices Principia nova methodo exposita [Peano 1889a],
1. For background on Peano’s life and works, see [Kennedy 2002]; for discussions of
his philosophy and works, see [Kennedy 1963] and [Skof 2011]. In the following text,
all translations are by the author (DS) unless a reference to a published translation
is given.
2. For a more detailed discussion, including the background of Peano’s develop-
ment, see [Bottazzini 1985].
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in Latin, which begins with a chapter on logical notations in which he also
introduces the difference between set membership (symbolized by “ε”) and
inclusion (replacing the symbol “<” that he used earlier with “ C”). Again,
Peano also replaces some of the logical symbols, but, more importantly, he
introduces the dot notation for the grouping of subexpressions. From then on,
this notation was employed in most of Peano’s publications, beginning with
I Principii di Geometria logicamente esposti [Peano 1889b] published later in
the same year, as well as articles dedicated explicitly to mathematical logic,
such as [Peano 1891b] and [Peano 1891a], and the various editions of the
Formulario [Peano 1895a, 1897, 1901, 1903, 1905].
How these historical developments are intertwined with Peano’s general
views about methodology in mathematics is the main topic of this paper. In
the following, we begin by discussing Peano’s general views on symbolization
and his view of logic as a method of analysis (Section 2). In Section 3, we
relate these views to Peano’s considerations for the design of notations. In
particular, we present in detail the principles that guide the introduction
of new symbols, the choice of characters, and the layout of mathematical
formulas. In the third part of the paper (Section 4), Peano’s use of dots for
the grouping of subformulas is explained and discussed in the context of its
historical development. This particular notation is one of the most striking of
Peano’s innovations and has been widely popularized by its use in Whitehead
and Russell’s Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell 1910-1913], but it
has hardly received any attention in the literature.3
2 Logic as method of analysis
2.1 Peano and Frege on logic
Let us begin by comparing and contrasting Peano’s general attitude toward
logic with Frege’s, given that the latter has been studied extensively and is
thus widely known. Both share the desire to secure rigorous reasoning in
mathematics with the use of a symbolic language with clearly defined, unique
meanings [Peano 1890a, 186]. However, their conceptions of rigor differ with
regard to the level of explicitness of the analysis of logical reasoning. Frege,
on the one hand, wanted to avoid any appeal to intuition in mathematical
inferences and thus emphasized his use of formal rules of inference. On the
other hand, possibly due to the fact that his main influences in logic came
from the algebraic tradition of Boole and Schröder, Peano’s paradigm of
deduction was that of reasoning with algebraic equations [Peano 1889a, III]
and [Peano 1889b, 28–29]. His lack of explicit inference rules was criticized
by van Heijenoort as “a grave defect” [van Heijenoort 1967, 84]. In practice,
3. For example, a discussion of the dot notation is conspicuously missing in
[Kennedy 2002].
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however, Peano’s derivations can be construed formally as being based on
instances of axioms, the substitution of equalities, and modus ponens [von
Plato 2017, 55–56]. In short, Peano’s system is not a “formal system” in the
modern sense, i.e., with a recursively defined language and explicit rules of
inference, but, according to von Plato, it could be fairly straightforwardly
constructed as one.4
Another aspect in which Frege and Peano differ is their attitude toward
an investigation into the fundamental principles of logic. While Frege put
his theory on a firm axiomatic foundation, Peano did not, although he
had done so for arithmetic and geometry, and remarked that “it would
be an interesting study” [Peano 1889b, 29]. Unlike Boole and Schröder,
both Frege and Peano intended their logical formalisms to be applied to
mathematics and not be used in isolation, merely for the efficient solution of
logical problems. Peano writes:
I understand how important theoretical studies of logic are; but,
given the immensity of such studies, I prefer directing my forces
toward application. [Letter from Peano to Couturat, 1 June 1899]
(reprinted in [Roero 2011, 87])
Nevertheless, with regard to the aim of applying logic to mathematics,
Frege and Peano differed: for Frege, it was a theoretical exercise aimed at
clarifying concepts and securing the foundations of mathematics; for Peano,
it was a practical matter of actually doing mathematics in a new way.
Because of this emphasis on practical use, Peano concentrated his efforts on
developing a convenient formalism for the analysis and concise representation
of mathematical ideas.
2.2 The Formulario project and concise notations
Soon after completing his axiomatizations and symbolic presentations of
arithmetic [Peano 1889a] and geometry [Peano 1889b], Peano envisaged an
impressive collaborative project, aimed at publishing a collection of important
mathematical results expressed in a symbolic language. The first edition of
the Formulaire de mathématiques, or Formulario Mathematico, as it was later
called, appeared in 1895; an Introduction, in which Peano presented his logical
notation, had already been published one year earlier [Peano 1894]. Four
different editions of the Formulario were subsequently published in 1897, 1901,
1903, and 1905, each of which was the result of substantial revisions of the one
preceding it. Peano also showed great historical awareness by often listing a
theorem together with a reference to where it first occurred. The idea for this
project is put forward in print for the first time in 1891 as the concluding note
of a paper on the concept of number. Before ending the paper by inviting
4. Deviating from the modern usage, we shall thus refer to Peano’s symbolic
language as a formalization.
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suggestions for theorems to be included in the collection, Peano motivates the
project as follows:
It would also be very useful to collect all the known propositions
referring to certain parts of mathematics, and to publish these
collections. Limiting ourselves to arithmetic, I do not believe there
would be any difficulty in expressing them in logical symbols.
Then, besides acquiring precision, they would also be concise,
so much so, probably, that the propositions referring to certain
subjects in mathematics could be contained in a number of pages
not greater than that required for the bibliography. [Peano 1891c];
[Peano 1957-1959, III, 109] (quoted from [Kennedy 2002, 63])
Given the sheer volume of the project, a concise form of representation was
indispensable. Thus, while Peano writes that “the fundamental utility of the
logical symbols is rigor and precision” [Peano 1908, X], he also emphasizes the
importance of symbolization for reducing the length of presentations, because
in some cases they would be impossible otherwise:
It turns out that symbolic writing is about ten times shorter
than in ordinary language. A publication of the ample present
Formulario in ordinary language would be almost impossible in
practice, as would be the publication of logarithmic tables in
ordinary language or using Roman numerals. [Peano 1908, IX]5
We note that, for Peano, one of the main practical requirements for the design
of a notation is the reduction of the length of individual formulas, rather
than the number of different signs that are employed. These two desiderata
are frequently in tension with each other, as the comparison between binary
and decimal place-value notations illustrates: the former uses only two signs
instead of ten but results in longer expressions.6 Given the aim of reducing
the length of expressions, Peano’s interest in reducing the use of parentheses
should not come as a big surprise. We shall return to this in Section 4, when
discussing the development of Peano’s dot notation.
2.3 Formalization as method of analysis
It is clear from the announcement of the Formulario quoted above that the
use of a symbolism was an integral part of the project from the beginning,
since it allows for both precision and conciseness. Moreover, the process of
formalization itself is a method of conceptual analysis that begins with the
5. In fact, Roman numerals for natural numbers (without subtractive notation)
are on average 2.6 times longer than Indo-Arabic numerals [Schlimm & Neth 2008,
2101].
6. E.g., “10010011” vs. “147”.
100 Dirk Schlimm
following two steps:7 (1) The identification of the fundamental mathematical
ideas, and (2) the representation of these ideas by primitive signs of the
symbolism. The first step requires a precise and unambiguous identification
of the underlying ideas:
The reduction of a new theory into symbols requires a profound
analysis of the ideas that occur in this branch. Imprecise ideas
cannot be represented by symbols. [Peano 1895a, iv] (quoted from
[Kennedy 2002, 67])
As a consequence, the more thoroughly ideas have been analyzed and expressed
in ordinary language (Step 1), the easier it is to translate them into a
symbolism (Step 2). Peano writes:
The transformation into symbols of propositions and proofs
expressed in the ordinary form [...] is a very easy thing when
treating propositions of the more accurate authors, who have
already analyzed their ideas. It is enough to substitute, in the
works of these authors, for the words of ordinary language, their
equivalent symbols. Other authors present greater difficulty. For
them one must completely analyze their ideas and then translate
into symbols. Not rarely it is the case that a pompously stated
proposition is only a logical identity or a preceding proposition,
or a form without substance. [Peano 1891c]; [Peano 1957-1959,
III, 109] (quoted from [Kennedy 2002, 63])
However, it is not only the use of ambiguous or pompous language that
obscures the ideas to be uncovered by logical analysis, but also the ideas’
fundamental character and the fact that they do not necessarily correspond
to basic expressions in ordinary language. As Peano explains in a textbook of
arithmetic and algebra written for use in secondary schools, the logical symbols
“⊃”, “ε”, and “ E”, which stand for derivation, membership, and existence,
represent simple ideas and it is precisely their simplicity that
prevented them for a long time to be isolated and stripped
from the complexity with which they present themselves both in
ordinary language and the language of science. [Peano 1902, III]
The surface structure of language can mislead even skilled logicians, such as
Schröder. His use of a single sign to denote the ideas represented by “⊃” and
“ε” is criticized by Peano as a major flaw that prevents Schröder’s symbolism
from being a proper ideography [Peano 1898a, 97–98].
7. The view of logic as analysis was also clearly formulated by Peirce, who wrote:
“In logic, our great object is to analyze all the operations of reason and reduce them
to their ultimate elements; and to make a calculus of reasoning is a subsidiary object”
[Peirce 1880, 21]. This work is referred to in [Peano 1889a, IV]. However, in contrast
to Peano, Peirce was also interested in theoretical investigations of logic itself.
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That Peano indeed considered formalization as a method of analysis can
also be seen from the subtitle of Peano’s work on the axiomatization of natural
numbers, which reads “nova methodo exposita” (“presented by a new method”,
[van Heijenoort 1967, 83]), and in [Peano 1896-1897, 202], where he speaks of
the “analytic instrument”8 that has been applied by himself and others.
2.4 Formalization as a method for checking
an analysis
The utility of a symbolic language is not exhausted once mathematical ideas
are expressed in it; the formalization itself can be used to check the adequacy of
the analysis. Thus, a third step is added to the method of analysis: (3) Further
study of the symbolic expressions to determine consequences and possible
simplifications. For this, Peano suggests the following:
After having written a formula in symbols, it is useful to apply
several logical transformations to it. It can thus be seen if it
is possible to reduce it to a simpler form, and one can easily
recognize if the formula has not been well written. This is because
the notations of logic are not just a shorthand way of writing
mathematical propositions; they are a powerful instrument for
analyzing propositions and theories. [Peano 1895a, vi] (adapted
from [Kennedy 2002, 68])
With regard to the analysis of theories, i.e., sets of propositions and not
just individual ones, a formalization can also be used to impose a logical order
on the propositions (i.e., present some as axioms and others as theorems) and
to check the definitions. Peano writes:
It is always difficult to order the propositions of a theory. One
can order them according to the signs employed for writing them.
This rule yields, in general, good results. [Peano 1895a, vi]9
Once a theory is symbolized, i.e., the primitive ideas are determined and
expressed by primitive symbols, the propositions ordered, and symbols for
complex ideas introduced by definitions, one can easily verify that all symbols
used in the definiens have been properly introduced. This can be done “in
a mechanical way”, because only the symbols need to be considered and no
recourse to the original ideas is necessary. Peano explains:
The ideography makes evident, in a mechanical way, that defini-
tions are correct and that demonstrations are rigorous.
8. Kennedy translates “strumento analitico” as “analytic method” [Kennedy 1973,
190].
9. See [Peano 1897, 28] for an application of this suggestion; see [Cantù 2014] for
a discussion of Peano’s views on the order of the primitive ideas of a science.
102 Dirk Schlimm
For example, it is a fundamental rule of definitions, that the
defined symbol must be expressed by previous symbols. Thus, if
we consider for example the definition of prime number on p. 58,
we see that it is expressed by the symbols −, 1, +, ×, Ni, which
were introduced on pages 10, 29, 29, 32, 37, and that several of
among these symbols are defined by previous symbols, and so
on, until we reach a decomposition into primitive ideas that are
determined by primitive propositions. [Peano 1908, X]
2.5 Depth, uniqueness, and arbitrariness of analysis
2.5.1 Depth and uniqueness of analysis
So far, we have learned that formalization yields a “profound” and “complete”
analysis of mathematical ideas, but how do we know when this process is
complete? In the following passage from a letter to Felix Klein, Peano explains
the aim of mathematical logic and mentions an additional goal with regard to
the outcome of logical analysis:
It is the aim of mathematical logic to analyze the ideas and forms
of reasoning that occur especially in the mathematical sciences.
The analysis of the ideas allows to find the fundamental ideas,
with which all other ideas are expressed, and the relations between
various ideas, i.e., the logical identities, that are those forms of
reasoning. This analysis also leads us to indicate the simplest
ideas with conventional symbols, which, when appropriately
combined, represent composite ideas. This yields a symbolism or
symbolic writing that represents all propositions with the smallest
number of signs. [Letter from Peano to Felix Klein, 19 September
1894] (reprinted in [Peano 1990, 124])
Thus, a successful analysis yields a minimal set of fundamental, simple ideas
that are represented by symbols, such that through the combinations of these
symbols all complex ideas can also be expressed.10 A small number of symbols
is therefore a hallmark of a formalism, because it indicates the depth of the
analysis. Indeed, at the beginning of many of his publications, Peano proudly
emphasizes the small number of primitive symbols being used and, in his
discussion of Frege’s work, he takes the diminution of the number of primitive
symbols as indicative of a more thorough and deeper analysis. In his review
of the first volume of Frege’s Grundgesetze [Peano 1895b], Peano compares
his own with Frege’s formalism, acknowledging that many of their ideas are
analogous. However, among other criticisms, Peano points out the lack of a
10. See also [Peano 1894, 173] for a similar formulation; in [Peano 1890b], he
sets out to “find the minimum of signs and conventions necessary to express the
25 propositions of the Fifth Book of Euclid”.
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symbol for set membership in Frege’s Begriffsschrift as a defect and, since
Peano’s notation is allegedly built on fewer primitives than Frege’s, Peano
regards his own analysis as “more penetrating” [Dudman 1971, 30].11
With regard to the outcome of different symbolic analyses, Peano makes
the following general remark:
Now if, independently of each other, there arise two systems both
capable of representing and analysing the propositions of a theory,
one will have to be able to present an absolute formal difference
between them; but there will have to exist at bottom a substantial
analogy; and if the two systems are equally developed, the relation
between them will have to be that of identity. For mathematical
logic does not consist of a set of arbitrary conventions, variable
according to the author’s fancy. It consists rather of the analysis
of ideas and propositions into those that are primitive and those
that are derivative. And this analysis is unique. [Peano 1895b,
123] (quoted from [Dudman 1971, 28])
This claim about the uniqueness of logical analysis, which is repeated again
at the end of Peano’s review, fits together with the earlier claim about the
minimality of the set of simple ideas. In what sense, however, different analyses
could result in unique, “substantially analogous” systems is left unclear. Based
on the minimality and uniqueness claims, the passages quoted above could be
interpreted as expressing some kind of realist view, according to which the
structure of the symbolism mirrors the (true) logical structure of the ideas.
2.5.2 Arbitrariness of analysis
The realist interpretation of the representations of mathematical ideas and
propositions offered at the end of the previous paragraph is called into question
by the intertranslatability of various logical connectives, which Peano discusses
in the same text [Peano 1895b]. As he is well aware, in propositional logic
either implication or disjunction can be taken as primitive (together with
negation) and the other as defined. Moreover, in other places, Peano is
quite explicit about the difficulties involved in determining which ideas and
propositions should be taken as fundamental: he notes that the distinction
between primitive and derived ideas is “somewhat arbitrary” or “a little bit
arbitrary” on numerous occasions12 and that “each author can begin with
the group that they find most satisfying” [Peano 1898a, 100]. To choose
11. Frege vehemently disagreed: “I do not regard the mere counting of primitive
symbols as sufficient to substantiate a judgment about the profundity of analysis
toward fundamentals” [Dudman 1971, 35]. See also Peano’s review of Schröder’s
formalism, in which he points out that the latter is based on 15 primitive ideas,
whereas his own system is built on 8 [Peano 1898a].
12. See, e.g., [Peano 1889b, 25], [Peano 1891a, 25], [Peano 1894, 50–51], and [Peano
1897, 27].
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between alternative sets of primitives, Peano frequently invokes a notion of
“simplicity”.13 However, this notion is left unspecified, and he notes that
“there is arbitrariness in the assessment of simplicity” [Peano 1894, 51].
On the first page of the Preface to the first edition of the Formulario, Peano
states the independence of mathematics from particular representations even
more forcefully:
The notations are a bit arbitrary, but the propositions are absolute
truths, independent of the notations used. [Peano 1895a, III]
On the basis of these considerations, Peano’s attitude has been frequently
characterized as “strictly instrumental” with regard to the role of logic [Segre
1994, 286] and “instrumentalist” with regard to notations [Bellucci, Moktefi
et al. 2018, 3].
2.5.3 Possible resolution of the tension between uniqueness
and arbitrariness
The tension between Peano’s claims about the uniqueness of an analysis,
which leads to a minimal set of primitives, and his conviction about a certain
insurmountable arbitrariness regarding the choice of primitives can be resolved
by taking a careful look at what Peano says in the following passage, in
the context of whether “point” and “segment”, or “point” and “ray”, should
be chosen as primitives in geometry (as we have seen above, an analogous
situation arises in logic):
It is clear that not all entities can be defined, but it is important
in every science to reduce the number of the undefined entities
to a minimum. [...] The reduction of the undefined entities to a
minimal number can be somewhat arbitrary; so, if by means of a
and b we can define c, and by means of a and c we can define b,
our choice between a, b and a, c as an irreducible system remains
arbitrary. [Peano 1889b, 25] ([Peano 1957-1959, II, 78])
Here, both minimality and arbitrariness are considered: the number of
primitives should be minimal, but among the possible minimal sets, it is
arbitrary which one is chosen. Moreover, if one of these sets is taken as
primitive and the other entities are defined in terms of this set, and if
the axioms are chosen appropriately, the same theorems will follow. The
theories, then, understood as sets of theorems, are indeed identical and the
analysis unique, as Peano claimed in his review of Frege’s Grundgesetze
(see the second quote in Section 2.5.1).14 This interpretation is also
13. See, e.g., [Peano 1891a, 25], [Peano 1894, 50–51], and [Peano 1897, 27].
14. This interpretation is also consistent with Peano’s remark on the identity of
domains on the basis of them satisfying the same propositions [Kennedy 1973, 225].
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compatible with all examples that Peano mentions in his discussions of
arbitrary choices of primitives.15
A prominent case in which the minimality of the set of primitives is
frequently given up is propositional logic itself. As Peirce noticed in the 1880s
and Sheffer rediscovered some 30 years later [Sheffer 1913], a single binary
connective (either Peirce’s arrow or the Sheffer stroke) can be used to define
all other propositional connectives. Accordingly, we would expect Peano to
consider this analysis of propositional logic to be deeper and more profound
than his own.16 Although it is known that Sheffer visited Peano in 1911 and
that they corresponded in 1921, I am not aware of any reactions by Peano to
Sheffer’s discovery.17
We have established so far that, given different minimal sets of primitives,
Peano saw no theoretical reasons to prefer one over the others.18 However, for
any actual presentation, such a choice has to be made, and for this, practical
reasons come into play, even ones that push toward giving up the minimality
of the set of primitives.
2.5.4 Practical considerations against minimality
The demand for a notation to be concise was discussed in Section 2.2 in
connection with Peano’s Formulario project. This suggests adopting a set of
primitives that is not minimal, as they allow for shorter expressions without
having to define derived symbols. Other reasons given by Peano for dropping
the requirement of minimality of the set of primitives in logic are related to
the readability of formulas and their connection to expressions in ordinary
language. For example, after noting that a cb is equivalent to a − b = V, so
that the sign “ c” could be omitted from the list of primitives, Peano notes:
We shall keep it, however, for greater variety and for analogy
with the common form of expressing the thought. [Peano 1891b,
6], [Peano 1957-1959, II, 98] (quoted from [Kennedy 1973, 160])
In sum, it appears that Peano’s criteria for deciding which ideas are to
be taken as primitive are guided more by considerations of practicality and
convenience of use than by some kind of epistemological or metaphysical
considerations.
15. See the references in Footnote 12.
16. Such was indeed the reaction of Russell; see the Introduction to the second
edition of Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell 1925].
17. I thank Juliet Floyd for this information. The extant correspondence between
Peano and Sheffer, which is held at the Harvard University Archives, does not mention
Sheffer’s innovation.
18. This is in contrast to Frege, who invoked a notion of simplicity of content to
choose the conditional as a primitive connective in his system; see [Bellucci, Moktefi
et al. 2018, 6–7] and [Schlimm 2018, 71–73].
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3 Design principles for characters
and layout
After having discussed Peano’s general outlook on logic and formalization,
we now take a closer look at his approach to mathematical notations. We
have seen above that, for Peano, a symbolism that represents the result of
an analysis should represent the basic concepts of a domain of inquiry by
individual symbols and more complex concepts by symbols that are defined
from them. We have also seen that there are some difficulties in identifying
the primitive concepts, but that is not our primary concern here. Rather, it
is the question of how to represent them, once we have settled on them.
In general, we can consider a notation to consist of a set of characters (also
referred to as signs or symbols)19, structural rules that determine well-formed
expressions, and an interpretation that assigns meanings to (at least some of)
the characters and expressions. Although the choice of characters is arbitrary
from a theoretical point of view, Peano did formulate some design principles
explicitly, while others can be extrapolated from his practice.
As we shall see, the general aims of rigor and conciseness that motivated
Peano’s use of a symbolic language in the first place also underlie his choice
of characters (Section 3.1). In addition, Peano tried to design his notations
in such a way that they reduce the cognitive effort necessary for their use,
e.g., by linking their shapes to their meanings and by using a layout that
facilitates their readability (Section 3.2). Presumably, this would reduce errors
and mistakes when using the notation. Finally, Peano also considered factors
that influence the horizontal and vertical arrangement of the notation on the
printed page (Section 3.3).
3.1 Conciseness and reduction of ambiguity
3.1.1 Uniqueness of meanings and new symbols
to avoid ambiguities
In [Peano 1888], where he presents the logical calculus of Schröder, Peano
replaces each of the five basic symbols employed by Schröder with his own:
It seemed useful to substitute the symbols ∩, ∪, −, #,  for
the logical symbols ×, +, Ai, 0, 1 used by Schröder, in order
to forestall any possible confusion between the symbols of logic
and those of mathematics (a thing otherwise advised by Schröder
himself). [Peano 1888, X] (quoted from [Peano 2000, xiv])
19. To be clear, we mean here character types or symbol types, not tokens, but this
distinction plays no particular role in our discussion.
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Because Peano intends to use his logical symbolism in conjunction with the
usual mathematical notations, he must introduce new characters, which are
not already used in other mathematical domains, to avoid ambiguities. The
use of standard arithmetical symbols in logic does not pose a problem for
Schröder, since he presents logic as a self-standing theory that is not used in
conjunction with other theories, such as ordinary arithmetic.
Peano took the symbols “∩” and “∪” possibly from Grassmann [1844, 5],
who uses them for his more abstract theory of magnitudes; the circle and filled
circle do not have any obvious previous uses, but the symbol for negation (or
set complement) looks very similar to the minus sign. This seems to have
bothered Peano as he later recommends the following:
In the manuscript, it is best to give the sign for ‘not’ the form ∼,
so as not to confuse it with − (minus). [Peano 1895a, VI] (quoted
from [Kennedy 2002, 68])
This comment comes from the beginning of the first edition of the Formulario,
where Peano included a list of remarks and rules to facilitate future collabo-
rations. The above considerations about the introduction of new symbols are
encapsulated for the general case in the third item on the list:
Every time a new theory is translated into symbols, new signs will
be introduced to indicate the new ideas, or the new combinations
of preceding ideas, that are met in this theory. [Peano 1895a,
III–IV] (quoted from [Kennedy 2002, 67])20
Behind this principle lies the more fundamental principle that each symbol
that stands for an idea should have only a single fixed meaning. An example
for application of this design principle is Peano’s preference for writing the
decimal point:
I prefer the English notation 1 · 23 and · 45 to 1, 23 and 0, 45
for writing decimal fractions, because the comma has too many
meanings. [Peano 1916] (translated from [Peano 1957-1959, I,
448])
An explicit formulation of the principle that each symbol must be assigned
a unique meaning is given in the following passage, where Peano extends
it also to those symbols that are used for grouping subexpressions, such as
parentheses:
If one wants mathematical formulas to say everything without the
need of verbal additions, one cannot give two values to the same
sign. The assignment of another function to parentheses, other
than the grouping of more signs, is like trying to make a decimal
arithmetic in which the numbers 6 and 9 are represented by the
same sign. [Peano 1912, 377]
20. See also [Peano 1895b] for a similar formulation [Dudman 1971, 28].
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Despite his convictions, Peano himself did not always adhere to this
principle. For example, he interpreted the symbol “ c” as both deduction
and material conditional, for which he was criticized by Frege [1896, 372–374]
(quoted from [Frege 1969, 8–9]).
3.1.2 Simplifications of frequently used expressions
Peano not only uses symbols to represent the primitive ideas of a discipline,
but also allows for the introduction of new symbols within a theory through
definitions. However, he suggests to restrict such additions to the following
situations:
A new notation will be introduced by means of a definition when
it brings a notable simplification. A new notation will not be
formed when the same ideas can already be simply represented
by the preceding notations. [...]
A new notation will be introduced only if the simplification that it
brings will be used in the propositions following. Definitions alone
do not make a theory. [Peano 1895a, IV] (quoted from [Kennedy
2002, 68])
An early example for the application of this principle is Peano’s introduction
of a symbol to express “every A is B” in [Peano 1888, 3]. After noting that
this can be expressed with the primitive symbols of his theory as AB = #, he
continues:
Even though the preceding proposition for indicating that propo-
sition is already quite simple, for greater convenience we will
nevertheless also indicate it by the expression A < B or B > A
[...]. [Peano 1888, 3] (quoted from [Peano 2000, 2])
This symbol is indeed used very frequently in the further development and it
considerably shortens the expression introducing only one symbol in addition
to the variables, instead of three (“ ”, “=”, “#”). The notion of simplicity
appealed to in this principle thus refers to reducing the length of expressions.21
Another example for the application of this principle is Peano’s intro-
duction of expressions containing an existential quantifier “ Ea”, which he
motivates as follows:
The proposition a∼ = V, where a is a class, thus signifies “some
a exist”. Since this relation occurs rather often, some workers in
this field hold it useful to indicate it by a single notation, instead
of the group ∼ = V. [Peano 1896-1897] (quoted from [Kennedy
1973, 203])
21. That expressions can be expressed with fewer symbols is one of Peano’s two
meanings of “simplicity”, according to [Bellucci, Moktefi et al. 2018, 3]; the other
concerns the number of primitive logical symbols used in a theory.
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Again, a single symbol replaces three, and Peano explicitly mentions the
frequent use of this expression. We can thus summarize Peano’s principle as:
symbols that stand for derived ideas or relations should shorten expressions
and be used frequently. The particular shape of the new symbol, “ E”, was
chosen on the basis of semantical considerations, to which we turn next.
3.2 Semantical considerations
3.2.1 Iconicity and mnemonics
Even when taking only a cursory glance at Peano’s works, one cannot miss
his use of mnemonics when introducing new characters, although he does not
discuss it as an explicit principle. To illustrate this practice, let us look at
one of the most famous symbols introduced by Peano, the “horseshoe”. The
symbol for “proves” (or deduces) and “contains” was changed several times in
Peano’s writings. With an implicit analogy to the less-than relation in algebra,
it was first introduced as a < b in [Peano 1888, 3] for the calculus of classes.
In later writings, Peano formulated this analogy explicitly:
Segner in 1740 and Lambert in 1765 used a < b and a > b,
respectively; because the relation corresponds to the sign < or >,
or better to 5 or 5, of algebra, depending on whether with the
class one considers the number of individuals that constitute it,
or the number of ideas that determine it. [Peano 1900, 10]
Thus, Peano deliberately chose a symbol that bears some connection to the
represented relation. This connection, whereby the intended interpretation
is suggested by the particular shape of the symbol, is often called “iconic”,
following terminology introduced by [Peirce 1885, 181].22
Possibly because the less-than symbol is also used in algebra, thus
violating the principle that new symbols should be introduced for new ideas
(Section 3.1.1), Peano quickly replaced it with an inverted capital letter “C” a
year later, writing a Cb [Peano 1889a, viii] and interpreting it as a relation both
between classes and propositions.23 It is described as “the reversed initial letter
of the word contains [contiene]” in [Peano 1889b, 6],24 whereas the symbol





b, to indicate whether the endpoints of an interval a and b are excluded
or included, he notes that “this figurative notation is very convenient and fairly
widespread” [Peano 1916-1917, 455]. That the use of iconic mathematical symbols
has indeed cognitive advantages has recently been shown in [Wege, Batchelor et al.
2020].
23. In the original publication the symbol C does not appear aligned on the baseline
as the text, but somewhat lower, as in: a Cb.
24. Similarly, with the French word “contient” in [Peano 1890a, 183]; [Peano 1900,
316] refers to Gergonne for using “C” as the initial of “contains”; Quine [1987, 5]
refers to [Gergonne 1816-1817].
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“C” is described as the first letter of the word “consequence [consequenza]”
in [Peano 1891b, 100, footnote 5]. In [Peano 1894], the symbol remains an
inversed capital “C”, but in a smaller font, such that it appears as a cb.
Finally, the “⊃” symbol appears in Peano’s writings in 1898, e.g., [Peano
1898a], and is described as “a deformation of C, the reversed first letter of the
word “contains” [contient]” in [Peano 1900, 10]. Thus, Peano used the first
letter of a word that expresses the meaning of the relation as the sign that
represents it. The reversal was probably done to avoid confusing the symbol
with the name of a variable.
Other examples of Peano’s use of mnemonics to guide the choice of symbols
are: “P” for propositions, “Th” for theorems, “M” for maximum, and “D” for
divides [Peano 1889a, VI]. In some cases Peano chose the first letter of a word
in a different language than Italian or French, such as “V” for verum (the
Latin word for true),25 or “ε” and “ι”, which are the first letters of the Greek
words for “is” (ἐστί) and “equal” (ἴσος) [Peano 1894, 7 and 38].
3.2.2 Inverted symbols for inverse relations and operations
Another principle for the choice of characters that Peano frequently employs,
and that was already hinted at above, is the introduction of an inverted
symbol to express the contrary or inverse of the meaning of the original
symbol. This practice is referred to by Quine [1987, 18] as “Peano’s strategy of
notational inversion”.
For example, after introducing the symbol “V” for verum, Peano replaced
his earlier symbol for absurdity, “#”, with “ V” [Peano 1889a, VIII]. What is
unusual in this case is that the “V” itself is not used in the further development
of the theory, thus violating the principle identified above, according to which
only symbols that are actually used should be introduced (Section 3.1.2). The
desire for providing a set of symmetric symbols is likely to have motivated him
to do so. This becomes clear in a later publication, where, after listing the
symbols ε, c, c, =, ∪, ∩, −, v, v, which allow for the expression of all logical
relations, he remarks:
The signs c and v are mentioned here for the sake of symmetry,
but they have no practical utility. [Peano 1894, 7]
In [Peano 1891b, 159], Peano explicitly refuses the use of “V”, explaining:
We shall not introduce the sign V, which corresponds by duality
to V, because we do not need it.
In other works again, the inverted “V” is introduced without even mentioning
the upright letter at all; e.g., in [Peano 1889b, 6], where Peano simply explains
that “ V” is the first letter of the word vero (“true” in Italian), and in
25. In works written in Italian or French, it is motivated by the words vero and
vrai.
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[Peano 1894, 7], where it is introduced as the first letter of the French word
for “true”, vrai.
Although Peano does not give reasons for his frequent choice of inverted
symbols, their use arguably reduces the cognitive effort of learning the meaning
of new symbols. For example, given the meanings of “M” and “D” as maximum
and divisibility, the meanings of “ M” and “ D” as minimum and multiple can
easily be inferred [Peano 1889a, VI].26
Another reason for simply inverting symbols lies in the fact that the
printing types are readily available. For example, while Peano uses square
brackets as “symbols for inversion”, e.g., to write [xε] for class abstraction
in [Peano 1889a, XIV], he changes this to xε in [Peano 1894, 20] without
giving any reasons, possibly to shorten the expression. But in the German
translation of [Peano 1896-1897], which appeared as an appendix in [Genocchi
1899], we find the added footnote: “Instead of xεpx one can also write x εpx for
easier printing” [Peano 1990, 18].27 Here, the inversion of symbols is explicitly
motivated by typographical considerations, a topic we turn to next.
3.3 Horizontal and vertical arrangement
3.3.1 Symbol size and spacing for easier readability
In addition to the choice of characters themselves, Peano’s concerns extended
also to their arrangement on the page, e.g., their spacing. For the second
edition of the Formulario, he explicitly designed his symbolism for easier
readability:
In providing this material we tried to combine the clarity of the
formulas with the ease of composition. For example, we fixed the
length of the signs
= > ⊃ + − × / √
√
in proportion to the numbers
10 10 10 8 8 6 6 4 4
that measure them in typographical points; these dimensions
help to naturally read the formulas according to the common
conventions regarding the omission of parentheses. [Peano 1898b,
233]
What lies behind this remark is the idea that symbols that are closer together
are more readily seen as belonging together, such that the spacing around a
26. Other pairs of symbols that Peano uses are “f” and “ f” [Peano 1894, 27–29] and
“↑” and “↓” [Peano 1894, 39–40]; the symbol for exponentiation “” is described as
“the reversed sign for radicals” [Peano 1905, 34].
27. On the use of overlining, see also [Peano 1900, 8].
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symbol can support the correct interpretation of its binding strength. Recent
work by Landy and Goldstone [2007] has empirically validated this claim with
regard to the reading and writing of algebraic equations. Notice in the above
quotation how the width of the symbols (“the length of the signs”) correlates
with their usual binding strength: the less space a symbol occupies, the
stronger it binds.28 In his later reflections on mathematical typography, Peano
elaborates on how the spacing can support the correct reading of formulas:
The spacing of the formulas does not present typographical
difficulties; it can facilitate the reading. The formulas a+b × c
and a + b×c suggest the readings (a + b) × c and a + (b × c),
where the former is contrary to and the latter in conformity with
the conventions in algebra. The spacing a + b × c has become
standard in typography. The reading will be easier if the sign ×
is smaller than +. [Peano 1915, 403]
In the last remark, Peano not only suggests to tighten the spacing but to
actually make the sign smaller to indicate a stronger binding, which accords
with the common writing of a × b as a · b or simply ab. By carefully
selecting the size of the characters and the spacing between them, Peano
wanted to ensure that the way his formulas appeared on the paper would
facilitate their readability.
3.3.2 Printing costs and typographical convenience
Due to his leading position in the Formulario project, Peano was more involved
with the practical matters of printing than most other mathematicians.
In particular, this included being concerned about the cost of publishing
mathematical works. In general, whenever a notation requires types that
are not readily available by the typesetter or yields expressions that exceed
the height of a line, its production becomes more costly. Peano frequently
alluded to the cost of printing when discussing notational design, e.g., noting
that the typographical realization of the usual notation for fractions, where
the numerator appears above a line and the denominator below it, as in
“a
b
”, costs three times of that of writing them in a single line, as “a/b”
[Peano 1912, 377].29 Accordingly, Peano notes that from the second edition
onward of the Formulario, he introduced only notations that could be printed
within a single line.
28. This idea is formulated somewhat cryptically in the introduction of the third
edition of the Formulario as: “To make them stand out better, we will give the signs
different dimensions, helping ourselves with typographic spaces” [Peano 1901, 3].
29. The production process and pricing is explained in [Peano 1915, 281]: multiple
fractions in a line are five times as expensive as a single line, and with nested fractions
the cost increase is “dizzying” (vertiginosamente).
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In an article dedicated exclusively to typographical issues, Peano offers
suggestions for writing formulas without extending the height of a line so as to
keep the publishing costs down and to increase the readability of mathematical
texts, such as: avoiding large parentheses, large integral and sum signs,





”, and radical signs with a vinculum
[Peano 1915]. Here is an example of how such considerations affected Peano’s
notations: Peano did not use overlining in his 1889 books to write the inverse of
a function f as f , as Dedekind did in his axiomatic presentation of arithmetic
that was published a year earlier in 1888, but rather square brackets, because
of “typographical convenience” [Peano 1890a, 187].30
4 Peano’s dot notation
We now turn to one of the most striking innovations in Peano’s notation, the
use of dots to indicate the grouping of subformulas. In the 1894 introduction
to the Formulario, the dot notation is described as being “equivalent” to the
use of parentheses and vincula. To illustrate this point, Peano presents the
following three representations,




[(hk)l], ab cd efg hkl,
and justifies his choice of using the dots for the grouping of propositions by
a brief remark that parentheses render formulas “very complicated” [Peano
1894, 11]. At other occasions, Peano notes that “a convenient system of
dots” achieves the same as parentheses, but “with greater simplicity” [Peano
1891b, 155], and that “parentheses would be absolutely bulky and cumbersome
[absolument encombrantes]” [Peano 1897, 22]31. As we shall see presently,
the notions of simplicity and convenience that Peano attributes to the dot
notation are closely related to considerations about notations discussed earlier:
conciseness (Section 2.2) and vertical arrangement (Section 3.3.2). Compared
to those with parentheses, expressions that are grouped using dots are shorter,
while at the same time requiring no extra vertical space, as vincula do.
Before addressing the development of the dot notation in Peano’s writings
in Section 4.2, let me first briefly explain how it works and use syntax trees to
illustrate its relation to the usual linear notation.32
30. See also the example discussed at the end of the section 3.2.2.
31. This is repeated in [Peano 1900, 1901].
32. Syntax trees can be seen as a canonical notation for propositional logic and were
also employed in [Schlimm 2018] to shed light on Frege’s Begriffsschrift notation.
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4.1 Syntax trees and the dot notation
The main idea behind the dot notation is that, instead of aggregating elements
that belong together by enclosing them within a pair of parentheses, groups of
dots are used to separate two parts of an expression by marking the position
at which the formula is divided. To understand the way in which a formula
is partitioned by the dot notation, it is illustrative to consider the grouping
of a string of symbols. The following are two examples discussed by Peano
when introducing the dot notation for the first time [Peano 1889a, 104]. The
groupings that are effected by parentheses in the expressions
(ab)(cd) and (((ab)(cd))((ef)(gh)))k
are represented in the dot notation by
ab . cd and ab . cd : ef . gh ∴ k
Notice that in the first example, all four parentheses are replaced by a single
dot, while the 14 symbols for parentheses in the second example are replaced
by four groups of dots, for a total of seven dots. This economy of symbols is the
main reason explicitly stated by Peano for using dots instead of parentheses.33
In order to deepen our intuitive understanding of the dot notation, it is
instructive to look at the following syntax trees, which display the structure









This representation illustrates how the number of dots in Peano’s notation
corresponds to the level in the syntax tree; more precisely, the number of dots
of a node indicates (or is determined by) the length of the longest path from
it to a leaf.
To employ the dot notation in logical formulas, we place a group of dots
adjacent to a connective (to the left, right, or both) to separate a subformula
from the rest of the expression. Consider, for example, the formula
(p ∪ q)⊃ ((p ∪ (q ⊃ r)) ∩ (p ∪ r)) (1)
33. These comparisons in terms of the number of symbols used raise the question
of whether to count either the individual dots or each group of dots (e.g., . , : , ∴ ,
: : ) as symbols. We shall consider the latter as symbols because groups of dots are
never broken up and always used as a single unit.
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The use of syntax trees allows us to obtain the corresponding formula in the
dot notation very easily. We first draw the syntax tree for the formula and
label its edges as follows: if the longest path from the following node to a leaf


















We can also think of arriving at these labels by starting from the leaves and
labeling each edge with an increasing number of dots, while moving upward
toward the root, starting with zero. If the edges below a node are labeled with
different numbers of dots, say n and m, then the edge immediately above this
node is max(n,m)+1. In other words, the label of an edge above a connective
is one more than the greatest label of the edges that are immediately below
it. For example, since the edges that extend downward from the “∩” symbol
are labeled with groups of 1 and 2 dots, the edge above it must be labeled
with 3 dots. If a syntax tree is annotated in this way, the labels contain
information about the nesting of the subformulas: we immediately notice that
the connective that has the greatest label on one of its downward edges is the
main connective; the same also holds for each subtree.
Finally, to represent a formula in the linear dot notation, we parse its
syntax tree in the usual (infix) way and write the groups of dots before a
connective, if they appear on the left downward edge of the corresponding
connective, and after it, if they appear on the right downward edge. In our
example, this yields:
p ∪ q .⊃ ∴ p ∪ . q ⊃ r : ∩ . p ∪ r (3)
When comparing this formula to its representation with parentheses (1),
we see that a group of dots to the right of a connective corresponds to one
or more opening parentheses and that a group to the left corresponds to one
or more closing parentheses. This close connection between parentheses and
the dot notation can also be illustrated by using labeled parentheses. Using a
numeric label above a parenthesis to indicate its depth of nesting, we obtain
for (1):
1




















To arrive at the dot notation starting from this representation, we first have
to discard some of the parentheses that are redundant: all outer parentheses,
both at the beginning and the end of the formula, are omitted; if two or more
parentheses occur consecutively, we only keep the one with the greatest label











( p ∪ r (5)
Now, simply replacing any labeled parenthesis with a group of as many dots
as are indicated by the label yields the dot representation (3) of the formula.
If the dot notation is introduced without reference to syntax trees, one often
speaks of the scope of a group of dots, i.e., the subformula that is determined
by that group.34 The scope extends to the left of the group if the dots are
to the left of a connective, and to the right if the dots are to the right of a
connective. By looking at the syntax tree, it is easy to see that the scope of a
group of dots is a subtree, i.e., it extends beyond all groups that consist of a
smaller number of dots.
Because we always need two parentheses to enclose a subformula, but
only one group of dots to separate a subformula, the dot notation uses
fewer symbols. In our example, Formula (1), which contains 6 connectives,
has 10 parentheses, omitting outer parentheses as is convention, but its
representation in the dot notation (3) needs only 5 groups of dots. Because of
this, the dot representation is more concise, a fact that is frequently used to
argue in its favor.
4.2 Peano’s use of the dot notation
Peano introduced the dot notation in his 1889 booklet on arithmetic, in
which he presented his famous axiomatization of the natural numbers [Peano
1889a].35 His explanation for the notation is surprisingly short; he apparently
expected his readers to have no difficulties in using it.36 Peano writes:
34. See, e.g., the introduction of dots in Principia Mathematica [Whitehead &
Russell 1910-1913, I, 9–11].
35. Shortly afterwards, Peano published a logical exposition of geometry in which
the dot notation is introduced with a very similar wording [Peano 1889b, 7].
36. In [Peano 1891b], he remarks that dots are already used in analysis, where
“one writes d.uv and du.v instead of d(uv) and (du)v” and notes some analogy to
a notation used by Leibniz, referring to [Leibniz 1855, 276] and [Leibniz 1863, 55].
In these passages, Leibniz discusses the use of vincula and parentheses to group
subexpressions, and he also uses groups of commas for this purpose, but without
much explanation; in one example he also uses a combination of a comma with a
dot. Whether Peano’s dot notation was actually inspired by Leibniz or whether he
found the passage from Leibniz only after having developed his own notation remains
unclear.
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We shall generally write signs on a single line. To show the order
in which they should be taken, we use parentheses, as in algebra,
or dots, ., :, ∴, : :, and so on.
To understand a formula divided by dots we first take together
the signs that are not separated by any dot, next those separated
by one dot, then those separated by two dots, and so on. [Peano
1889a, VII] (quoted from [van Heijenoort 1967, 86])
This explanation is followed by the two examples presented at the beginning
of Section 4.1, and by a brief remark that the dots can be omitted if different
punctuations do not change the meaning of a formula (e.g., both “ab . c” and
“a . bc” can be rendered simply as “abc’ if the operation is associative) and
if no ambiguities arise. Because groups of dots have also been used in other
mathematical contexts (e.g., for multiplication and division), Peano warns:
To avoid the danger of ambiguity we never use . or : as signs
for arithmetic operations. [Peano 1889a, VII] (adapted from [van
Heijenoort 1967, 87])37
Despite the fact that dots make formulas shorter, Peano allows for both
dots and parentheses to be used within the same formula, with the convention
that parentheses bind stronger than dots [Peano 1889a, VII] ([van Heijenoort
1967, 87]).38 In general, both dots and parentheses occur in the same formula
to syntactically mark semantical differences between logical and arithmetical
expressions, e.g., in Definition 18 [Peano 1889a, 2]:
a, b εN . C. a+ (b+ 1) = (a+ b) + 1.
From this example, one might be tempted to surmise that Peano uses
parentheses for the grouping of mathematical (or algebraic) expressions and
dots for their logical grouping. While this is indeed mostly the case and he
praises the use of dots for avoiding “the confusion with parentheses in algebraic
formulas” [Peano 1891b, 155], Peano’s usage is not completely consistent in
this regard, sometimes relying simply on good judgement. For example, in
[Peano 1889a, IX], he uses dots in
23. a ∪ b .= ∴− :− a .− b
but parentheses in the very similar formula
25. −(a ∩ b) = (− a)(− b)
37. See also [Peano 1894, 13]: “When introducing the dots to separate the parts of
a proposition, one must discontinue their use for indicating multiplication a . b, which
will be written ab or a× b, and division a : b, which will be written a/b.”
38. The sentence in question is missing in Kennedy’s translation [Kennedy 1973,
104].
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The two previous formulas also illustrate that, in addition to the symbol for
conjunction, “∩”, Peano also uses juxtaposition to indicate conjunction. Thus,
the dot between “− a” and “− b” in Proposition 23, above, separates these two
expressions, such that they are rendered as “(− a)(− b)” using parentheses
(cf. Proposition 25, above). Citing the conciseness of the resulting expressions
as motivation, Peano explains:39
The sign ∩ is read and. Let a and b be propositions; then a ∩ b
is the simultaneous affirmation of the propositions a and b. For
the sake of brevity, we ordinarily write ab instead of a ∩ b. [Peano
1889a, VII] (quoted from [van Heijenoort 1967, 87])
In rare cases, Peano even uses both juxtaposition and ∩ within the same





c : d ce ∪ f ∴ c: h ∩ k cl . c. m cn
Here, on the one hand, the conjunction of “a c.b cc” and “d ce∪f” is indicated
by the first occurrence of “:”, which separates the two juxtaposed expressions.
The conjunction of h and k, on the other hand, is expressed by “∩”.
To determine the number of dots in a group that separates two conjuncts,
it is helpful to consider again the representation of formulas in terms of syntax
trees. As an example, consider Formula (3) and its corresponding syntax
tree (2) on p. 115, above. In this case the conjunction symbol (“∩”) is explicit
and has a group of two dots on the left and a single dot on the right. To
express this formula using juxtaposition for conjunction, we simply have to
replace the symbol “∩” by the group next to it with the greatest number of
dots and omit the other group. Replacing “: ∩ .“ with “:”, this results in the
formula
p ∪ q .⊃ ∴ p ∪ . q ⊃ r : p ∪ r
Note that, while Whitehead and Russell explicitly introduced a single dot as
the symbol for conjunction in Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell
1910-1913, I, 6], for Peano both dots and parentheses are exclusively marks
for grouping.40 In the third edition of the Formulario, Peano is unequivocal
about the use of parentheses for this unique purpose:
The symbols of the Formulario always have the same meaning.
Using parentheses to group the parts of a formula prevents us
from using them in another meaning. We will be able to denote
by (a) neither a power of a, as does Girard 1629 [...], nor the
39. This is also consistent with the considerations about readability and spacing
(Section 3.3.1).
40. Presumably due to Russell’s use, Peano’s notation has been misinterpreted in
the literature as using dots for conjunction; see, e.g., [Kneale & Kneale 1984, 521]
and [Lolli 2011, 57, footnote 27].
Peano on Symbolization, Design Principles, and the Dot Notation 119
integral part of a, nor the absolute value of a, nor a function of
a. In general, a single letter will never be enclosed in parentheses,
because it is not grouped. [Peano 1901, 3]41
Analogously, as Peano uses dots as marks for grouping, the expression “a . b”
would not be in accord with his usage, given that each symbol must have
a unique meaning and that a single letter cannot be grouped. Accordingly,
Peano omits dots on the side of a connective that has only a single variable in
its scope, as in a C. a ∪ b [Peano 1889a, IX, Prop. 26].
Peano’s use of the dot notation is systematic but not rigid. It is evident
from his formulas that he also employs implicit conventions regarding the
binding strength of operations that are familiar from algebra, e.g., that
juxtaposition binds stronger than any binary connective and that logical
connectives bind stronger than the equality symbol. If this were not the case,
Propositions 11, 14, and 27 in [Peano 1889a, IX],
ab
C
a, aa = a, and a ∪ b = b ∪ a
would have to be written as
ab .
C
a, aa . = a, and a ∪ b . = . b ∪ a
In later publications, Peano discusses some of his binding conventions
explicitly, e.g., [Peano 1894, 12–13], but also mentions additional ones to
further reduce the number of dots needed in a group. Presumably, however,
this practice would not pose serious difficulties for a reader familiar with the
typical binding conventions used in algebra.
In general, using more dots than are necessary in a group does not alter
the structure of a formula, as long as the number of dots in groups with
more dots are also increased accordingly. Thus, superfluous dots may be
introduced in a formula and some later authors will systematically do so,
presumably to enhance readability.42 Also, larger groups of dots stand out
more and are thus easier to see at a glance, which allows readers to faster
identify the main connective in a formula, because it is flanked by the greatest
number of dots. However, Peano does not add dots in a systematic fashion,
but only occasionally, e.g., in Proposition 2 [Peano 1889a, VIII], possibly due





c : C: a Cc. (6)
In fact, this proposition is rendered without the superfluous dot on the right





c : C. a Cc. (7)
41. See also [Peano 1897, 54], where Peano insists on writing fx instead of f(x).
42. For example, Landini adds dots such that each connective has always the same
number of dots on each side, “for easier reading” [Landini 2012, ix].
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As we have seen earlier, Peano’s symbolic language is not a formal
language in the modern sense, i.e., based on an explicit, recursively defined
grammar. Similarly, his dot notation is not defined rigorously, its usage is
not entirely uniform, and several conventions are left implicit. This practice
is consistent with common practice in algebra and with Peano’s general
attitude of being more interested in actually using the logical formalism for
the representation of mathematics than in giving a rigorous presentation of
the symbolism itself. Moreover, his general aims of attaining rigor and clarity
while striving at the same time for conciseness can also be seen at play
in this use of the dot notation.
5 Conclusion
Although some of Peano’s views were shared by other influential logicians
at the time, such as Peirce and Frege, his particular outlook and the
associated enterprise of the Formulario remain unique. Perhaps because of
the collaborative nature of the latter, Peano was more explicit than most
other mathematicians about the principles that guide the introduction of new
symbols, their shapes, and their layout. Moreover, while Frege maintained
that “the convenience of the typesetter is not the highest Good” [Frege 1896],
Peano was willing to take such practical matters into consideration. Despite
his efforts, Peano’s symbolism was not widely adopted outside of Italy in the
late 19th century. Felix Klein wrote to Pieri in 1897:
My general experience indicates that articles which are written us-
ing this symbolism, at least in Germany, find practically no read-
ers and moreover meet with immediate rejection. [Marchisotto &
Smith 2007, 365; see also 383]
Nevertheless, with time, many of Peano’s symbols did eventually enter the
mathematical canon, and, through its adoption by Whitehead and Russell
in their groundbreaking Principia Mathematica [Whitehead & Russell 1910-
1913], Peano’s dot notation also became very popular in logical works in the
first half of the 20th century, though it has by now almost completely faded
into the background.43
The above discussions have given us insight into Peano’s views on logic and
his motivations for the development of a logical symbolism as a methodological
tool for the analysis of mathematical ideas and as an indispensable practical
tool for the presentation of mathematical theories. Accordingly, two main
normative ideals underlie Peano’s symbolizations: attaining rigor and clarity,
mainly through the avoidance of ambiguities, which is primarily achieved by
ensuring the uniqueness of meanings as well a judicious choice of notation,
43. A more detailed account of the use of the dot notation in early 20th century
logic is in preparation by the author.
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and conciseness. In addition, practical considerations, such as reducing the
effort to learn and memorize the meanings of the notation, enhancing the
clarity of the presentation and the ease with which it can be read, and, finally,
reducing the printing costs, all guided Peano’s design of notations. All of these
considerations also support Peano’s most conspicuous notational innovation,
the dot notation for grouping subexpressions.
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in the Making of Latino sine Flexione
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Résumé : Cette contribution examine l’arrière-plan scientifique de Latino sine
Flexione (LSF), une langue auxiliaire internationale élaborée par Peano. Le
LSF s’insère dans le cadre d’un mouvement linguistique plus vaste résul-
tant des nouvelles technologies, lesquelles accélérèrent la mondialisation. La
science constitue une force motrice dans le développement d’une langue auxi-
liaire internationale, étant donné qu’elle favorise les contacts internationaux et
qu’elle fournit des données et des méthodes permettant de construire une telle
langue. Avec le LSF, Peano entreprit de réaliser une partie du rêve leibnizien
d’une langue universelle, dont une version simplifiée et provisoire du latin
représenterait la première étape. Le LSF fut conçu à partir des fragments
de Leibniz rassemblés par Couturat. En éliminant les traits conventionnels
du latin standard, Peano entreprit de le réduire à son expression logique.
Inspiré par des préoccupations similaires à celles qui furent à l’origine du
symbolisme du Formulario, il chercha à mettre sur pied une langue simple,
réduite à un noyau logique commun à toutes les langues, et de ce fait adaptée
à l’usage international. Pour ce faire, Peano procéda de la manière suivante :
il élimina les inflexions de tous les mots et il établit une « algèbre de la
grammaire » régissant les règles de formation des mots. La simplicité, la non-
redondance et la calculabilité sont les valeurs-clés du LSF inspirées de la
pratique mathématique de Peano.
Abstract: This contribution examines the scientific background of Latino
sine Flexione (LSF), an international auxiliary language constructed by Peano.
LSF is part of a larger linguistic movement resulting from new technologies
that accelerated globalisation. Science is a major driving force behind the
international auxiliary language movement, both for creating an increased
need for international contacts and for lending its data and methods to
language construction. With LSF, Peano attempted to realize part of Leibniz’s
dream of a universal language, of which a temporary simplified form of Latin
would become the first step. LSF was designed following Leibniz’s fragments
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compiled by Couturat. By eliminating conventional features from standard
Latin, Peano attempted to reduce it to its logical expression. Inspired by
the same concerns that motivated the symbolism of Formulario, he aimed
for a simple language that owed its fit for international use to its being
stripped down to the logical core shared by all languages. To achieve this,
Peano proceeded by eliminating inflections from all words and establishing an
“algebra of grammar” that governed the rules of word-formation. Simplicity,
non-redundancy and computability are key values of LSF inspired from Peano’s
mathematical practice.
1 Introduction
This essay is dedicated to Giuseppe Peano’s work in interlinguistics, or
language construction for international communication. Peano’s reflections
on mathematical symbolism and his pursuit of major Leibnizian ideas resulted
in Formulario and the axiomatic theory of natural numbers that earned him
his reputation in the history of mathematics and also in the construction of
an international language called Latino sine Flexione (LSF), or Interlingua.
This linguistic project occupied most of his later years, ensuring him an
important place in the history of international auxiliary languages. In the
following, we examine the philosophical background of LSF. We start with
a short overview of the historical context that led to the emergence of
constructed languages for international communication. Peano’s involvement
in the movement was boosted by his reading of Leibniz’s newly discovered
manuscripts and his contact with Louis Couturat. Following Leibniz’s idea of a
characteristica universalis, Peano separated logic from convention in language
and planned LSF as a language free from conventions reigning in natural
languages. The influence of Peano’s mathematical thinking on LSF can be
seen in its axiomatic properties of simplicity and non-redundancy, as well as
in its algebraic modification of Latin.
2 The question of language in the early
20th century
International auxiliary languages (also called interlingua by Peano, or inter-
language) are defined as languages constructed for communication between
people with different native tongues. They appeared towards the end of
the 19th century when national independence movements and rivalries grew
simultaneously with cross-border commercial, administrative and scientific
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contacts in Europe. The international auxiliary language (IAL) movement
can be considered an intellectual product of “the first wave of globalization”
that lasted from 1870 to 1914. In economic history, this period is marked by
the rapid development of transportation and telecommunication technologies
and a resulting increase in the circulation of goods and persons. This situation
gave rise to a growing number of international bodies and an associated trend
toward standardization across national borders. The International Telegraph
Union was established in 1865, the Universal Postal Union in 1874 and the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures in 1875. The Olympic Games
were initiated in 1896 and the Nobel Prizes in 1901. From 1867 onwards world
fairs began to be organized regularly. As well as the 2nd International of the
workers’ movement, transnational political structures were founded such as
the International Federation of Free Thought (1880), the International Sionist
Organization (1897), the International Bureau for Masonic Affairs (1902) and
the first international positivist congress which met in 1908. Among other
notable structures set up during the first wave of globalization are the Hague
conferences in 1899 and 1907, the international peace congresses and several
international scientific bodies [Rasmussen 2001].
IALs (or interlanguages) were suggested by many as a viable alternative
to any of the existing languages belonging to a particular nation because
of the increased need to cooperate in a multilingual Europe of emerging
and competing national sensitivities. War resisters were among the leading
supporters of such a seemingly neutral solution to the language problem.
A constructed language that was nobody’s property would, they expected,
contribute to mutual understanding of peoples and prevent enmities. Despite
general scepticism at its reception, IAL was a project with considerable
backing from a good deal of scientists, including linguists. The leading
interlanguages like Esperanto and its derivative Ido figured in the agendas
of scientific organizations [Gordin 2015] and were far from being marginal
amateur creations. IAL was discussed alongside other possible solutions to
the perceived language problem in Europe such as an existing language (and
possibly more than one) or the revival of a dead language (Latin). But
IAL advocates advanced strong arguments against these. Firstly, the use of
the language of a dominant nation would grant unfair privilege to its native
speakers, whereas a neutral language would put all interlocutors on an equal
footing. Therefore, a language that would be learned by everyone was thought
to be an antidote to nationalism and an incentive to build a peaceful global
community. Secondly because an interlanguage would be built specifically
for the purpose of international communication, it would be a more efficient
instrument to accomplish that function. To succeed, an interlanguage would
have to be designed with the ease of learning and its expressive potential
primarily in mind. The movement started with the creation of Volapük by
Johann Martin Schleyer, a German priest, in 1879. Volapük was the subject
of considerable but short-lived interest. In 1887, Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof,
a Russian-Jewish ophtalmologist in the multi-ethnic and multilingual city of
130 Başak Aray
Bialystok, published Esperanto, an interlanguage whose community outlived
its creator and which has remained active to this day. Esperanto was followed
by alternatives, including those emerging from reform proposals, such as Ido,
devised by the French logician and Leibniz scholar Louis Couturat to be an
improvement of Esperanto. It is in this context that Peano created LSF as
a Latin-based isolating language for international communication. He used
this language in the 5th edition of Formulario and published some other
mathematical papers using it.1
Peano maintained strong ties with the IAL movement and he had in-depth
knowledge of its most important projects. In 1906 (3 years after publishing
LSF), Peano attended the World Esperanto Congress in Geneva. In 1907, he
took part in the meeting of the Delegation for the adoption of an international
auxiliary language, set up under the leadership of Couturat following the
International Congress of Philosophy (1900). This event marks the beginning
of Peano’s active interest in language construction which constituted his main
focus in his later life. In 1908, he was elected member and director of
the Akademi internasional de lingu universal (the Volapük Academy). The
following year he renamed it Academia pro Interlingua, made the membership
open to all and declared that each academician was free to use his own
form of interlanguage—a major change from Schleyer’s monopolistic attitude
with Volapük which arguably alienated its supporters in the long term and
hampered its adoption. Peano praised Volapük for its morphological regularity
(which constitutes the main reason of its success, according to Peano) but also
criticized it for its lack of internationality as its lexicon was mainly based on
shortened Germanic roots:
Each affix has a fixed meaning; the affix is added to the root
without reduction. This constitutes the biggest superiority of
Volapük over natural languages and explains its rapid diffusion
in 1887. But the author gives the affixes values of Germanic
affixes; and there is no univocal correspondence between affixes,
prepositions and grammatical elements from different languages.2
[Peano 1912, 479]
After taking over the directorship of the Academy, Peano soon turned it into a
democratic platform for experimenting with IAL and then an organ of diffusion
for LSF/Interlingua.
In a sense, one might consider the existence of IALs as a testimony
to the capacities of modern science. Not only were they inspired by new
1. See [Kennedy 1980] for a full bibliography.
2. “Omni affixo habe sensu constante ; affixo es addito ad radice sine reductione.
Hoc constitue magno superioritate de Volapük super linguas naturale, et explica suo
diffusione rapido in 1887. Sed auctore da ad affixos de Volapük valore de affixos
de germanico ; et non existe correspondentia univoco inter affixos, praepositiones
et elementos grammaticale de linguas differente.” [All translations are mine, unless
otherwise indicated.]
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technologies and used data from comparative linguistics, but, to some extent,
they also aimed at increasing scientific literacy and sustaining a common world
culture around science. For Peano, the de facto internationality of scientific
terminology shows the path to the internationalism desired in other areas.
For this reason, a scientific vocabulary common to all (or most) European
languages forms the core of LSF/Interlingua vocabulary. Internationalization
through the progressive expansion of scientific vocabulary to other contexts
also has a secondary pedagogic effect of familiarizing the lay public with
the language of science. For Peano, Interlingua would be intelligible to
scientifically literate Europeans with virtually no effort required. Those not
familiar with scientific jargon could acquire this knowledge through learning
and using Interlingua which is a positive side effect of this linguistic project:
Every cultured person who knows either Latin vocabulary or
the scientific vocabulary of a European language understands
Interlingua without studying it. Through Interlingua a less
cultured person acquires Latin vocabulary which is living within
his own language and becomes cultured.3 [Peano 1927, 501]
Although the major influence came from mathematics and linguistics,
scientists from other disciplines engaged in the IAL activism in the first half
of the 20th century, notably Richard Lorenz, Leopold Pfaundler and Wilhelm
Ostwald, who contributed with Couturat and Jespersen to a volume entitled
International Language and Science in 1910 [Couturat, Jespersen et al. 1910].
A decade later, the question of an international language for science figured in
the agenda of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS).
The possibility of an international auxiliary language for scientific publications
was discussed at the 1921 meeting of the International Research Council in
Brussels. A committee was appointed by the BAAS “to investigate and report
to it [council] the present status and possible outlook of the general problem of
an international auxiliary language” [British Association for the Advancement
of Science 1921, 390]. The question is discussed in the 89th report of the
BAAS, with a detailed examination of concurring solutions to the problem of
international communication, namely Latin, English, Esperanto and Ido. The
question of an IAL is introduced in terms of finding ways to ensure peace.
The committee’s assessment of the respective merits and weaknesses of all the
above options led to its preference for a constructed language such as Esperanto
and Ido (“Esperanto and Ido are suitable: but the Committee is not prepared
to decide between them” [British Association for the Advancement of Science
1921, 401]) to be adopted as the IAL:
From the evidence laid before it, the Committee (Professor
Ripman dissenting) has come to the conclusion that a language
3. “Omne homine culto, que cognosce aut vocabulario latino, aut vocabulario
scientifico de unu lingua de Europa, intellige Interlingua, sine studio. Homine minus
culto disce, in Interlingua, vocabulos latino vivente in suo lingua, et fi culto.”
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of the type of Esperanto and Ido should be adopted as the
International Auxiliary Language; and also, that, whatever lan-
guage be adopted, it should be placed under scientific control.
[British Association for the Advancement of Science 1921, 401]
The report mentions LSF as a constructed language rather than as a way
of internationalizing Latin, then dismisses it due to the proven success of
Esperanto/Ido that was already in stable use.
For the BAAS committee, a world unified by unprecedented developments
in transportation and telecommunication technologies needs another linguistic
technology to complement this ongoing globalization process:
It is a truism that modern science has revolutionised the material
conditions of our existence and that, in particular, the devel-
opment of means of inter-communication—railway, steamship,
telegraph—has added to the amenities of life; but, unfortunately,
opportunities for strife have increased almost pari passu and
what is now required is some means of attaining greater mutual
knowledge as an insurance against future conflicts and misunder-
standings. Experimental science has forged the wheels of civilised
life; can humanistic science provide a lubricant to make them
run more smoothly? [British Association for the Advancement of
Science 1921, 390]
Indeed, arguments from technology and historical development are prominent
in the IAL movement, which often portrayed itself as a logical product of its
times.4 IAL advocates praised technological developments and highlighted
the contrast between the material unification of the world and subsisting
national divisions. For instance, Couturat and Léau insist on the necessity
for language to catch up with the advancement and standardization reigning
in other products of human civilization.5 This distance between perceived
levels of material and intellectual advancement is also used by Lorenz for the
4. Gordin notes that “[t]he common trope [in the movement] was to draw
inspiration from contemporary innovations in communications and transportation
technologies and the standardisations that followed in their wake” [Gordin 2015,
114].
5. “Its necessity results even more obviously from the development of means of
communication: what good is being able to commute abroad in a few hours if one can
neither understand the inhabitants nor make oneself understood by them? What good
is being able to telegraph from a continent to another and make a phone call from a
country to another if the two interlocutors do not have a common language to write
or converse in?” [“Sa nécessité résulte encore plus évidemment du développement des
moyens de communication : à quoi bon pouvoir se transporter en quelques heures dans
un pays étranger, si l’on ne peut ni comprendre ses habitants ni se faire comprendre
d’eux ? À quoi bon pouvoir télégraphier d’un continent à l’autre, et téléphoner d’un
pays à l’autre, si les deux correspondants n’ont pas de langue commune dans laquelle
ils puissent écrire ou converser ?”] [Couturat & Leau 1903, ix].
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defence of IAL.6 Likewise, Pfaundler situates the IAL in the continuity of the
modern standardization process.7 Through comparisons with successful ac-
complishments in other areas, IAL’s advocates intended to mitigate prejudice
against it while also putting the movement into a wider historical perspective
to help it gain legitimacy.
3 Leibniz, the precursor to Interlingua
Peano’s introduction to the second tome of Formulaire de mathématiques and
his explanations elsewhere make clear that the symbolism used in Formulario
originates in the Leibnizian idea of an ideographic writing [Peano 1896a,b,
1897]. But it is after starting his exchanges with Couturat that Peano turned
to Leibniz for a solution to the problem of international communication which
was much debated in his day. In 1899, Peano sent his assistant Giovanni
Vacca to Hannover to study Leibniz’s unpublished manuscripts. The following
year, Vacca met Couturat at the first International congress of philosophy
(Paris). At the time, Couturat was already working on the Logic of Leibniz, a
monograph in which he introduced Leibniz’s thoughts on universal language
[Couturat 1901]. After his contact with Vacca, Couturat started an editorial
project of compiling Leibniz’s unpublished writings which was to be completed
in 1903.8 Peano’s quotations of Leibniz in his first article on LSF [Peano 1903]
are taken from this compilation by Couturat. Later, Peano collaborated with
Couturat on the publication of a mathematical dictionary in 1910, in Ido,
German, English, French and Italian. After fruitful contacts lasting for years,
Peano and Couturat fell out, seemingly due to rivalry about IAL.9
As noted by Couturat [Couturat 1901], in addition to his influential
characteristica universalis, the need to construct a rational grammar for the
universal-language-to-come brought Leibniz to search for a provisory auxiliary
idiom that would “serve as an intermediary between living languages and the
6. “We boast of our international intercourse. The civilised world has extended
to new nations and has embraced whole regions of the earth and yet, in spite of
the magnificent means of material communication, nothing of a similar nature has
been done for the purpose of uniting minds together in an equally practical manner”
[Lorenz 1910].
7. “The introduction of a common system of weights and measures was also
declared to be impossible at one time, nevertheless it has since been carried out
in science. The construction of a system of telegraph wires connecting the whole
civilised world and a telegraph alphabet common to all nations was declared seventy
years ago to be an impossibility. Now it is ancient history” [Pfaundler 1910].
8. In the preface, Couturat mentions Vacca who drew his attention to the
unpublished manuscripts of Leibniz and credits Peano’s school for initiating his
interest in the logic of Leibniz [Couturat 1903, i].
9. See [Roero 1999], [Luciano & Roero 2005] and [Luciano 2012] for Peano’s
correspondence with Couturat. For Couturat’s exchange with Russell on Peano, see
[Russell 2001] and [Garvia 2015].
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future rational language”. Leibniz chose Latin as the basis of this auxiliary
language. While characteristica universalis inspired Peano the symbolism of
Formulario, the side project of an international language was realized through
LSF. Like his predecessor, Peano turned to Latin to solve the problem of
international communication because it had been the international language
of science until the end of the 18th century and he considered that an
interlingua based on Latin would benefit from this historical and cultural
basis. Peano situates LSF in the continuity of Latin—not the high Latin
of scientists but the Vulgar Latin, where cases were simplified. For Peano, the
common vocabulary of European languages is also “a living document about
the history of civilization”. Updating Latin for contemporary use would help
preserve the cultural heritage of Europe by building a common identity beyond
national divisions. However Peano wanted to adapt Latin to contemporary
use by “rationalizing” its grammar following the guidelines set up by Leibniz.
Peano’s recipe for a successful IAL is to combine international elements of
vocabulary with a “minimal” grammar that leaves words identical throughout
different propositional contexts. An isolating grammar helps the reader in the
immediate identification of words, which are to be selected from international
ones for a maximal efficiency:
Experience proves that, by using international vocabulary and
simple or no grammar, many authors write in a language that
cultured people understand with almost no study.10
[Peano 1930, 515]
The result was to be Latino sine Flexione.
In his first exposé of LSF, Peano lists the rules of the language with
corresponding quotations from Leibniz [Peano 1903]. The text starts in Latin
but Peano adopts each rule from the moment it has been stated, so that the
paper ends in LSF after the incorporation of successive rules. The first rule
states the defining feature of LSF that makes it different from Latin—the
absence of affixes and the resulting invariability of words:
The noun case can always be eliminated by substitution of some
particle in another place.11 (Leibniz qtd. by [Peano 1903, 439])
Following Leibniz, Peano prefers the use of standardized prepositions over
variation in word endings:
We indicate genitive with of, dative with to, ablative with from,
out of,...12 [Peano 1903, 440]
10. “Experientia proba quod per usu de vocabulos internationale, et grammatica
simplice aut nullo, numeroso auctore scribe in lingua que homine culto intellige sine
studio, aut quasi.”
11. “Nominum casus semper eliminari possunt substitutis in eorum locum particulis
quibusdam.”
12. “Indicamus genitive cum de, dative cum ad, ablative cum ab, ex, ...”
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The adoption of the SVO word order common to most European languages
makes the accusative unnecessary—as long as this regular word order is
respected, object and subject of a verb are sufficiently well distinguished even
in the absence of an accusative marker on the object. Substantives do not
vary according to the case and they will have an inflexible form generally
corresponding to the ablative. This is the main principle of LSF. The second
rule of LSF excludes grammatical gender:
The distinction of gender has nothing to do with rational gram-
mar.13 (Leibniz qtd. by [Peano 1903, 440])
Substantives are genderless but mas (male) and femina (female) can be used
with them to emphasize gender when needed. Singular and plural can be
indicated by uno and plure respectively but substantives are not marked by
number (“the plural seems useless in a rational language” (Leibniz qtd. by
[Peano 1903, 440])).14 Conjugation is eliminated using a similar method:
Persons of verbs can be invariable, it suffices to change I, you, he,
etc.15 (Leibniz qtd. by [Peano 1903, 441])
Like the substantives, verbs are inflexible: the person is indicated by the
subject (me, te, nos...), the tense by adverbs of time such as heri [yesterday],
in passato [in the past], nunc [now], cras [tomorrow], in future [in the future],
etc. Participles are expressed without changing the verb ending: laudante –
qui lauda [who praises], laudando – dum laudo [while praising], laudato – qui
aliquo laudo [whom someone praises], laudaturo – qui lauda in future [who will
praise], etc. In vocabulary building, the guiding principle is again to leave
each word inflexible: hortulo – parvo horto, Romano – de Roma, Chartaceo –
ex charta [paper], animose – cum animo, amabilo – qui aliquo pote ama, etc.
4 Logic and convention in language
For Peano, who followed the ideas in Leibniz’s linguistic writings, rationalizing
Latin means to remove grammatical “conventions”, avoid redundancy and
ambiguity, be regular and economical. LSF or Interlingua is an attempt
to make Latin rational by eliminating grammatical difficulties that lack any
demonstrable logical function. In designing LSF, Peano aspired to develop a
language “without grammar” (in his own words) in which sentences would be
formed merely by juxtaposition of vocabulary and all words would keep the
same form in all contexts, as they are found in the dictionary. This led Peano
to turn away from agglutinative languages and choose an isolating structure
instead, like English, Chinese, or the language of mathematics (“Chinese has
13. “Discrimen generis nihil pertinet ad grammaticam rationale.”
14. “Videtur pluralis inutilis in lingua rationali.”
15. “Personae verborum possunt esse invariabiles, sufficit variari ego, tu, ille, etc.”
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no grammar. Mathematical formulas, such as 2 + 3 = 5, are propositions
without grammar.”)16 In an analytic language, parts-of-speech do not affect
the form of words through modifications such as declension or conjugation.
As indicated by the name LSF, the language’s main novelty is the absence of
inflexions. Peano’s dismissal of parts-of-speech is the result of the distinction
he made between universal logic and a myriad of differing, conventional
grammars. To prove his point, Peano illustrates how cases can be expanded
with, with an example from his native Italian language:
Italian: Io scrivo. Tu leggi. Noi abbiamo una lingua e due
orecchi. La lingua internazionale ieri era un’utopia, domani sarà
la verità.
Italian without flexions: Io scrivere. Tu leggere. Noi avere uno
lingua e dua orecchio. Lingua internazionale ieri essere utopia,
domani essere verità. [Peano 1927, 492]
This experiment in translation shows that inflections can be disposed of
without affecting the intelligibility of the text:
Such a language is as clear as a language with grammar. Therefore
gender, number, articles, person, mode, verbal tense, etc. are
useless.17
Incidentally the absolute distinction of parts-of-speech is only found in
inflecting languages:
Distinction of parts-of-speech ‘substantive, adjective, verb, ad-
verb, preposition’ is relative to inflecting languages and have no
logical value; therefore it is of interest to linguists only. All the
resulting grammatical nomenclature is without value.18
Therefore, parts-of-speech do not correspond to “real” categories which need to
be faithfully represented in an ideography (or, for instance, an ideographically-
inspired language like LSF).
The opposition of linguistics to logic was a grounding idea in the emergence
of symbolic logic, to which Peano contributed greatly. Peano’s view of logic
as distinct from grammar follows the Aristotelian distinction between formal
and real definitions. According to that, to find out whether a property of a
noun is formal or real, we can substitute it with another noun with the same
meaning. If the resulting sentence conserves the same truth value, then it
16. “Lingua de Sina (China) non habe grammatica. Formulas de mathematica,
quale 2 + 3 = 5, es propositione sine grammatica” [Peano 1927, 493].
17. “Tale lingua es tam claro quam lingua cum grammatica. Resulta inutile genere,
numero, articulo, persona, modo, tempore de verbo, etc.” [Peano 1927, 492].
18. “Distinctione de partes de oratione ‘substantivo, adjectivo, verbo, adverbio,
praepositione’, es relativo ad lingua cum flexiones ; et habe nullo valore logico ; hoc
es ultra noto ad linguistas. Toto nomenclatura de grammatica resulta sine valore”
[Peano 1927, 493].
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expresses a “real” property possessed by its corresponding object; otherwise,
it expresses a “formal” property belonging to the name only. For example, in
the proposition “homo es rationale” [“man is rational”], “man”, which has
the same meaning as “homo” can replace the latter without affecting the
truth value of the proposition. By contrast, “homo es bisyllabo” (“homo is
disyllabic”) states a property of the noun homo, not of the man. Referring to
Max Müller (The Science of Thought [Müller 1887]) and Michel Bréal (Essai
de Sémantique [Bréal 1899]), Peano points out the relativity of parts-of-speech
on an interlinguistic scale. Müller said that Aristotle’s categories correspond
to the categories of Greek grammar (for instance, they are not relevant to
Semitic languages). In English, too, the same word can be used as a verb,
subjective or adjective (Peano’s example is “I ink a pen, I pen a word, I word
a thing.”). Therefore, substantive, verb, etc., are only formal properties of
words, not real ones.
The result of the fact that grammatical categories are relative
to Greek and its affiliated languages and not to all languages
is that this classification is formal. A property of a word is
real (of the thing) if it is about the object or idea indicated
by the word, it is formal (of the form) if it is about the word
that indicates an idea.19
Following this distinction, Peano criticizes Esperanto for taking syntactic
categories for granted. In Esperanto, word endings are standardized according
to the part-of-speech (POS). All words are roots, to which a POS-marker
is added: all substantives end with –o, adjectives with –a, adverbs with –e.
Conjugation is also regular: the –i ending marks the infinitive, –as the present
tense, –is the past tense, –os the future tense, –u the imperative, –us the
conditional. Zamenhof built the entire Esperanto grammar around the parts-
of-speech distinction. He eliminated all cases but retained the accusative
for a flexible word order (ex: Kato ĉasas muson = muson ĉasas kato, “the
cat chases the mouse”). In Esperanto, Peano appreciated the elimination of
grammatical gender and of the personal marking by verbs. He considered
this an improvement over natural languages. Yet, for him, Zamenhof did
not go far enough in rationalization because he maintained parts-of-speech
(although in a more systematic way than in natural languages). In Peano’s
view, as a merely formal property of words, POS-markers do not have a place
in a rational language. Like Couturat, who criticized Esperanto’s derivational
system for failing to meet the logical criteria of univocity and reversibility
[Couturat 1910], Peano saw objective (therefore, truly neutral) grounds for an
IAL and a solid reason for its universal acceptance in universal logic. Both
separated universal logic from conventional languages, associating the former
19. “Ex facto que categorias grammaticale es relativo ad graeco, et linguas affine,
et non ad omni lingua, resulta que isto classificatione es formale. Proprietate de
vocabulo es reale, de re, si tracta de objecto aut idea indicato ab vocabulo, es formale,
de forma, si tracta de forma de vocabulo, que indica idea” [Peano 1912, 459].
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with the unity needed for a successful IAL and the latter with the diversity
responsible for the language barriers dividing peoples of the world. Under
Leibniz’s influence, both privileged logic over linguistics and both insisted on
making the IAL conform to the requirements of logic.
5 The influence of mathematics
Mathematicians first debated IAL at the International congress of philosophy
in 1900. Couturat was in the organizing committee. He brought up the
topic during the event, then pioneered the Delegation for the Adoption of an
International Auxiliary Language that met following on from the congress.
The Delegation was formed as a self-appointed dedicated body to settle
the international language problem by engaging experts. The philosophy
congress was followed by the congress of mathematicians, where Charles Méray
suggested the adoption of Esperanto [Méray 1902, paper read by Léopold
Léau]. Couturat, Léau, Charles-Ange Laisant and Alessandro Padoa (of
Peano’s school) were in favour of the proposal while Ernst Schröder20 and
Aleksandr Vasil’ev were against. Despite Couturat’s efforts to recruit him
to the cause of IAL, Bertrand Russell only expressed unenthusiastic interest
in it. Couturat himself broke from the Esperanto movement after successive
rejections of his reform proposal. He also ended his collaboration with Peano
and both men continued to promote their own IALs.
Among mathematicians, Peano’s biggest support came from Paul Mansion,
who appreciated the mathematical principles of construction behind LSF and
declared it to be “the real IAL of the future” ([Mansion 1904], cited by
[Roero 1999, 12]). Indeed LSF’s morphology had qualities that appealed to
mathematicians because it had taken inspiration from axiomatics and algebra.
Peano’s search for simplicity, non-redundancy and computability in IAL attests
to the influence that his axiomatisation of the system of natural numbers had
on LSF, despite these two projects being clearly separated in his work.21 In
his attempt to purify Latin from redundancies proper to natural languages,
Peano is led to eliminate inflections whenever their meaning can be clearly
expressed by adjoined words. Moreover, Peano goes so far as to claim he
had eliminated all grammar derived from Latin (“Grammar can be reduced to
20. In 1897, Schröder had introduced a pasigraphy of his own making for scientific
purposes only, in his talk in the International Congress of Mathematicians in Zürich.
See [Gray 2008], [Peckhaus 2014] and [Schröder 1898].
21. For instance, Peano associates simplicity with the practice of mathematicians:
“Mathematicians generally prefer simpler forms; orators and poets prefer long and
sonorous sentences.” [“Mathematicos praefer in generale forma plus simplice; oratores
et poetas praefer periodo longo et sonoro”] [Peano 1912, 466].
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little or nothing”).22 This means paraphrasing standard Latin sentences by
replacing affixes with appropriate accompanying words or prepositions.23
The strategy of eliminating all “useless elements” from IAL indicates a
functionalist view of language that dominated the understanding of interlan-
guage planners. It helped them counter-object to accusations of not respecting
historical languages as they are and attempting to change them in an unnatural
way, without regard for their spiritual identity. For Peano, we do not owe
the Latin of Cicero and Horatio respect for its traditional grammar as it is
already a dead language. Using a living language “without grammar” would
produce a similar effect to walking around with uncustomary clothing in public
but the fact that Latin is not in public use makes it legitimate to modify it
following the technical needs of international communication such as simplicity
[Peano 1927, 493]. If the adjunction of fixed words in their form as found in
dictionaries suffices to produce an intelligible output (and this is the case,
as Peano shows with examples of translation from Latin to LSF), then this
method should be preferred for its greater simplicity and thus its suitability
for its purpose—easy universal use.
To some extent, Peano takes the ideographic language of algebra as a model
for LSF, even though these two symbolisms do not have the same purpose.
The ideographic nature of algebraic symbols makes them suitable for use in
calculations.
Algebraic equations are much shorter than their expression in
ordinary language, are simpler and clearer and may be used in
calculations. This is because algebraic symbols represent ideas
and not words. [Peano 1915, 228]
The Peanian ideography is intended to “establish a one-to-one correspondence
between ideas and symbols, a correspondence which is not found in our
ordinary language” [Peano 1897, 191].
The ideas represented by our symbols are very simple ideas and
do not have exactly the value of their corresponding terms in
ordinary language, which represent more complex ideas. Thus
the sign ε may be read “is a”, or “est” in Latin but represents the
idea obtained from the term “est” when abstraction is made from
grammatical mood, tense and person. [Peano 1897, 193]
22. “Grammatica pote es reducto ad pauco aut nihil” [Peano 1927, 484].
23. Clearly, what Peano means by grammar is the agglutinative features of Indo-
European languages. Against this ethnocentric misunderstanding, Jespersen points
that, technically, there is no language without grammar. Even Chinese, a model
for Peano (like Leibniz and other language constructors inspired by its ideography,
before him) for its analytic structure that contrasts with Indo-European languages,
incorporates grammatical features through means other than desinences. [Jespersen
1928, 47–48], qtd. [Falk 1999, 64–65].
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In LSF, eliminating inflections that cause word variations can be read as the
linguistic counterpart of this ideographic attempt.24
Peano’s algebraic conception of grammar for a rational language is most
clearly seen in the derivation system of LSF. Talking about Formulario,
Peano insists on the role that symbols play in rigorous reasoning and
discovery of knowledge beyond their more modest function as a shorthand
for more cumbersome expressions. The Leibnizian calculus ratiocinator was
influential mainly in Peano’s search for an appropriate symbolism for writing
mathematical statements. In a similar way, Peano undertook to create an
“algebra of grammar” [algebra de grammatica] to clean Latin from redundant
suffixes and, to achieve this, established morphological equations such as the
following. For example, by putting que before or –nte after a verb, one obtains
an adjective. Que, like –tore, –ace, –ido, etc., turns a verb into an adjective;
therefore, it belongs to the category A−V [adjectivo ex verbo]. “A−V = que
= (stude)nte = (audi)tore = (rap)ace = (val)ido = (noc)ivo = (pend)ulo =
(viv)o = (med)ico”. Followed by an adjective, “es” makes a verbal construction
(therefore, it is classified as V −A). Given that V −A (es) and A− V (–nte)
have opposite values, they cancel each other and can be eliminated altogether
for the sake of simplicity: “es (V −A) studente (A− V )” equals “(V −A) +
stude + (A − V )”, equals “stude”.25 The suffix –tate turns an adjective into
a noun (substantivo abstracto ex adjective, S − A). The reverse (A − S) is
expressed by que habe, cum, –ale, –ose, etc. Using basic algebraic equations,
Peano offers logically simpler alternatives to some words in standard Latin:
Justitia = jus + –to + –itia = jus + A− S + S − A = jus, jure.
Porositate = poro + –oso + –itate = poro. [Peano 1912, 471]
Likewise, “habe (V−S) ardore (S−V )” equals “arde” ((V−S) + arde + (S−V )
= 0), “habe dolore” equals “dole”, “habe fervore” equals “ferve”, since “habe +
(–ore) = 0”.26 Together, such equations constitute “the algebra of grammar”.
Incidentally, according to the algebra of grammar, ente or ont– [being] has no
real conceptual value (“This word is commonly used in philosophy. We can
see its null value.”).27 In a similar way to Carnap’s elimination of Heidegger’s
discourse on Being and Nothing by a logical analysis of its propositions, Peano
arrives at an anti-metaphysical position against the concept of “being” through
a logical analysis of derivations in Latin.
24. “Leibniz’s idea of a characteristic containing ‘real’ characters is not completely
abandoned in Peano’s perspective. It emerges with even more force in Peano’s
investigations into a universal language because the latino sine flexione was to be
based on symbols (roots of Latin words) that should preserve the essential relation
to the denoted concept, independently of grammatical variations” [Cantù 2014, 30].
25. 0 = (V −A) + (A− V ) = es que = es –nte.
26. 0 = (V −N) + (N − V ) = habe -ore.
27. “Isto vocabulo es de usu commune in philosophie. Nos pote vide suo valore
nullo” [Peano 1912, 464].
Logic and Axiomatics in the Making of Latino sine Flexione 141
6 Conclusion
Peano created LSF in an age of globalization that led many intellectuals to look
for an alternative medium of international communication. His engagement
with Leibniz’s influential work in logic and his familiarity with ongoing trends
in linguistics are the main influences behind LSF—a constructed language
modelled on axiomatics with a lexical basis in the common cultural heritage
of Europe as found in scientific terminology.
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Peano and the Debate on Infinitesimals
Paolo Freguglia
DISIM L’Aquila University (Italy)
Résumé : Le principal objectif de cet article consiste à mettre en évidence
la thèse de Peano visant à rejeter les infinitésimaux. Dans un premier temps,
nous nous concentrons brièvement sur le contexte culturel dans lequel sont
apparues et se sont développées les considérations de Peano. Ensuite, nous
examinons l’article de Peano de 1892.
Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to put Peano’s opinion about the
unacceptability of the actual infinitesimal notion into evidence. First we briefly
focus on the cultural environment where Peano’s considerations originated
and developed. Then we examine Peano’s article of 1892, “Dimostrazione
dell’impossibilità di segmenti infinitesimi costanti” [Peano 1892].
1 Introduction1
Between the 19th and 20th centuries the possibility of theoretically accepting,
or not, actual infinitesimals was much debated.2 Mathematicians who were
interested in the foundations of mathematics often had different opinions. At
first we think it is useful to outline the distinction between actual infinite and
potential infinite, according to the classical tradition. The potential infinite
is conceived as something to which it is always possible to add a certain
quantity, while the actual infinite is the possibility of instantly imagining
a collection, a whole that has no end.3 So, for instance, in Euclidean
geometry, a half-straight line is generated by applying the first and second
Euclidean postulates. For Aristotle the actual infinity cannot be accepted,
Philosophia Scientiæ, 25(1), 2021, 145–156.
1. This work is supported by INDAM group GNSAGA.
2. This debate takes place in the context of the rigorous foundation of the analysis
[i.e., see Lolli 2004, 82–86].
3. For other general information [see Bottazzini 2018].
146 Paolo Freguglia
and this conception prevailed until the nineteenth century.4 Likewise, we can
state concerning the infinitesimals. A potentially very small magnitude can
be generated through the principle according to which given a magnitude
there is always a smaller one (see Archimedes’ postulate). On that subject,
Paul du Bois-Reymond wrote:
The infinitely small is a mathematical quantity and has all its
properties in common with the finite. [...] A belief in the infinitely
small does not triumph easily. [...] A majority of educated
people will admit an infinite in space and time, and not just an
“unboundedly large”. But they will only believe in the infinitely
small with difficulty, despite the fact that the infinitely small
has the same right to existence as the infinitely large. [du Bois-
Reymond 1877, 152]; [English trans. in En. Wikipedia]
Once the infinite number is accepted as an infinity, this number does not
stay in R. The infinitesimal can be seen as its reciprocal. Infinitesimals and
infinities naturally occur in any description of the infinity. E.g., a potential
infinitesimal is 1/n|n=∞. The inverse is an infinity: 1/(1/n) = n|n=∞ =∞.
We will define below the notion of the actual infinitesimal.
To understand the notion of infinitesimal we must take into account the
concept of real numbers. In fact real numbers are based on the Dedekind
axiom and it is well known that:
Archimedes Post. + Cantor Ax. ⇔ Dedekind Ax. [see Benedetti
1937, 28–36]
But Archimedes’ Postulate5 is not compatible with the concept of the actual
infinitesimal. Hence, if one considers the Dedekind axiom then we are at odds
with the acceptability of (actual) infinitesimals.
4. About the actual infinite, Desargues had written: “So every straight line is
intended to be stretched indefinitely both from one side and the other [...]” [see
Taton 1981, 99].
5. Let us recall Archimedes’ Postulate (axiom):
Let a and b be two magnitudes, if for example a < b then ∃n ∈ N such that
na > b
The Dedekind axiom (1872) says:
IF a segment AB of a straight line is divided into two parts in such a way that
– each point x of segment AB belongs to one of the two parts
– the point A belongs to the first part and B to the second
– any point of the first part precedes any point of the second in the order
established in AB,
THEN there exists a point M of the segment AB (which may belong to one or the
second part), such that each point of AB which precedes M belongs to the first part,
and each point of AB which follows M belongs to the second part according to the
assigned subdivision.
From Dedekind’s axiom one can derive Archimedes’ Postulate.
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In this article, first we present the Cantorian attempt to show the
unacceptability of the infinitesimal notion. Then we highlight the debate on
non-Archimedean concepts in Italy. Finally, we analyze Peano’s position.6
2 Cantor and the unacceptability of
the infinitesimals
Cantor examines the unacceptability of the actual infinitesimals. We will
refer to a letter written by Cantor to Benno Kerry, dated 4 February 1887
[see Ehrlich 2006, 29–34]. As we know, Cantor conceives the actual infinite
which plays a crucial role in his theory of transfinite numbers. Without this
approach, he could not have constructed this theory. It may therefore seem
strange that he does not accept the actual infinitesimals. At first he proposes
the unacceptability of 1/ω, ω being the first transfinite ordinal. Following
[Ehrlich 2006], and with our modifications, we expose the claimed (but not
right) Cantorian proof. One considers a set Z of linear magnitudes (i.e., the
extremes of straight segments of finite length as linear numbers), which we
denote ζ1, ζ2, . . . These numbers must satisfy the following axioms:
Ax. 1 : The set of ζ1, ζ2, . . . is a commutative semi-group for the addition,
where the operation ν × ζ, with ν ∈ N, is possible.
Ax. 2 : ζ1 + ζ2 + ζ3 + . . . = s ∈ Z.
If 1/ω exists, it is an infinitesimal because it is an inverse of an infinite (ω).
We will have the magnitude ζ = 1/ω and that is:
ζ × ω = 1. (1)
If ζ1 = ζ2 = . . . = ζn = . . . = 1/ω we could write (1) as:
ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn + . . . = 1 (the sum on the left has ω addends). (2)
The Cantor axiom (1872) says:
IF two classes of a straight line segments are such that
– no segment of the first class is greater than a segment of the second
– if a small segment σ, as small as one wants is prefixed, then there is a segment
of the first class and one of the second class whose difference is less than σ.
THEN a segment exists which is neither less than any segment of the first class nor
greater than any of the second.
It is possible to give a postulate which is equivalent to Cantor’s axiom. According
to Veronese this postulate consists in the following assertion:
“Ip. VIII: If a segment, whose extremities always vary in opposite directions
becomes indefinitely small, it contains a point out of the range of variability of its
extremes” [see Veronese 1889, 150].
6. For further information see infra [Benci & Freguglia 2019, 2016], [Ehrlich 2006],
[Borga, Freguglia et al. 1985] and [Gemignani 1993].
148 Paolo Freguglia
At this point, Cantor uses the following property:
If s ∈ Z, with s < 1 then, in virtue of (2), ∃n ∈ N such that
ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn > s. (3)
Hence for equation (3), let s = 3/4, then we will have:
ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn > 3/4. (4)
Because ζ1 = ζ2 = . . . = ζn = . . . = 1/ω then (4) can be worth another
ζin-tuple, so:
ζn+1 + ζn+2 + . . .+ ζ2n > 3/4. (5)
Adding (4) and (5) we achieve:
ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn + ζn+1 + ζn+2 + . . .+ ζ2n > 3/4 + 3/4 = 3/2 > 1. (6)
Which is in contradiction with (2). Therefore if we consider 1/ω we arrive at a
contradiction. Actually Cantor uses the following axiom (see equation (3)):
[Ax. 3 ]: If ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn + . . . = s, then ∀s′ < s and ∃n ∈ N such that
ζ1 + ζ2 + . . .+ ζn > s′. (7)
But one can see that this axiom [Ax.3] is a variant of Archimedes’
Postulate. Therefore one remains within Archimedean mathematics where it
is impossible to give the definition of actual infinitesimals (see equation (9)).
So this Cantorian proof is not tenable.
Cantor develops this theme and he reaches an attempt to prove the
unacceptability in general of infinitesimals, independently from the case 1/ω,
which is however an important case. A first draft of this general demonstration
is presented by Cantor in a letter to Karl Weirstrass dated May 16, 1887 [see
Ehrlich 2006, 41]. These Cantorian analyses were accounted for by some Italian
mathematicians.
3 The debate in Italy
A very interesting debate concerning the infinitesimals took place in Italy in
the pages of the Rivista di Matematica, whose director was Giuseppe Peano
from 1891 onward. We find contributions by Giulio Vivanti [Vivanti 1891a,b],
by Rodolfo Bettazzi [Bettazzi 1891, 1892] and by Peano himself [Peano
1892]. Peano had asked for an invitation to the discussion also for Giuseppe
Veronese, but this last declined the invitation. However, Veronese wrote an
article about Peano’s proof in Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo
in 1892 [Veronese 1892].
Giulio Vivanti in his article of 1891 wrote:
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It seems that the idea of the proof of Cantor is this. Asserting that
ζ [infinitesimal] is a segment, it is equivalent to admitting that if
we successively arrange a sufficiently large series of segments, all
equal to ζ, upon a straight line, we shall of necessity eventually
cover the assigned finite segment in its entirety; next Cantor states
(and here there is a gap in his explanation) that if this is not
possible by means of a finite series of segments, it is impossible
by means of an infinite series as well, however extended the series
might be.7 [Vivanti 1891a, 138]
But—according to Vivanti—in the case of infinite series (a case which
we cannot exclude), if the segment is covered then it is assimilable to a
linear continuous which is compliant with the Dedekind axiom. Therefore the
infinitesimals cannot be accepted. Vivanti wrote another article [see Vivanti
1891b] in the same journal and in the same year. Rodolfo Bettazzi in his article
“Osservazioni sopra l’articolo del Dr. G. Vivanti sull’infinitesimo attuale”, also
published in 1891 in Rivista di matematica, wrote:
It is preferable to derive the definition of actual infinitesimal from
the words of the author [Vivanti] [...] “when repeated any finite
number of times, it (the infinitesimal) never constitutes [...] any
finite determined quantity” than from the same author’s words [...]
which are not well defined [...] according to which the infinitesimal
would be obtained by means of division into infinitely many equal
parts, since the word repeat is understood in the ordinary manner
of multiplication.8 [Bettazzi 1891, 175]
Bettazzi claims that admitting (see (9) below) nα < β ∀n ∈ N (where α
is an infinitesimal with respect to β, and β is a finite magnitude) one never
reaches the finite determined quantity β. But is it possible to arrive at β by
means of n as transfinite number? For the nature of the linear magnitudes
(segments), which Cantor even considers, “with a sufficiently large number of
magnitudes α one can reach or exceed β”. Therefore the infinitesimals could
7. See English trans. in [Ehrlich 2006, 78]. : “Il concetto della dimostrazione di
Cantor sembra essere questo. Dire che ζ è un segmento equivale ad ammettere che,
disponendo successivamente sopra una retta una serie abbastanza grande di segmenti
tutti eguali a ζ, si debba di necessità arrivare a coprire per intero un segmento finito
assegnato; ora Cantor stabilisce (e qui v’ha una lacuna nella sua esposizione) che, se
ciò non è possibile mediante una serie finita di segmenti, non lo è neppure mediante
una serie infinita, comunque estesa essa sia” [Vivanti 1891a, 138].
8. See English trans. in [Ehrlich 2006, 86]. “La definizione dell’infinitesimo
attuale, meglio che dalle parole dell’autore [Vivanti] [...] per le quali l’infinitesimo
si otterrebbe dalla divisione in infinite parti uguali, non ben definita, si ha dalle
altre dello stesso autore, che fanno seguito a quelle citate: ‘[...] esso (l’infinitesimo),
ripetuto un numero finito qualsiasi di volte, non forma giammai [...] una quantità
finita determinata qualunque’ purché si prenda la parola ripetere nell’ordinario
significato della moltiplicazione” [Bettazzi 1891, 175].
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not be accepted (see Peano’s proof). It remains to be established whether
the transfinite numbers exhaust the “sufficiently large infinite numbers” (as
requested above). But that—as Bettazzi says—is not proven. Bettazzi wrote
in 1892 another article “Sull’infinitesimo attuale” in the same journal [see
Bettazzi 1892].
The debate based on Veronese’s ideas had an international readership
which then led Hilbert to contemplate in a logically correct way non-
Archimedean geometry. Veronese had also had controversial exchanges with
mathematicians such as W. Killing (1895), Cantor himself [see Veronese 1896],
L. Schoenflies [see Veronese 1897, 1898] and H. Poincaré (1904)9 to mention
just a few. Briefly, Veronese’s structure V of numbers (according to our
reconstruction) is the following:
– V is an ordered field
– R (real numbers) ⊂ V
– (*) Exist α ∈ V such that α > n,∀n ∈ N
α is an infinite number, but it is not unique; in fact:
α+ 1, 5α, α2, etc., are also infinite numbers.
If x ∈ V and for every k ∈ N we have: |x| < 1/k then x is called
infinitesimal.
Indeed actually Veronese proposes the replacement of Archimedes’ postu-
late with its negation, that is, with the fact that there are magnitudes that
cannot be compared [Veronese 1891]. Explicitly, Veronese gives the following
principles.
Principle III. In R there is no minimal interval (magnitude) if the zero
is excluded.10
Principle IV. If an interval (XX ′) whose extremities always vary in
opposite directions becomes indefinitely small, it always contains an element
Y of V distinct from X and X ′.11
This Principle IV establishes that in V an infinitesimal (interval) is
different from zero. If (XX ′) is considered as a set of points, this principle
affirms (XX ′) 6= ∅.
Otto Stolz read [Veronese 1891] and it seems that he shares Veronese’s
ideas, even if he prefers the Cantor-Dedekind approach [see Stolz 1891, 16].
9. Poincaré in his review of Hilbert’s Grundlagen calls into question Veronese who
answers in [Veronese 1905], see also [Veronese 1909].
10. [Veronese 1889, 610], English trans. in [Ehrlich 2006]: “Princ. III. Nel
sistema R non vi è un intervallo (grandezza) minimo se si esclude lo zero.”
11. [Veronese 1889, 612], (English trans. in [Ehrlich 2006]): “Princ. IV. Se
l’intervallo (XX′) i cui estremi sono sempre variabili in verso opposto diventa
indefinitamente piccolo, esso contiene sempre un elemento Y di Σ distinto da X
e X′” A comparison between this Principle and Veronese’s Ip. VIII is interestnig, see
footnote 5.
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So it is possible, through (*) to define the notion of actual infinitesimal
(see (9) below). Tullio Levi-Civita in [Levi-Civita 1892-1893], based on
Veronese’s teaching, introduces the concept of monosemii and A. Bindoni,
another disciple of Veronese, shows in 1902 [see Bindoni 1902] Hilbert’s
geometrical field is contained in V.
4 Peano’s “proof”
Peano published an article in 1892 in Rivista di matematica entitled
“Dimostrazione dell’impossibilità di segmenti infinitesimi costanti” [Peano
1892]. He examines the problem of the unacceptability of actual infinitesimal
segments. He begins by this premise:
This problem [that is, on the acceptability or not of the actual
infinitesimals], debated between Dr. Vivanti and Dr. Bettazzi on
the Rivista di matematica, is very interesting especially in this
period where on the hypotheses of their existence theories and
printed volumes exist. Cantor replied negatively to hypotheses of
their existence, but the proof that this illustrious mathematician
gave is so concise that it was judged incomplete. The aim of this
article is to develop this proof.12 [Peano 1892, 59]
Our aim is to analyze this proof, regardless of Ehrlich. Peano considers a
half-straight line of origin o, as a set P of points. It seems clear that for Peano
an ended segment is an open interval on the half-line, so:
op ≡ {x : o < x < p and p ∈ P}
o is called origin and p ending,
while a segment is an ended segment u that verifies the following properties:
– u is a proper subset of the half-straight line,
– every point y between o and a point x ∈ u is also a point of u,
– vice versa: every point y ∈ u is between o and some other point x of u.
The set of ended segments is denoted by S, and that of segments by s. It is
possible to establish the sum of ended segments and the multiple of an ended
segment and when one ended segment is lower than another: “Let u and v be
two segments, we say that v is less than u, or that u is greater than v, if v is a
12. “Questa questione, dibattutasi tra i dott. Vivanti e Bettazzi sulla Rivista di
matematica, è assai interessante tanto più che negli ultimi tempi sull’ipotesi della loro
esistenza si sono fatte teorie e stampati dei volumi. Ad essa rispose negativamente il
Cantor; ma la dimostrazione che questo illustre matematico ne diede è così concisa
che fu giudicata incompleta. Scopo della presente nota si è di sviluppare questa
dimostrazione” [Peano 1892, 59].
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segment ended at a point in u, that is the ending of v is a point of u”. Every
ended segment is a segment, but not vice versa.13
∞u, which is called by Peano multiple of infinite order of u, denotes the
set of points which stay on some of segments u, 2u, 3u, etc. or on their upper
limit. Peano shows that ∞u is a segment but not an ended segment. At first
he affirms that an ended segment u is such that when it is added to itself, it
becomes a double segment that exceeds u itself, that is :
2u > u. (8)
Of course the (8) can be iterated.
Then he proposes the well-known actual infinitesimal definition, so:
The segment u is an infinitesimal related to the segment v,
and we will write u ∈ {v|∞}, if every multiple of u is lower than v.
(9)
So if u is an infinitesimal relatively to v, ∞u, being the upper limit of the
multiples of an infinitesimal, is less than v, i.e., ∞u < v. In fact, ∞u cannot
exceed v because it is still a multiple of u and all multiples of u, for the (9),
must be less than v, even if ∞u is the upper limit of all multiples. Besides,
Peano explicitly assimilates∞ to ℵ0,14 therefore the following operations make
sense under the assumption that u is an infinitesimal.
u, v ∈ S, u ∈ {v|∞} ⇒ (∞+ 1)u =∞u. (10)
u, v ∈ S, u ∈ {v|∞} ⇒ 2∞u =∞u. (11)
If u is an infinitesimal in comparison to v, we have a class ∞u
that is a segment contained in v. Therefore if we add ∞u to the
segment u, we obtain the segment (∞+1)u and by adding u again
we have (∞ + 2)u, etc. We can also add ∞u with itself and we
obtain 2∞u. So in general, we can have all multiples of ∞u; we
can multiply ∞u by ∞ and we can have ∞2u, and so on.
But all these various segments obtained by multiplying u by
the transfinite numbers of Cantor [ℵ0 as ∞] are always equal to
[∞u].15 [Peano 1892, 61]
13. Otherwise we would be in the context of Dedekind’s axiom.
14. In the sense that it has the same arithmetic behavior. In fact i.e.: ∞ + 1 =
1 +∞ = ∞ as ℵ0 + 1 = 1 + ℵ0 = ℵ0; 2∞ = ∞ as 2ℵ0 = ℵ02 = ℵ0, etc. But on
the contrary ω + 1 6= 1 + ω, 2ω = ω and ω2 6= ω. Hence, Peano (for ∞) refers to
Cantorian transfinite cardinal.
15. Peano says: “Risulta che, se u è un infinitesimo rispetto a v, la classe ∞u è un
segmento contenuto in v. In conseguenza possiamo aggiungere ad ∞u il segmento
u, ottenendo il segmento (∞ + 1)u, a cui aggiungendo u otteniamo (∞ + 2)u, ecc.
Possiamo sommare ∞u con se stesso ottenendo così 2∞u, ed in generale possiamo
formare tutti i multipli di ∞u; possiamo moltiplicare ∞u per ∞ ed ottenere ∞2u,
e così via”. “Ma tutti questi varii segmenti, che si ottengono moltiplicando u per i
numeri transfiniti di Cantor sono uguali tra loro”.
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In short, we have:
∀M transfinite number: Mu =∞u
∀n ∈ N : nu < v
∞u < v.
(12)
That is: ∀M transfinite number: Mu =∞u < v and in particular:
2∞u =∞u < v. (13)
In this way Peano shows ∞u (with u infinitesimal) is not an ended segment.
Indeed—according to Peano’s opinion—equation (13) is in contradiction with
the “nature” of the ended segments and their calculus, i.e., with equation (8).
Thus, it is impossible to obtain the infinitesimal “as an element of finite
magnitude”. But in fact equations (8) and (13) cannot be compared because
(8) is in an Archimedean context and (13) is not. Hence, Peano’s proof
is not tenable.
If equation (9) is satisfied, then u is an infinitesimal. But if u is a
finite segment (that is, if infinitesimal segments do not exist—as Peano
says) then ∞u represents the infinite half-straight line with origin o. As
we said, Veronese wrote a brief article that appeared in 1892 on Rendiconti
del Circolo Matematico di Palermo [see Veronese 1892] entitled “Osservazioni
sopra una dimostrazione contro il segmento infinitesimo attuale”. This referred
to Peano’s proof, arguing this same conclusion. Afterward he repeats his
proposal given in [Veronese 1891].16
5 Some conclusions
Despite the fact that history does not deal with ifs and buts, we must observe
the discussion on aversion to the infinitesimals, which could have been more
opportunely based on well-argued explicit positions, instead of on untenable
proofs which in fact need, in various forms, Archimedes’ postulate. Indeed,
the proofs of the actual infinitesimals that we have examined in a more or less
explicit way use Archimedes’ postulate. These proofs are unacceptable, even
with recourse to the proto-physical concept of “nature” of segments and the
related calculus. From a foundational point of view, Hilbert in [Hilbert 1899,
in particular see § 12 chap. II] analyzes the possibility of non-Archimedean
geometry. But, in general, from a point of view pertaining to content, many
analyses and proposals of theories in which one considers infinitesimals are still
lacking sufficient rigor, except for the Levi-Civita proposal [Levi-Civita 1892-
1893] and research on non-Archimedean fields. Among the explicit opinions
16. Among other of Veronese’s remarks we see that he interprets, unlike us, the
symbol ∞ (used by Peano) with ω.
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against the actual infinite and infinitesimals, we report those of Poincaré and
of Russell. The first, wrote: “The actual infinity does not exist: the Cantorians
have forgotten it and they have obtained the antinomies” [see Poincaré 1906,
316–317] and Russell affirms: “It follows that the infinitesimals, in order to
explain the continuity must be considered unnecessary, erroneous and self-
contradictory [...] we have shown that differential and integral calculus do not
need infinitesimals” [see Russell 1948, 480, 510].
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Résumé : Dans cet article nous discutons les enjeux des essais de réforme
de l’enseignement de la géométrie élémentaire au tournant du xixe siècle en
examinant la contribution de Mario Pieri, membre distingué des entourages de
Peano et Segre à Turin. Le rapport symbiotique entre axiomatique et pédagogie
et le rôle de l’intuition dans l’apprentissage sont deux aspects majeurs à cet
égard. La notion d’intuition a été l’objet d’un grand nombre d’analyses qui ont
une longue histoire, de la part de philosophes, mathématiciens, didacticiens
des mathématiques, psychologues, historiens. Pour établir le contexte de la
réflexion de Pieri, on cherche tout simplement à offrir un bref aperçu de
quelques idées au sujet de son rôle pédagogique, dans l’instruction élémen-
taire et jusqu’à celle universitaire, qui peuvent avoir façonné les efforts pur
l’amélioration de l’enseignement de la géométrie au secondaire au début du
xxe siècle. Pieri prend en compte la question de l’intuition dans plusieurs parmi
ses travaux d’axiomatisation, et notamment dans ceux qui sont consacrés
à la géométrie projective qui a été son intérêt principal du point de vue
des fondements des mathématiques. On considère ici cependant surtout ses
systèmes axiomatiques pour la géométrie élémentaire, où il adopte l’approche
basée sur les transformations géométriques de Felix Klein. Notre objectif est
de représenter la pensée de Pieri sur la façon d’intégrer deux types d’intuition,
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dites sensible et rationnelle, dans les démarches pour l’amélioration de l’ensei-
gnement de la géométrie d’Euclide. Nous montrons comment les vues de Pieri
sur l’intuition géométrique et la réforme pédagogique ont été soit ignorées,
soit déformées dans plusieurs publications notables au tournant du xxe siècle.
En particulier, nous donnons à Pieri une voix en réponse aux commentaires
spécifiques formulés au début des années 1900 par Federigo Enriques, Ugo
Amaldi et Florian Cajori dans des publications largement diffusées inspirées
de Klein.
Abstract: In this paper, we discuss a proposal for reform in the teaching of
Euclidean geometry that reveals the symbiotic relationship between axiomatics
and pedagogy. We examine the role of intuition in this kind of reform, as
expressed by Mario Pieri, a prominent member of the Schools of Peano and
Segre at the University of Turin. We are well aware of the centuries of attention
paid to the notion of intuition by mathematicians, mathematics educators,
philosophers, psychologists, historians, and others. To set a context for Pieri’s
proposal, we only seek to open a small window on views of the pedagogical
role of intuition, from primary education to university study that may have
informed early 20th century efforts to improve the teaching of geometry at
the secondary school level. Pieri addressed the topic of intuition in many
of his axiomatizations, including those in projective geometry which was his
main area of concentration in foundations. We focus here primarily on his
axiom systems for elementary geometry, which embraced the transformational
approach of Felix Klein’s vision for the subject. Our goal is to convey Pieri’s
thoughts on how to integrate two types of intuition, denoted as sensible and
rational, in his endeavors to improve the teaching of the geometry of Euclid.
We show how Pieri’s views on geometric intuition and pedagogical reform were
either ignored or misrepresented in several notable publications at the turn of
the 20th century. In particular, we give Pieri a voice in response to specific
comments made in the early 1900s by Federigo Enriques, Ugo Amaldi, and
Florian Cajori in widely circulated publications inspired by Klein.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine perceptions of the role of intuition in certain
early 20th century proposals for reform of Euclidean geometry. We begin
with a discussion of sensible intuition and studies in early education that
promoted the teaching of intuitive geometry. Our examination of pedagogical
reforms emanating from considerations of rational intuition forms the basis
for our discussion of the relationship between the foundations of geometry and
its teaching, as expressed by Mario Pieri in the context of his membership
of the Schools of Giuseppe Peano and Corrado Segre at the University of
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Turin. We show how Pieri’s ideas were ignored or misrepresented by certain
notable scholars who recognized the close connection between mathematical
formulation and its educational outcomes, and by others who harbored deep
rooted prejudices against that connection. In this short paper, we limit our
focus to comments about Pieri in three publications inspired by Felix Klein
that were widely circulated in the early decades of the 1900s.1
2 Sensible intuition as an impetus
for pedagogical reform:
Intuitive geometry
Before the 19th century, “geometry” was essentially a synonym for Euclidean
geometry. The Elements served as a prism through which to view the subject.
Synthetic geometry, in the style of Euclid, dominated the mathematical
curriculum, both as a foundation for and educational pathway to mathematics
[Giusti 1993, 2], [Rowe 2018, 370].
The teaching of synthetic geometry was considered gymnastics for
the mind that could only be fostered by a system of propositions
as those set by Euclid. [Barbin & Menghini 2014, 482]
The use of the Elements in the classroom throughout history, for its content
and methodology, is complicated to describe, in part due to variations in when
and how it was adopted in the educational spectrum.2 There is no question
however, that well before the turn to the 20th century, serious concerns had
emerged about its efficacy as a basis for geometry textbooks. There were
various reasons for this. Among them was the exclusion of algebraic methods
in Euclid’s closed system, criticized by those who advocated a more analytic
approach to the subject. Another was the belief that the emphasis on a
formal exposition of geometry neglects the psychological and emotional needs
of students, neither capturing their interest nor encouraging them to think
mathematically.
The quest for pedagogical reform drew from a wide spectrum of both
mathematics, which included research on its foundations, and mathematics
education, in studies that ran the gamut from primary school to university.
Scores of textbooks written with the intention of improving the exposition
1. For broader discussions of Pieri’s pedagogy in the context of his tenure at
the University of Turin, see Quaderni di storia dell’Università di Torino, 10 (2009-
2011), https://www.omeka.unito.it/omeka/items/show/396; also [Marchisotto 2010],
[Luciano 2012a,b, 2017], [Marchisotto, Rodríguez-Consuegra et al. 2020, § 10].
2. For the most part, academic geometry textbooks had begun to find a place in
European secondary schools in the 18th century. For comprehensive discussions see
[Karp & Schubring 2014, Section IV].
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of Euclid would appear. Among them, editions of [Clairaut 1741-1852]
and [Legendre 1752-1833] found their place in 19th century classrooms.
That their authors were noted research mathematicians, Alexis Clairaut
and Adrien-Marie Legendre, is indicative of a history of concern about
pedagogical issues within the mathematical community. Applying strategies of
practical geometry, Clairaut replaced Euclid’s deductive proofs with geometric
constructions and reasoning based on them.3 Legendre instead embraced
Euclid’s deductive methodology, but infused it with arithmetic notation and
appeals to intuition. His approach was metrical as he envisioned geometry as
a “science that has as its object the measure of extent”4 [Legendre 1752-1833,
citation from 1823, 1, Definition VII]. Legendre’s text, which was widely used
in Italy until 1867, inspired a great number of others, many less rigorous than
his, and replete with mistakes. Largely through advocacy of Luigi Cremona,
the noted mathematician who devoted himself to the study of geometry and
its teaching, an Italian translation of Euclid’s Elements [Betti & Brioschi 1867]
was adopted for the schools. In response to those who believed that the return
to a more rigorous text would be too challenging for “less gifted” students,
Cremona reminded the Italian public that in Germany there was an increasing
number of geometry books designed to be “more accessible to even mediocre
intellects” [Cremona 1873, vii], see [Giacardi 2012, Giacardi & Scoth 2014],
[Millán Gasca 2011], [Israel 2017].
Concerted national and international efforts had emerged by the turn to the
20th century to address the reform of secondary school mathematics teaching.
Notable among them was the Commission internationale de l’enseignement
mathématique whose founding president was Klein. Intuition in geometry
became a focus for discussion.5 Certain proposals called for the teaching
of “intuitive geometry”, which promoted strategies that emphasize “informal
reasoning”, understood as argumentation based on observation for which
justifications are not explicitly provided. At the heart of this method of
teaching is the idea of sensible intuition, as a form of immediate knowing,
possibly linked to data provided by the senses from the very presence of the
object of knowledge, see [Betz 1933], [Hendrix 1936].
There were many who advocated the teaching of intuitive geometry well
before secondary school.6 The Swiss education reformer, Johann Pestalozzi,
a teacher of the geometer Jacob Steiner, believed that the education of the
mind (the head, in his terminology) included three integrated components,
word, number, and form [Pestalozzi, Cook et al. 1894, 118]. The teaching
3. Along with geometric constructions, practical geometry incorporated mensura-
tion techniques and other problem-solving strategies rooted in arts and crafts. It was
adopted in middle school education, see [Menghini 2015].
4. This translation is ours, as are all others unless otherwise indicated.
5. For example [Poincaré 1899]. By this time, various interpretations of “intuition”
had emerged from philosophical investigations, see [Osbeck & Held 2014].
6. For a discussion of developments in the teaching of geometry to children, see
[Millán Gasca 2015].
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of geometry (form) based on drawing is propaedeutic to graphical aspects of
writing and reading, and is therefore central to early education.
The use of diagrams was intimately linked to intuitive reasoning, see
[Lorenat 2020]. Students were taught linear drawing to initiate them into
the study of geometry, see [D’Enfert 2003]. The German educator, Friedrich
Fröbel, who was another of Pestalozzi’s students, created a collection of
geometrical exercises of decomposition and ratio with 3-dimensional regular
forms for his kindergarten students [Fröbel 1826]. William George Spencer7
wrote Inventional Geometry [Spencer 1860], which consisted of Pestalozzian
sequences of questions appealing to intuition, designed to familiarize the pupil
with geometrical concepts.
Insights about cognition obtained by studying early childhood education
suggested other pathways for learning. Texts such as Geometry for Beginners
[Minchin 1898] by the Irish mathematician and physicist George M. Minchin
addressed the roles of instinct and observation in learning. Writers like Mary
Everest Boole, wife of logician George Boole, stressed the need to prepare the
unconscious mind for the development of a scientific attitude in children by
“restoring the vitality of geometric instinct” [Boole 1904, 68]. Édouard Séguin,
who pioneered modern educational methods for teaching cognitively-impaired
children, considered the motion of the finger or the pencil from one point to
another point “avec rectitude et précision” [Séguin 1843, citation from 1897,
123] as the first law of understanding. His ideas to promote understanding
by means of exercises that use rods of increasing length was later adopted by
Maria Montessori in [Montessori 1909, citation from 1912, 327].
Mentioned here are only a few of the methodologies, residing in studies
of early education, which served to inform efforts to reform the teaching of
Euclid.8 At the opposite end of the spectrum were proposals that were largely
infused by research at the university level.
3 Rational intuition as an impetus
for pedagogical reform:
Demonstrative geometry
“Demonstrative geometry” has been described as the teaching of geometry
with an emphasis on logical reasoning. It pays particular attention to rigor
in remedying the logical lapses of the Elements. By the early 1900s, it
enjoyed a prominent place in the United States curriculum. The American
7. Spencer’s son, Herbert, a noted educator and philosopher, republished the book
and wrote an introduction. Many editions were adopted as textbooks to transition
students gradually from concrete thinking to abstract thinking.
8. For example, Enriques referenced Fröbel in [Enriques 1900, 26]. Klein weighed
in on Pestalozzi [Lorenat 2020, 81]. See [Giacardi 2012], [Roberts 2014], [Millán Gasca
2015].
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mathematician, David Eugene Smith, considered one of the founders of
the field of mathematics education, proposed that “as an introduction to
mathematics, it is the right and privilege of every student to know what
demonstrative geometry means since that is where many students first awaken
to the significance of mathematics” [Smith 1919, 112–113]. Those who
advocated on behalf of demonstrative geometry cited, among its benefits, the
power in uniquely developing the habit of deductive thinking [Hart 1924, 172].
At the same time in Italy, the intense production of technical papers,
expository essays, textbooks, and publications addressed to mathematics
teachers revealed deep connections between logical research and pedagogy,
see [Giacardi & Scoth 2014]. The Peano School at the University of Turin
flourished as a center for research in analysis, logic, foundations, and teaching.
Peano and members of his School championed the role of logic to achieve
more rigor in geometry. Prominent among them was Pieri—who explicitly
recognized the “pedagogical and didactic” power of purely logical methods,
attributing to them “the only capability to expose known truths”, with an
“economy of labor” as compared with inductive reasoning from experience
[Pieri 1906, 56–57(1980, 442–443)]. Yet, while Pieri’s immersion in the Peano
School at the University of Turin is primarily seen as the context in which to
view his foundational works, it is important to recognize also the influence of
Pieri’s long and enduring membership in Segre’s School of algebraic geometry
there. Aldo Brigaglia has demonstrated how Pieri’s research in the field of
algebraic geometry, under the mentorship of Segre, did not conflict with his
axiomatic research and in fact closely intersected with it, see [Brigaglia 2012].9
Referencing Pieri’s first axiomatization of projective geometry (three Notes
published between 1894 and 1896), Brigaglia observed that Pieri made use of
“the teachings of Peano to bring to fruition a scientific program developed by
Segre” [Brigaglia 2012, 26].
Pieri’s proposals for teaching geometry are rooted in the symbiotic
relationship between axiomatics and pedagogy. It was almost exclusively in his
axiomatizations of elementary geometry [Pieri 1900a, 1908] that he explicitly
talked about teaching. He did address the idea of geometric intuition in earlier
foundational works. For example, to underscore his intention to develop
projective geometry with a puramente deduttivo ed astratto approach, Pieri
explained that by abstract, he meant,
[...] it disregards any physical interpretation of the premises, and
therefore also their evidence, and geometric intuitiveness: unlike
another direction (which I would call physical-geometric) accord-
ing to which primitive entities and axioms want to be inferred
from direct observation of the external world, and identified with
the ideas that are acquired through experimental induction from
9. Brigaglia included a deep discussion of rigor in the application of the axiomatic
method that informs the research of Pieri vis-à-vis his mentors.
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certain physical objects and facts (PASCH, PEANO ...). [Pieri
1896, 10(1980, 84)]
In his constructions of abstract geometry, primitive notions, arbitrarily
chosen, are implicitly defined by the postulates,10 and theorems are formally
derived using Peano’s mathematical logic. Geometry, so developed as a
hypothetical deductive system, distinguishes itself from the classical content-
centered Euclidean system where primitive concepts are based on verifiable
evidence that is “transmitted to derived propositions through the definition of
evidence and the demonstration of veracity” [Ingaliso 2011, 242].
Envisioning geometry as a hypothetical deductive science was, in Pieri’s
view, the optimal way to teach it. It would foster, in students, rational
intuition, which he defined as “a perception of the logical relationship between
principles and consequences” [Pieri 1906, 58(1980, 444)]. Pieri saw great
benefits for students to develop such an intuition because,
a mind educated with general ideas and supported by a reasonable
faculty of abstraction becomes capable of perceiving also, beyond
the abstract logical sense, the connection between the various
propositions and their deductive roles, the concatenation of
the parts and their relationships with the whole. [Pieri 1908,
447(1980, 557)]
Pieri emphasized that rational intuition is “purely logical and intellectual
syntheses, which do not admit anything from sensible intuition” [Pieri 1906,
58(1980, 444)]. However, he only excluded sensible intuition as an instrument
to justify deductive reasoning [Pieri 1906, 35(1980, 421)]. In this he agreed
with Moritz Pasch11 who viewed such a use as a “sign of a shortcoming of
deductions” [Pasch 1882, 82].
Pieri believed that geometry “as a formal science, should [...] be able
to stand and to be understood without ever appealing to [...] intuitive
or physical representations”.12 However, he explicitly noted “the heuristic
importance, and [...] the didactic value, of [...] concrete interpretation[s]
of geometric entities” [Pieri 1906, 47(1980), 413]. As early as 1889, in
his annotated translation of [von Staudt 1847], Pieri had advocated for
concrete interpretations in works “of geometry aimed especially at youth”.
He proposed:
10. Pieri’s understanding of primitives and postulates reflected his selective en-
dorsement of views expressed by Peano and Segre, see [Bottazzini 2001].
11. Pasch gave two “conditions” to define the concept of rigor that eschewed
intuition [Pasch 1882, 16].
12. Pieri spoke eloquently about intuition in an address [Pieri 1906, 35(1980, 421)]
delivered at the University of Catania, see [Ingaliso 2011], [Marchisotto, Rodríguez-
Consuegra et al. 2020, § 9.4.3]. For a discussion of rigor and axiomatics, see [Israel
1981].
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Only after having constructed the figure of a demonstration, by
himself and without any preconceptions, do we believe that the
reader can assume that he has mastered this. [von Staudt 1889,
xxv]
The important message here is that while Pieri advocated abstraction in the
deductive process of proof, he saw the need for the visualization of a concrete
image and/or construction of a figure to claim comprehension of that process
and its outcome.13
We extract from these and other comments in his papers, our under-
standing of Pieri’s stance on the pedagogical role of intuition. It is the
responsibility of the teacher to promote in students a rational intuition of
geometry as an abstract science. Among the benefits for students is that they
learn how to draw consequences from principles, using logic, in a way that
enables them to understand these consequences in relation not only to the
principles, but also to one another. Students are encouraged to determine
if these consequences conform to their sensible intuition of them, not only
to assess their comprehension of them, but after deducing them logically, to
appreciate the process used to derive them.
The underlying rationale of Pieri’s proposal for educational reform thus
emerges. He sees no contradiction in promoting both the intuitive and logical
aspects of geometry in its teaching.




Pieri saw mathematics developed as a hypothetical-deductive system, not only
as a means to achieve rigor and precision, but also as an opportunity to simplify
its teaching in ways that promote in students a deeper understanding and
appreciation of the subject. He proposed that the combination of the abstract
with a transformational approach, in an exposition which simultaneously
develops two and three-dimensional geometry, would make the subject more
accessible to students.
Pieri believed he had experienced a level of success in his quest for
simplicity with respect to his axiomatizations of elementary geometry. He
13. Observing that Pieri “had proposed construction as a yardstick for assessing
geometric mastery of a proof”, Lorenat characterized Pieri’s “claim for learning
geometry” as representing a “crucial” distinction between him and Pasch [Lorenat
2020, 82].
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claimed that in his exposition of absolute14 geometry, he had achieved “such a
degree of deductive simplicity that educational systems can certainly also take
advantage of it” [Pieri 1900a, 3(1980, 185)]. Still, he called for further research
to effect an even greater simplification. Answering his own call several years
later with an axiomatization of Euclidean geometry [Pieri 1908], Pieri wrote:
“Born of such research is the present Essay, which (if I am not mistaken)
reaches exactly that degree of simplicity and rigor that I had in mind at that
time, and which to my eyes represents the maximum value of this type of
investigation” [Pieri 1908, 345(1980, 455)].
What did Pieri mean by deductive simplicity? This question is difficult to
answer because although Pieri repeatedly emphasized its importance, he did
not provide a formal definition.
Victor Pambuccian has systematically explored the many different ways to
define the simplicity of an axiom system, see [Pambuccian 1988]. Under the
rubric of purely syntactic considerations, one criterion addresses the language
in which the axiom system is expressed. In this context “simple language”
means having primitives that are both few in number and of lowest possible
arity. Others concern the axioms themselves, asking for the fewest number of
quantifier alternations appearing in each axiom or seeking a minimization of
the number of variables appearing in axioms containing the largest number of
variables [Pambuccian 2009, 328]. Another class of simple axiomatizations is
the quantifier free one, in languages that contain only operation symbols (but
no predicate symbols), see [Pambuccian 2008]. Showing the independence of
the axioms in a finite set has been stipulated as a requirement for simplicity,
see [Mancosu, Zach et al. 2009, § 1.3]. For didactic considerations, axioms have
been described as “simpler”, when they are “more intuitive” [Lolli 2011, § 4.4].
We can perhaps use some of these measures as a lens through which
to examine Pieri’s claims for simplicity. With respect to Pambuccian’s
descriptions of criteria for syntactic simplicity, we note that Pieri relied almost
exclusively on principles expressed by first-order sentences in both [Pieri 1900a,
1908]. In this, he distanced himself from Peano who, for example in [Peano
1889], did not distinguish first-order from second-order quantification. First-
order logic would only emerge as a coherent framework for logical studies in
the 1920s. In the evolution of thought related to this, what Pieri accomplished
received little explicit attention until Alfred Tarski brought [Pieri 1908] into
the discussion, beginning with an address to a 1927 mathematical congress
in Lwów, see [Pambuccian 2002], [Marchisotto & Smith 2007, § 5.2], [Smith
2010],[Marchisotto, Rodríguez-Consuegra et al. 2020, § 10.4]. In more recent
times, Pambuccian credited Pieri with accomplishing in [Pieri 1908] “the task
of achieving the upmost simplicity of the language of Euclidean geometry”
[Pambuccian 2009, 328].
14. This axiomatization focuses on Euclidean geometry as taught then in elemen-
tary courses, except for the theorems dependent on the Euclidean parallel postulate,
see [Marchisotto, Rodríguez-Consuegra et al. 2020, §§ 8, 9.3].
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Pieri also addressed another of Pambuccian’s simplicity criteria in his
advocacy of the efforts of the Peano School to minimize the number of
primitives in axiom systems. In both [Pieri 1900a, 1908], he reduced this
number to two, respectively “point and motion”, and “point and sphere (a
single ternary equidistance relation)”. When they recommended [Pieri 1900a]
for publication, Enrico D’Ovidio and Segre observed,
This is a most notable result; and it does not seem that others
previously have achieved such simplicity [...] From the purely
logical point of view the system of Pieri is fully satisfactory, and
contains [...] a result of particular importance in the reduction
made in the primitive notions. [D’Ovidio & Segre 1899, 761]
Although Pieri believed that the independence of the postulates is a
condition that nearly approaches “ideal perfection” [Pieri 1901, 380(1980,
248)], he did not prove the independence of his postulates for elementary
geometry. Nonetheless we can say that he spoke to the criterion for
simplicity specified in Mancosu, Zach et al. [2009] when he proved the ordinal
independence of his [Pieri 1898] postulates for projective geometry.
With respect to Lolli’s criteria for simplicity, we note Pieri’s deep-rooted
belief that the hypothetical-deductive approach would lead students to new
questions and deeper intuitions of the subject [Pieri 1900a, 177(1980, 187)].
Consider, for example, his strategy for developing the notion of line in [Pieri
1900a]. He began with a postulate stated solely in terms of the primitives,
point and motion,
For distinct points A, B, C: If there exists a non-identity
motion that fixes A and B, it will also fix C. [Pieri 1900a, § 1
Postulate VIII, 182(1980, 192)]
Pieri remarked, “This is a principle of great deductive capacity [...]. It is
now given to us to produce and develop through it the notion of ‘line’ and to
recognize some of its more notable properties.” Observing that postulate VIII
(and his definition of collinear points based upon it) cannot describe the
geometry of hyperspace, Pieri explained that he chose to consider “only
elementary geometry, seeking as much as possible to establish the principles
in a manner more suitable to deductive simplicity” [Pieri 1900a, 182(1980,
192)]. To develop the notion of line, Pieri followed his usual practice of
formulating definitions explicitly (in terms of primitives) or implicitly (in terms
of postulates). He used postulate VIII to define collinearity in terms of motion:
a point is collinear with two given points if there exists a non-identity motion
that fixes all three points. A straight line on two given points is then the line
of points collinear with them, a unique line that remains motionless when it
rotates around those two points, see [Marchisotto 1992].
Ugo Amaldi observed that with [Pieri 1900a], Pieri had established “a
rigorous logical structure” based on this definition of line [Amaldi 1912-1914,
42]. Amaldi’s use of the term “rigorous” would be, for Pieri, an affirmation of
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the simplicity he sought in developing geometry as “a study of a certain order
of logical relations” [Pieri 1908, Preface 347(1980, 457)]. Indeed to that very
description in [Pieri 1908], Pieri (in a footnote referencing [Halsted 1904, 189])
included a quotation from [Hilbert 1900] proposing that the most rigorous
method is often the simplest and the easiest to comprehend.
These examples suggest that Pieri saw the rigorous application of ax-
iomatic method as one which enabled an exposition of geometry that he could
characterize as deductively simple.15 To that end, using a minimal number of
primitives, he “unfolded” geometry axiomatically, introducing postulates and
definitions only as needed to derive theorems by applying the laws of logic. His
proofs were rigorously executed and extraordinarily detailed, showing precisely
which postulates, definitions, and previously-proved theorems justified his
statements. In these ways, Pieri hoped to promote in students a mindfulness
of the deductive role that collections of postulates played with respect to
when and how theorems are proved. He went to great lengths to encour-
age deep thinking about geometric propositions, exposing how postulates,
definitions and theorems relate to each other in relation to the geometric edifice
being constructed.
Still, Pieri’s quest for simplicity was not restricted to logical deduction.
His vision for teaching geometry as an abstract science emerged not only
from his embrace of deductive logic, but also from his pioneering use of
Klein’s transformational approach to geometry, see [Marchisotto, Rodríguez-
Consuegra et al. 2020, §§ 10.2, 10.4]. He believed the integration of these
elements could address the challenges of “reconciling the needs of schools with
the ideals of the deductive method”. In his review of a secondary school
textbook written by Giuseppe Ingrami [Ingrami 1899], Pieri described such
a reconciliation as an “undertaking if it ever comes to be”, which will be a
result of “the toil and exertion of many” [Pieri 1899, 181].
For Pieri, the transformational approach would facilitate the teaching
of geometry as a hypothetical-deductive system in a way that encouraged
students to appreciate the duality between the abstract nature of mathematical
objects and their concrete representations. He noted that,
The act of using the simplest motions, such as translations,
rotations, symmetries, and so on, and their products, more
broadly than usual in definitions and arguments confers on the
system as a whole a certain ease of manner that is not devoid of
clarity and effectiveness. [Pieri 1901, 384 (1980, 252)]
15. Pambuccian (in a personal communication of June 2020) has suggested that
since Pieri referenced deduction, his idea of simplicity can be interpreted in the arena
of what is today known as Hilbert’s “24th Problem”. See [Pambuccian 2019], which
analyzes the manner in which the simplicity of proofs could be defined using concrete
examples from other works of elementary geometry.
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In his axiomatization of absolute geometry [Pieri 1900a], Pieri followed
[Peano 1894] in choosing direct motion as primitive.16 The Italian philosopher
Antonio Aliotta called this choice “intuitive” [Aliotta 1911, citation from 1914,
317]. Bertrand Russell noted how Pieri used it17 to its best advantage,
Pieri has shown, in an admirable memoir, how to deduce metrical
geometry by taking point and motion as the only indefinables.
[Earlier] we objected to the introduction of motion, as usually
effected, on the ground that its definition presupposes metrical
properties; but Pieri escapes this objection by not defining motion
at all, except through the postulates [...]. The straight line is the
class of points that are unchanged by a motion that leaves the
two points fixed. The sphere, the plane, perpendicularity, order
of points on a line, etc., are easily defined. This procedure is
logically unimpeachable, and is probably the simplest possible for
elementary Geometry. [Russell 1903, § 395]
Consider, for example, Pieri’s treatment of perpendicularity in [Pieri 1900a,
§ 2P19, 190–191 (1980, 200–201)]. He “easily” defined it in terms of the
existence of a motion,
Let A,B,C be points such that A is different from B and C. We
say AC is perpendicular to AB if and only if there exists a motion
that leaves A and B invariant while transforming C into a point
of AC different from C.
He next gave two ways to interpret this definition,
Given non-collinear points A, B, C, in the rotation of their
plane onto itself about A and B as hinges, C falls back onto the
line AC.
There exists a proper (non-identity) motion that leaves the
points A and B fixed, bringing the line AC back onto itself.
After which, illustrating the melding of its transformational and abstract
aspects, he set the discussion in the context of the scheme of the logical-
deductive plan,
Here orthogonality is introduced in the form of a relation among
three given points and no other, thus restored to its primitive
terms and divested of all that is superfluous (with respect to our
system). Thus, it is in the nature of algebraic logic.
16. For a broader discussion of the commonalities and differences between Peano
and Pieri relative to their treatment of geometry and its transformations, see
[Marchisotto 2011].
17. Despite the fact that no direct influence has been shown so far, Pieri’s approach
has proved to be extraordinarily fruitful. In particular, Johannes Hjelmslev’s
approach, continued by Arnold Schmidt, and finally by Friedrich Bachmann, created
an axiomatization of absolute geometry based entirely on “motions”, see [Pambuccian,
Struve et al. 2017], [Marchisotto, Rodríguez-Consuegra et al. 2020, § 7.5].
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Thus, Pieri saw the integration of abstract and transformational ap-
proaches as a compelling pedagogical strategy. To further enhance its ef-
fectiveness, he appealed, albeit not explicitly, to fusionism.18 Riccardo de
Paolis had proposed this method, which treats plane and solid geometry
simultaneously, to improve its teaching. He noted, “[...] there exist many
analogies between certain figures of the plane and certain figures of space” for
which reason “in studying them separately we lose the knowledge of everything
these analogies teach us and voluntarily fall into useless repetition” [De Paolis
1884, Appendix 2].
Cremona had suggested that stereo-metric considerations often suggest a
way to simplify complicated proofs in plane geometry and make them more
intuitive.19 He recommended alternating theorems of plane and solid geometry
in the high school teaching of projective geometry to sharpen the intellect of
students and help them develop “geometric imagination” [Cremona 1873, xi].
Yet traditions in teaching and other methodological commitments (related to
“purity of methods”) impeded the adoption of such strategies for Euclidean
geometry [Arana & Mancosu 2012, 303].
Pieri, however, was not dissuaded. Fusion served his didactic objectives.
It helped him show, among other things, that a geometric property does not
exist in isolation. Pieri believed that when a property
appears at the same time in several hypotheses and in different
propositions, [...] it comes to connect with other properties: then
only the logical process of deduction is sufficient to recognize
in these other properties the existence of new bonds and new
connections. [Pieri 1906, 42(1980, 408)]
For example, in [Pieri 1900a, § 3P20, 197-98(1980, 207-08)], Pieri demonstrated
how one property can be used to define the reflection point B of a point A
across a line r or across a plane Π: that the point for which the midpoint of A
and B is the foot of the perpendicular from A to Π. It was Pieri’s practice to
append to his formal definitions, comments intended to clarify their meaning.
Such observations here appended to P20 demonstrate the confluence of his
transformational and fusionistic approaches,
To say that points A and B are symmetric to each other with
respect to a line r or with respect to a plane Π will be like asserting
that these points are both on a line that meets r or Π orthogonally
at the midpoint of AB.
By means of a line or a plane, then, there is determined a
certain representation of points by points (of space into itself),
18. See [Arana & Mancosu 2012] for a discussion that includes an exposition of
historical, methodological and foundational aspects of fusionism.
19. When he was in Rome, Cremona studied with De Paolis. After reading [Pasch
1882], he sent to its author a copy of [De Paolis 1880-1881] on the foundations of
projective geometry, see [Millán Gasca 2017].
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such that each point A of r or of Π is associated with the same
point B.
This transformation or geometric correspondence is to be
called axial symmetry with respect to r in the one case, and planar
symmetry with respect to Π in the other.
Pieri next focused attention on the abstract deductive scheme by advocating
the consultation of previous propositions (§ 1P11, § 1P20 and § 3P1) for an
understanding of why a planar symmetry cannot be a direct motion (all
the points of a certain plane Π are fixed there, but not all the points that
exist). He then showed that any arbitrary axial symmetry is a direct motion,
which exists by virtue of § 3P20. Pieri proved that given three noncollinear
points, any motion that fixes two of them and transforms the third into its
symmetric point with respect to the line joining those two points will also have
to change any other point into its symmetric point with respect to that line.
His proof of this statement (summarized here) illustrates the level of detail in
his exposition, constructed to reveal precisely how deduction logically proceeds
from definitions and previously proven propositions:
Given noncollinear points A, B, C, let µ be a motion that fixes A
and B and transforms C into its symmetric point with respect
to AB. By § 1P5, § 1P20, § 1P22, § 1P24, § 2P17, etc., µ2 is a
motion that fixes A, B, and C, hence by § 1P11 leaves every
point invariant. Therefore, if µ(Z) = Z′, the points Z and Z′
are permuted with each other by µ. Thus, by § 2P5-P7, etc., their
midpoint X is fixed and thus will have to lie on AB, since µ,
by hypothesis, is a (non-identity) motion. It follows by § 2P19,
§ 2P27, etc., that either Z = Z′ = X, or XZ is perpendicular
to AB. Thus in each case, Z′ is the point symmetric to Z with
respect to AB, and µ is none other than the rotation of the plane
ABC onto itself about A and B as hinges (see § 2P11), etc. [Pieri
1900a, § 3P21, 198(1980, 208)]
We have provided these few examples to convey the essence of Pieri’s
proposals for reforming the teaching of Euclidean geometry and to illustrate
how his views on intuition informed them. We next address how Pieri’s ideas
were interpreted by several of his contemporaries.
5 A chorus of voices: the reception of
Pieri’s pedagogical views
Pieri made his proposals for reform at a time when there was considerable
support for the idea that research in foundations could help transform peda-
gogy. Those who endorsed building on the connections between foundations of
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mathematics and its teaching debated about the paths to do so, the underlying
epistemological ideas, the rudiments of student understanding, and more—
producing a chorus of voices, interpretations, and projects. We show how
Pieri was represented in three influential publications in the early decades of
the 20th century that served as forums for this chorus.
We begin with the prestigious Encyklopädie der mathematischen
Wissenschaften20 [Meyer & Mohrmann 1907-1934], and the article, entitled
“Prinzipien der Geometrie” written by Federigo Enriques [Enriques 1907]. In
his reference to [Pieri 1900a, 173], where Pieri had described what he meant
by hypothetical-deductive system, Enriques observed that “M. Pieri defined
‘segment’ using the concepts ‘point’ and ‘motion’ ” and, to that end, “had
developed a system of postulates”. He continued,
It should be noted that so far Pieri alone has formulated in a
complete way the postulates. However, these postulates, mainly
due to the fact that the primitive concepts of order (i.e., the
attributes of the straight line regarding only its being a line)
were deleted, come in an extremely complicated form and lose
all clarity and intuitive certainty ([sic] anschauliche Gewißheit);
however Pieri attaches no importance to this feature. [Enriques
1907, citation from 1907-1910 § 6, 33]
Enriques’ assertion that Pieri “attaches no importance” to the “intuitive
certainty” of his postulates is a misrepresentation. Indeed a year before
Enrique’s article appeared, in an address for the inauguration of academic
year at the University of Catania, Pieri explicitly warned against denying the
role of “ingenious intuition”, in the logical process [Pieri 1906, 79–80(1980,
445–446)].
In his revision for the 1911 French edition of the encyclopedia, Enriques
focused his comments about Pieri’s postulates more directly on the notion of
“evidence”, saying:
It should be noted that so far M. Pieri alone has formulated in
a complete way, the postulates of which he makes use. It should
be added, however, that these postulates come in an extremely
complicated form and lose all obviousness ([sic] tout caractère
d’évidence) relative to the intuition we have of them. This is
mainly due to the fact that the primitive concepts of order (that
is to say, the attributes of the line as a line) were removed by
M. Pieri. Besides, M. Pieri attaches no importance to the greater
20. The first volume of the first edition of this German encyclopedia appeared in
1899. The original project, initiated by Klein, Heinrich Weber and Franz Meyer,
sought to compile and present a comprehensive review of the science of mathematics
and its allied fields. It was considered a monumental and ambitious task which
aroused great interest among contemporary mathematicians [Ore 1942, 653].
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or lesser evidence of his premises. [Enriques 1911-1915, citation
from 1911, § 12, 33]
It is likely that Enriques’ italicized reference to “evidence” spoke to his
belief that the postulates of geometry are just rigorous forms of the intuitive
concept of physical space, and his recognition that this was a belief to which
Pieri did not subscribe. However, saying that Pieri attached “no importance”
to the evidence of his premises is an inaccurate characterization. Although
he believed that the source of primitive ideas and postulates resides “in the
domain of abstractions”, Pieri also stressed that they “must find an image [...]
exact and in accordance, if not perfect agreement, with every sort of objects
and phenomena to which one would apply the system in whole or in part”
[Pieri 1901, 379(1980, 247)].
Amaldi was more accurate in conveying Pieri’s stance on intuition. Amaldi
had collaborated with Enriques on a noted anthology [Enriques 1900] that
had been compiled as a resource for making changes in higher mathematics
teaching for the preparation of secondary school teachers.21 While he did
not cite Pieri in his essay for the first edition, “Sui concetti di retta e di
piano” [Amaldi 1900, 33–64], he did reference [Pieri 1898, 1900a, 1908] in the
expanded version of that essay for the second edition [Amaldi 1912-1914, 37–
91]. Unlike Enriques, Amaldi understood and reported that Pieri made no
appeal to intuition in formulating his postulates:
Starting from the formal point of view of reducing the number of
primitive ideas [...] leaving aside any other need for the postulates
with respect to intuition, [...] first analyzing the principles of
projective geometry and then those of elementary geometry, he
showed that all geometry can be built with only two primitive
ideas, those of point and distance. [Amaldi 1912-1914, 79]
Thus, Amaldi recognized the fact that Pieri excluded the consideration of
intuition in composing his primitives (and the postulates that define them).
However, Amaldi neglected to convey Pieri’s views, from both foundational
and pedagogical perspectives, on the role of intuition in interpreting them.
Therefore, Amaldi had told only part of the story. Pieri had emphasized,
Learning geometric facts is greatly helped by always having at the
onset an image or intuitive representation of a “point” and of the
“sphere through one point centered at another”: that is, the habit
of contemplating the real and concrete sense that usage provides
for statements such as “A, B, C are points, and C is as distant
from A as B is”. [Pieri 1908, 447(1980, 557)]
21. The spirit that led to the publication of the first edition was pervasive in Italy
and beyond. For example, Julio Rey Pastor, who believed Enriques was among those
mainly responsible for the influx of foundational research in secondary education,
brought this same spirit to Spain and Latin America, after spending time in Italy in
1914, see [Millán Gasca 1990], [Giacardi 2012].
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Pieri’s words here call to mind those of a fellow member of the Peano
School, Giovanni Vailati, who characterized [Pieri 1908] as a “step forward” in
treating the subject from “the most general possible viewpoint—compatible
with the concrete material to which it refers” [Arrighi 1997, letter 126,
June 25, 1908]. Amaldi appeared to agree, observing that [Pieri 1908]
provided “a complete analysis of the foundations of Euclidean geometry”, and
using the words “perspiciacious” and “simple” to characterize Pieri’s system
[Amaldi 1912-1914, 79]. Unfortunately, Amaldi’s comments were removed
in later editions of the anthology, while Enriques’ mischaracterizations
continued to be widely circulated for decades in the many editions and
translations of the encyclopedia.
Enriques and Amaldi were prolific in the area of pedagogical research,
authoring textbooks and publications devoted to teaching and the training of
teachers. Theirs were strong voices in the chorus, seeking to promote insights
drawn from recent foundational, logical, psychological and historical research
to improve the teaching of elementary geometry, while remaining faithful to
Euclid. There is little reason to believe that their characterizations of Pieri
would have motivated those seeking improvements in pedagogy in the early
decades of the 20th century to examine Pieri’s work. In the United States, a
widely circulated didactic publication may have done a similar disservice to
Pieri, in the context of its reporting on the research of the Peano School.
In [Cajori 1910], Florian Cajori, a Swiss-American historian and mathe-
matician published a survey of worldwide pedagogical practices. Drawing from
Klein, who used the word “radical” in his references to the Peano School [Klein
1909, citation from 2016, 262], Cajori reported,
A very remarkable school came into being in Italy, the purpose
of which is to render geometry still more rigorous than in the
Euclidean text. [...] the great school of Peano, which endeavors
to eliminate all intuition [...] has influenced even elementary
instruction and the teaching in technical schools. This recent
Italian emphasis upon extreme rigor has led to deplorable results
with the less gifted pupils, and a reaction appears to be setting
in. [Cajori 1910, 192]
The charge of endeavoring to “eliminate all intuition” is certainly not one that
applies to Pieri, nor, in fact, to others in the Peano School, see [Luciano 2012b].
Cajori’s survey was reprinted in a 1912 Report issued by a Committee
that had been formed under the joint auspices of the National Education
Association and the American Federation of Teachers of the Mathematical and
Natural Sciences.22 Cajori’s negative characterization of the Peano School thus
22. This “National Committee of Fifteen on Geometry Syllabus” was composed
of representatives from universities and secondary schools. Although it had not
completed its work in 1910, this committee advocated the early publication of Cajori’s
article, noting: “this historical setting prepared by Professor Cajori should be in the
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had the potential to dissuade many from considering the pedagogical proposals
of its members.
6 Pieri, in conversation with Klein
Klein was a significant influence for the works we cited in section 5. He
was very much a hero to Pieri although their relationship was complex, see
[Marchisotto, Rodríguez-Consuegra et al. 2020, § 10]. In this section, we
reference an 1897 exchange of letters between Klein and Pieri. The words
of the two mathematicians are particularly pertinent to our discussion about
Pieri’s pedagogy.
David E. Rowe observed that “Klein, like Poincaré, saw the burgeoning
interest in abstract structures and axiomatics around the turn of the century
as a potential threat to the lifeblood of mathematics”, but that being said,
one “would be mistaken to think that Klein had no appreciation for axiomatic
thinking” [Rowe 1989, 198]. A letter of March 31, 1897 reveals that Klein
had engaged with Pieri in a discussion of axiomatics and intuition, relative to
teaching [Arrighi 1997, Letter 65].
Referring to the “purely deductive mode of representation”, which he
acknowledged “to be scientifically very important”, Klein had asked Pieri
“what significance is to be given to this in teaching beginners”. Klein advised,
“in teaching it is necessary to begin with intuition (in order then to gradually
ascend to more abstract views)”. In his April 9, 1897 response to Klein,
Pieri wrote,
To answer your question about the influence that these purely
deductive research can have over the elementary teaching of
mathematics (where intuition must have a most essential part)
I will tell you that, in my opinion, many improvements in the
strictly deductive sense, [...] would perhaps help to make these
doctrines easier to understand than they are at present: since
the greater abstraction would be compensated by the greater
simplicity of the fundamental concepts. [Klein papers, Staats-
und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen, 22F, 97–99]
In this exchange, we see once again that Pieri fully acknowledged the
importance of intuition in the elementary teaching of mathematics. We also
see, in the presence of this acknowledgement, Pieri’s rationale for advocating
an abstract approach.
Still Pieri could find no place for his pedagogical strategies, even among
those like J.W. Young who admired his foundational works, see [Marchisotto &
hands of mathematical teachers at once”. The survey was reprinted in their Final
Report, published in 1912 in [National Committee of Fifteen on Geometry Syllabus
1912].
M. Pieri’s View... 175
Smith 2007, 135, 142–43]. In [Young 1911, 164], Young indicated he could not
recommend Pieri’s assumptions for use in the school because “the subject must
be presented to a boy of fourteen years in a different way from that employed
in presenting it to a mature mind [...]”, it being “necessary, in the beginning,
to make continued and insistent appeal to concrete geometric intuition”. This
was precisely Klein’s view. But it does not contradict what Pieri himself
suggested. For the teaching of geometry, Pieri wrote,
[...] it will never be superfluous to appeal [...] to [...] empirical
methods to emphasize and bring alive for the young all sorts of
intuitive and experimental cognitions of various geometric objects.
[Pieri 1908, 447, Note 2(1980, 557)]
Young had advocated starting with an informal treatment of geometry so
that “the pupil could be led to see the advantages of the more formal methods
that follow” [Young 1911, 163–164]. In our view, it is not clear why that formal
treatment could not be along the lines of that proposed by Pieri. Indeed, Louis
Couturat called [Pieri 1900a] “the most profound analysis of the principles of
geometry” [Couturat 1905, 193].
7 Concluding remarks
Gino Loria, Pieri’s colleague at the University of Turin, applauded Pieri’s
efforts to improve pedagogy. He called [Pieri 1900a] “a notable result, not just
because of its simplicity and originality, but also because it seems directed
toward those schools which would banish motion from pure geometry”. Loria
added, “The future will decide whether Pieri’s ideas can lead to a useful reform
of elementary instruction. What is without question, however, is that they
deserve the attention of scholars and teachers” [Loria 1899, 426].
That did not happen. Pieri’s proposals remained largely hidden from
view. Enriques’ publications with Amaldi, like those of Klein, which inspired
them, had a great impact on pedagogical reform in the early decades of the
20th century. Cajori’s historical survey of pedagogical practices enjoyed wide
circulation. Pieri’s ideas were absent or misstated in them. Sadly, the lack
of dissemination and misrepresentation of Pieri’s ideas are also evident in
examining Peano’s publication, the Formulario, see [Luciano 2017].
Pieri’s pedagogical proposals did not garner attention in the transnational
reform efforts of his era. For scholars and teachers of this era, we have
endeavored to shed light on Pieri’s ideas about how to integrate two types of
intuition, denoted as sensible and rational, in efforts to improve the teaching
of the geometry of Euclid. We have also wanted to reveal how certain
representations of Pieri’s ideas in the decade prior to his early death at age 52
in 1913, may have contributed to the obfuscation of what he truly proposed
for such reform.
176 Elena Anne Corie Marchisotto & Ana Millán Gasca
It is our hope that we have provided reasons why Pieri’s ideas should
have been heard in that chorus of voices, interpretations, and proposals being
discussed at the turn to the 20th century. We trust we have also conveyed
why today’s mathematicians and mathematics educators would benefit from
hearing his voice.
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University of Helsinki (Finland)
Résumé : Pour préparer son article sur la logique mathématique de Russell
(1944), Gödel a lu attentivement les Arithmetices Principia de Peano. Les six
pages résumant l’œuvre péanienne qu’il a écrites en employant la sténographie
de Gabelsberger contiennent une analyse remarquable de la structure formelle
des preuves de Peano, en contradiction manifeste avec l’opinion commune selon
laquelle le traité de Peano ne contiendrait aucun mécanisme déductif formel.
Abstract: In preparation for his article on Russell’s mathematical logic
(1944), Gödel read carefully Peano’s Arithmetices Principia. His six pages
of summary in the Gabelsberger shorthand contain a remarkable analysis of
the formal structure of Peano’s proofs which is diametrically opposed to the
common view that Peano’s treatise contained no formal deductive machinery.
1 Introduction
In early 1943, Gödel left behind an incredibly intensive period of formal work,
the main aims of which had been to prove the independence of the axiom
of choice and of the continuum hypothesis in set theory on the one hand,
the consistency of analysis on the other, with possibly the cardinality of the
continuum decided—his conjecture was that it is ℵ2. All of this can be seen
through a study of his 16 mathematical Arbeitshefte: Heft 4 was begun after
he had arrived to Princeton for good in late March 1940, Heft 15, eleven
notebooks later, has at page 57 the date 14.X.42, and Heft 16 is the last one,
with notes for his planned article “Russell’s mathematical logic” [Gödel 1944]
from page 9 on. Most notebooks run toward a hundred pages in length.
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There is a notebook of Gödel’s from the early 1930s, called the Altes
Excerptenheft, that contains summaries of his reading of works for the writing
of his part of the planned joint book with Arend Heyting, the Mathematische
Grundlagenforschung [Heyting 1934]. He was unable to finish in time, mainly
because of his incredible meticulousness, but his texts for two chapters for the
book have survived [cf. von Plato 2021a].
From page 95 on, the Heft of excerpts for the book is written in a different
style, and it even mentions the planned Russell article by which this part is
from the early 1940s. The summaries are mainly about the work of Russell
and Frege. Peano is not among the sources covered, and even the earlier parts
of the Heft contain just the Formulaire project of Peano [Peano 1895], and
readings from Peano’s journal Rivista di Matematica. There are no signs that
he would have studied the Arithmetices Principia directly [Peano 1889].
Gödel wanted, I believe, to be well prepared for the task of writing the
article on Russell’s logic, and to take a deep look at the work of Peano who so
much influenced Russell, he ordered a copy of the Arithmetices Principia from
a library in Chicago in early 1943. There is a summary of his reading of Peano,
with a beautiful first page in which he tried to reproduce the appearance of
the title page of Peano’s little treatise. His six-page summary is among a
large collection of excerpts written on loose papers at different times, some
clearly from the 1930s, others later, in reel 36 of the Gödel microfilm collection,
frames 416–421, document number 050135.
One sorry little corner in the historiography of logic and foundations
concerns Peano’s formalization of the rules of logical inference. In Jean van
Heijenoort’s widely studied From Frege to Gödel [van Heijenoort 1967], the
claim is that there is “a grave defect. The formulas are simply listed, not
derived; and they could not be derived, because no rules of inference are
given [...] he does not have any rule that would play the role of the rule of
detachment” [van Heijenoort 1967, 84], [cf. also von Plato 2021b, this journal].
It is an assessment that can at best be taken as a sign of total blindness.
Gödel had from early on seen that Peano has precise rules of inference that
are, however, not made explicit. His 1932 summary of Peano’s 1895 version of
the Formulaire des Mathématiques is found in one of his Excerptenhefte where
he lists Peano’s propositional axioms, then writes:
Rules: implication and substitution of equals (not formulated but
used).1
Gödel’s summary of the Arithmetices Principia leaves no space for doubt
about the formal character of proofs in Peano; this will be evident from the
text itself to follow. It is clearly at the center of his comments.
1. Found on frame 515 left part, reel 20 of the Gödel microfilm collection, written
in a mixture of German and Gabelsberger shorthand. Transcription in German is:
Regeln: Implikation und Einsetzung für gleiche (nicht formuliert aber angewendet).
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Peano’s treatise is written in Latin, a language in which Gödel was a great
expert. The text that follows maintains the Latin, but I have transcribed
and translated into English Gödel’s German remarks that are written in
the Gabelsberger shorthand. Peano’s treatise is readily available online; the
translation in [van Heijenoort 1967] can be of help with the Latin passages.
Gödel’s summary turns into a detailed commentary on Peano’s system of
proof in the middle of his page 5.







in R. Academia militari professore





Via del Corso, 216–217 Via Cerretani, 8
1889
This is an exact transcription of the title page of the book that I had borrowed
from the University of Chicago, 18. Jan – 4 Feb. 1943, number: QA 142.P35
2.
Sign. Tabula p. VI
Praefatio P III – V bad Latin: Hic difficultas,
arithmeticae applicationes [instead of ad] processus -i
2. Kurt Gödel Papers, Box 10a, Folder 39, item accessions 050135, on deposit
with the Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections,
Princeton University Library. Used with permission of Institute for Advanced Study.
Unpublished Copyright Institute for Advanced Study. All rights reserved.
3. JDesign of a circular stamp of the publishing house.K
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caput scripti = the main thing, namely the precise formalization, beyond that,
some theorems formulated unclearly
Citations: Boole Camb. & Dublin Math J. 1848
Pierce Americ. J. III 15
VII 180
Mc Coll Proc. Lond. Math. IX 9 X 16 1878
Schröder Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra 1873,
Der Operationskreis des Logikkalküls 1877
Jevons Princ. of Sci. 1883
Logicae notationes p. VI –XVI
1. Signum ⊃ significat “deducitur”
⊂ est consequentia
2. Defined in general: −aRb the same as a−Rb
in particular, a−=x
Vmeans: there exists a
Similarly aR∪Sb =Df aRb ∨ aSb,
for example <∪= aRSb =Df aRb . aSb
For example, a ⊃ −= b means a ⊃ b .−(a = b)
3.
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3. classis sive entium aggregatio
a ⊃ b means a is a part of b
4. Classes with one element are identified with individuals, i.e.:
If k ⊆ s, then:
k ε s ≡ k is a unit class ≡ (x, y)(x, y ε k ⊃ x = y . k 6= V)
5. [x ε ]a means: solutiones vel radices conditionis a
Similarly [(x, y) ε ]a = the class of pairs (x, y). The pair appears
as a basic concept.
6. εRx means R
”
x ε= qui (quae)
In particular, ε< y εDx, the divisor of x
It follows that x ε εαy (the same denoted by [ ε <]y and then
generally).4
Especially also: εε α = α
7. (x′, y′ . . . )[x, y . . . ]α =Df Subst(αx y...x′y′...)
8. ϕεF
’
s. ϕ is a function over s (that is denoted by putting it
ahead).5
Therefore a+ . ε . F
’
N,+a . ε .N
’
F 6
9. [ϕ] denotes the inverse. In case of ambiguity, the class is associated)
Square brackets in the above usage mean an inversion, namely
1. [x ε](x ε a) = a, x ε ([x ε]α) = α
4.
2. Let α be a formula that contains the letter x and ϕ the sign for the
function thus defined. Then we have α = ϕx, therefore ϕ = α[x]
and ϕx′ = α[x]x′. Analogously for α = xϕ
4. That is probably an error in printing and should be: [ ε ]< x.
5. That the function F is defined for x, is written as F (x) = F (x).
6. JThe second comma should be inverted as in Peano, p. XIII.K
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3. From dF (x) = f(x)dx follows symbolically F (x) = [d]f(x)dx
therefore F (x) =
∫
f(x)dx
10. Functions applied on classes are defined in the known way.
11. The powers of a “functionis postsignum” ϕ are written as follows: ϕn
Therefore, if + means the operation +1, then a + b means automatically
the correct one.
Arithmetices Principia p. 1–20
There are nine axioms, namely five axioms of equality, reflexivity, symmetry,
transitivity, invariance for N and for +, and further 1 εN,N+1 ⊆ N, x+1 6= 1
for x εN , complete induction, but the last axiom of equality contains
a+ 1 = b+ 1 . = . a = b
Example of a theorem:4 εD(a, b) = εDM εD(a, b), i.e., the divisors of a and
b are the same as the divisors of the Max of the divisors of a and b.
5.
§ 1 On numbers and addition
§ 2 Subtraction
§ 3 Maxima and minima (of sets of numbers) M,W in relation to sets
§ 4 Multiplication
§ 5 Powers
§ 6 Division, xDy = x is a divisor of y, analogously y Dx
§ 7 Various number-theoretic theorems without proof. xπy (relatively prime)
§ 8 Rational numbers (here also p1 =Df p)
§ 9 Irrational numbers (as “upper limit of arbitrary sets of rational numbers”)
Add & Mult defined
§ 10 Sets of real numbers, especially treated are the operations, inside, outside,
limit and different relations between these. Remark: Everywhere, only positive
numbers are defined.
Abbreviation of proofs: No distinction is made between “because” and “and,”
i.e., the theorems cited are always written as conjunctions of conditions. Each
proof has the form (in which the theorems cited are left out):
4. JPeano’s theorem 36, p. 11.K
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P :⊃ . Q . ⊃ . R . ⊃ . S . ⊃ . T etc . ⊃ . Y
and the theorem proved reads then P :⊃ . Q ⊃ Y.5 P and Q, are, then
arbitrary, and all of the previous theorems hold as conditions from R on [so
they can be used in the proof]. There stand next to the P,Q,R the theorems
cited in a conjunction [or obtained through substitution
6.
of their specializations] that are required for the derivation of the next
theorem.6
Direct use is very often made of the substitution of equals for equals [on the
basis of preceding theorems], in particular also λ-conversion, the distributivity
of x ε , etc. Theses, hypotheses, numbers of preceding theorems (possibly with
the indication of some substitution) are taken to be simply abbreviations for
the formulas in question [these can also contain free variables]. A proof is,
then, a chain of trivial implications that are constituted so that:
1·) There occur in the conditions for the proof a set of theorems earlier proved
that can be simply put aside.
2·) Then all the members can be put aside so that only the first (or the first
two) and the last remain. [Bound variables are often denoted the same as free
ones, x ε [x3].
The implications proved one after the other are simply the initial part of the
entire chain, where the preceding implications separate more strongly than
those that follow. This resembles much more the logic of assumptions than
Russell.
A definition is, after Peano, a proposition of the form V ⊃ . x = a in which x
is a sign (or a combination of signs) for which no meaning had been given so
far and a one for which a meaning had been already given.




This article has been written within the GODELIANA project led by Jan von
Plato in Helsinki, Finland and funded by the European Research Council under
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant
agreement No 787758). I thank project member Tim Lethen for invaluable help
with the shorthand and Latin passages.
5. P,Q can also be absent in theorems without or with a condition.
6. I.e., one obtains through a reference to this condition plain trivial implications,
and one can strike over afterwards in the conditions that which has already been
proved.
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